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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This PhD thesis has two core objectives:  
1) To critically analyse and compare the legal provisions relating to capacity 
assessment in England and Wales, Scotland and India 
2) To critically analyse and compare the legal provisions relating to decision-making 
on behalf of the incapable patient in England and Wales, Scotland and India.  
The methodology utilised to achieve these objectives is essentially a classic literature 
based comparative approach. This thesis provides an original contribution to 
knowledge by virtue of the fact that an in-depth tripartite comparative study of 
capacity law provisions in England and Wales, Scotland and India has yet to be 
undertaken within existing literature. The research undertaken in this thesis is timely 
given the implementation of capacity legislation in England and Wales and the 
relevant provisions of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 of England and Wales and the 
Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 are compared and critiqued as part of a 
discussion of the key ethical, legal and procedural concepts which underpin the law of 
capacity. In addition, the capacity law of England and Scotland is compared with the 
equivalent system in Indian law, which is at a nascent stage of development in 
comparison to the United Kingdom. The fact that India, despite being an Eastern 
country, also retains the influence of U.K law through its status as a Commonwealth 
country, means that the differences between the English, Scottish and Indian 
approaches to capacity can be attributed to issues of culture or development. The 
research undertaken for this thesis has shown that developmental issues are of greater 
impact, and while cultural issues are of some relevance, there are enough underlying 
commonalities between the three jurisdictions to suggest that India’s capacity law is at 
a different point developmentally speaking.  
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INTRODUCTION TO THIS THESIS 
 
OBJECTIVES AND VIABILITY OF RESEARCH 
 
The research which has been undertaken in this PhD thesis has two core objectives: 
1) To critically analyse and compare the legal provisions relating to capacity 
assessment in England and Wales, Scotland and India.  
2) To critically analyse and compare the legal provisions relating to decision-
making on behalf of the incapable patient in England and Wales1, Scotland 
and India.  
 
The right of the individual to make their own decisions regarding medical treatment is 
a cornerstone principle in healthcare law. Significant developments have taken place 
in the law of capacity during the last twenty years confirming that the capacity to 
make treatment decisions is present unless this presumption can be rebutted. 
Following on from this, the law also recognises that for some, the ability to exercise 
this right to self-determination in the making of a valid decision may not be present. 
In most cases, the lack of decision-making capacity can be attributable to either 
mental disorder or impairment and it may therefore be necessary in such cases for 
decisions to be taken on behalf of the individual. Two crucial criteria can therefore be 
identified. First, it is essential that an individual’s making capacity is thoroughly 
assessed in order to confirm that decisions have to be made on their behalf. Once this 
is confirmed, guidance must be in place to govern the process which must be followed 
by the proxy decision-maker. Following developments in the common law, both 
England and Wales and Scotland now have legislation which specifically governs 
these two core criteria. In the case of England and Wales, the Mental Capacity Act 
2005 has been in force for approximately sixteen months at the time of writing, with 
the Scottish legislation, the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, having been 
in force for the last six years. Given the relatively recent implementation of both U.K 
legislations, an exhaustive comparative analysis has yet to be undertaken. This thesis 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that for the remainder of this thesis, any reference made to the law of ‘England and 
Wales’ will be abbreviated to refer to the law of ‘England’. This is for the sake of brevity and narrative 
flow.  
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will engage in this analysis, examining the reasons why both jurisdictions deemed it 
important to introduce legislation to govern the law of capacity. Rather than remain a 
bipartite comparative study however, this thesis will undertake a tripartite study which 
includes an analysis of the law of capacity in India. It is this tripartite analysis which 
forms the basis of the original contribution to knowledge that is necessary in doctoral 
research.  
 
This thesis will provide an original contribution to knowledge in a number of ways, 
which are outlined below.  
 
1) In-depth comparative analysis of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the Adults 
with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 has not yet been undertaken within 
existing literature. This thesis will analyse the common law developments of 
the law of capacity as well as the consultation process which led to the 
implementation of the English and Scottish capacity legislations. The relevant 
provisions of both legislations will also be compared and critiqued in detail. In 
addition, a number of key substantive and legal concepts will be identified and 
discussed. These concepts will form a comprehensive set of benchmarks 
against which the capacity law of England, Scotland and India will be 
measured and critiqued. 
 
2) Academic analysis of the law of capacity in India is extremely limited. This 
thesis will critically examine the ways in which issues relating to capacity 
assessment and decision-making for the incapable adult are approached in 
Indian law and these will be compared and critiqued in a tripartite comparison 
with the English and Scottish law. India’s status as an Eastern country raises 
the possibility of cultural differences existing between India and the United 
Kingdom. However, India is also a member of the Commonwealth with a legal 
system significantly modelled on that of the United Kingdom. This thesis will 
examine the impact of both cultural and developmental issues and discuss the 
extent to which both of these inform the similarities and differences between 
England, Scotland and India. The discussion of these issues in the context of a 
tripartite comparative study between England, Scotland and India has not been 
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embarked upon previously, meaning that this thesis will provide a much 
needed original contribution to knowledge. 
 
3) As well as engage in a discussion of the substantive and legal principles which 
underpin the law of capacity, this thesis will also discuss the provision of 
procedural justice in relation to capacity law. To facilitate this discussion, a set 
of fundamental procedural principles will be detailed, again serving as 
benchmarks against which the procedural provisions outlined in English 
Scottish and Indian law can be measured and critiqued. One of these 
principles, the principle of conciliation, is detailed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, 
and further illustrates the original contribution provided by this thesis. This 
principle has been developed specifically within this thesis and is the result of 
detailed analysis of the existing literature on procedural justice.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This thesis utilises an exclusively doctrinal, literature based approach to doctoral 
research.  Useful reference point for the methodology used in this thesis is provided 
by Professor Peter De Cruz. In his book, Comparative Healthcare Law, Professor De 
Cruz compares and contrasts various aspects of healthcare law in a number of 
countries, first by focusing upon the law in England and Wales and following this up 
by covering the equivalent issues in overseas jurisdictions. Professor De Cruz 
concludes by providing an overview of themes common across the jurisdictions. This 
thesis follows a similar process. Having first set out and analysed the ethical, legal 
and procedural concepts which underpin the law on capacity, this thesis will discuss 
the relevant common law and statutory provisions of the law of capacity in England, 
Scotland and India. Finally, the concluding chapter in this thesis will highlight and 
critique the commonalities and difference in approach between the three jurisdictions. 
This approach is entirely literature based, utilising existing books, journal articles, 
case law and statutory law. It should however be noted that during research on the 
Indian law, a brief and preliminary piece of empirical research was conducted in India 
in order to ascertain whether using India as a comparator in the research was viable. 
The research took the form of a short questionnaire consisting of twelve questions. 
Each question took the form of a case scenario, the majority of which were based on 
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cases that took place in England, (although three of them were not). The intention of 
the questionnaire was to ascertain how cases such as those that were heard in England 
would be dealt with in India. Respondents were asked to consider each case in turn in 
relation to the following issues:  
- Firstly, was the respondent aware of any laws or rules that had to be followed when 
dealing with each case? 
- Irrespective of any laws, how did the respondent think that each case would be dealt 
with in practice? 
- Finally, was the respondent aware of any religious or cultural principles that may 
impact on the way in which each case would be dealt with? 
 
This short empirical study ultimately had no significant impact upon the 
methodological approach utilised in this thesis. The results will not be included in this 
thesis due to the fact that the ineligibility of some of the returned questionnaires 
rendered some of them unusable. The merits of the empirical research was thus purely 
as a finding exercise and confirmed that India was viable as a third comparator in the 
research.  
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CHAPTER 1: SUBSTANTIVE ETHICAL PRINCIPLES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to engage in a discussion of the substantive ethical 
principles which underpin the law relating to decision-making and the incapable 
patient. The principles which will be detailed in this chapter pertain specifically to the 
incapable adult themselves, in terms of the substantive rights which will come into 
play when a decision has to be made on medical treatment. It will be seen that the 
most important of these is the principle of autonomy, which permeates much of the 
law relating to capacity, particularly in the U.K. The other concepts which will be 
discussed, namely the principles of paternalism, communitarianism and non-
discrimination, are all applicable at certain stages of the decision-making process 
depending on the capacity of the individual and the circumstances in which the 
decision is to be made. Before discussing these principles however, this chapter will 
engage in a brief discussion of two ethical concepts which relate to the obligations of 
the doctor to his/her patients, the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence.  
 
The principle of beneficence states that a doctor is under a positive duty to good on 
behalf of their patients. The principle does not merely refer to the act of feeling pity or 
sympathy for the patient. It extends beyond that to require acting in furtherance of 
others’ well-being. Raanan Gillon explains: 
“… it is undoubtedly true that members of the medical profession undertake 
to place the interests of their patients before their own in many 
circumstances… The source of this additional moral obligation of beneficence 
taken on by doctors is presumably a certain feeling of benevolence… there 
cannot be many who do not at least start off their medical careers with a 
large measure of sympathy for people afflicted by illness and a desire to 
commit their working lives to helping them”2 
 
The duty to act in furtherance of the patient’s well-being falls into the category of 
specific beneficence. Specific beneficence refers to positive acts directed at those with 
                                                 
2 Gillon, R (1986) Philosophical Medical Ethics; Wiley Medical Publications Chichester at 73-74. 
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whom a proximity of relationship exists3, be this friends, children, parents or patients. 
This can be contrasted with general beneficence, which refers to positive acts directed 
to those with whom no proximity of relationship exists, i.e. helping a passer-by in the 
street.  
 
The obligation of the doctor to act beneficently towards his patient relates strongly to 
the obligation of the doctor to respect the patient’s autonomy. If a doctor is faced with 
a situation where a patient is refusing life-saving treatment, does this mean that the 
doctor is obliged to do whatever is necessary to get the patient to have the treatment in 
order to preserve his life? Given that the primary purpose of the medical profession is 
to preserve health and life, one might be forgiven for thinking that the answer would 
be yes. In reality however, the duty to act beneficently is arguably as much about 
respecting the decision of the patient as much as it is about administering treatment. 
Gillon argues that a doctor is failing to act beneficently if he/she fails to respect a 
patient’s decision regarding treatment, even if, in the eyes of the doctor, it is the 
‘wrong’ decision: 
“In most cases… of a doctor’s dealings with patients, not only is there an 
independent moral presumption that he must respect their autonomy, but, 
even if he is interested only in doing them good, he must generally respect 
their autonomy in order to do so.”4 
 
If the obligations of the doctor are thought of entirely in terms of administering 
treatment to patients who are suffering with a serious, non-serious or life threatening 
illness, then the principle of beneficence may be seen to conflict with the need to 
respect a patient’s decision to refuse treatment; if acting beneficently entails acting 
positively in furtherance of the patient’s well-being, then adhering to a patient’s 
                                                 
3 see the American case of McFall v Shimp [1978] 127 Pitts Leg J 14, which concerned the defendant’s 
refusal to donate bone marrow to his cousin, with the plaintiff arguing that his cousin was under a 
moral duty to donate and should thus be compelled to. The plaintiff lost the case and the court held that 
there was no legal obligation to act beneficently even to someone with whom proximity of relationship 
exists. However, the court also stated that from an ethical perspective, the refusal of the defendant to 
donate his bone marrow was hard to defend. The case thus illustrates the moral duty of an individual to 
act beneficently towards those with whom proximity of relationship is present. 
4 Gillon, R (1986) Philosophical Medical Ethics; Wiley Medical Publications Chichester at 75. See 
also, Doyal, L and Sheather, J (2005) Mental Health Legislation Should Respect Decision-Making 
Capacity; British Medical Journal; Vol.331; 1467-1469 at 1467, where the authors state that “it is both 
legally and professionally unacceptable for doctors to force treatment on competent patients 
because they think it is in their best interests.” 
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refusal could be deemed to violate the principle of beneficence. Not so according to 
Gillon, who submits that it is possible to harmonise the principles of beneficence and 
respect for patient autonomy by the doctor simply ascertaining what the patient wants, 
as opposed to assuming what this may be. In doing so, Gillon asserts that the patient 
“is more likely to do what the doctor considers to be medically optimal if the 
doctor explains why the patient’s own preference is less likely to be beneficial.”5 
Ascertaining the wishes and feelings of the individual has now become one of the 
important duties of the doctor under both the Mental Capacity Act 20056 and the 
Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 20007. However, ascertaining the wishes and 
feelings of the patient will not always be the same as acceding to patient demands on 
every occasion. Respecting a patient’s refusal of treatment will satisfy the principle of 
beneficence provided that the patient has the capacity to make the decision. If 
capacity is present, the patient’s wishes must be respected and having this wish 
overridden by the doctor on the basis that he/she feels it to be the wrong decision fails 
to respect the principle of autonomy, and thus fails the principle of beneficence when 
the principle is interpreted in a wider sense to go beyond mere physical well-being.  
 
In addition to the duty to act positively in furtherance of the patient’s well-being, the 
doctor also has a duty not to commit harm to the patient. This obligation is referred to 
as the principle of nonmaleficence, and should be considered in tandem with the 
principle of beneficence. Rather than involve an obligation to act positively, 
nonmaleficence involves an obligation not to act negatively. The Hippocratic Oath 
puts both principles side by side: “I will prescribe regimen for the good of my 
patients according to my ability and my judgment, and never do harm to 
anyone.” In this way, it could be argued that both beneficence and nonmaleficence 
have been combined into a single moral obligation; safeguarding the welfare of 
patients ultimately entails both acting positively and not doing harm to the patient. 
Raanan Gillon however, argues that prioritising nonmaleficence over beneficence is 
implausible; the former simply has a greater area of applicability than the latter: 
“While it seems entirely plausible to claim that we owe nonmaleficence, but 
not beneficence, to everybody, it does not follow from this that avoidance of 
                                                 
5 Ibid.  
6 s.4(6). 
7 s.1(4). 
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doing harm takes priority over beneficence. All that follows is that the scope 
of nonmaleficence is general, encompassing all other people, whereas the 
scope of beneficence is more specific, applying only to some people. Thus we 
can accept that each of us… has a moral duty not to harm anybody else 
without being committed to believing that this prima facie duty must always 
take priority if it conflicts with any duty…”8 
 
In the above quote, Gillon states that the duty of nonmaleficence takes priority over 
other duties vis a vis the patient. It is submitted that in the context of treating the 
patient, both beneficence and nonmaleficence are in essence two sides of the same 
argument. If a patient has full capacity to refuse any proposed treatment, a doctor is 
furthering the patient’s interests by respecting this decision. By the same token, it can 
be argued that overriding the wishes of a capable patient is actually causing harm to 
the patient; although the patient may ostensibly recover physically, the fact that their 
express wishes were ignored will be of little emotional benefit to the patient9. Gillon 
states that the people’s perceptions of harm are idiosyncratic, and are integral to the 
way that the individual lives their life10. In the English case of Re C (Adult: Refusal of 
Medical Treatment)11, a sufferer of paranoid schizophrenia required an amputation of 
a gangrenous leg, or risk a high probability of death. C was found to have had the 
requisite capacity to refuse the treatment despite his illness, and this decision was thus 
respected. On a simplistic level, it could be argued that overriding the patient’s will 
and performing the operation would have been a beneficent act which would also 
have prevented a great harm i.e. the potential death of the patient. However, in the 
light of the importance of the principle of autonomy (which will be discussed later in 
this chapter), the concept of harm, as Gillon stated, should not be considered merely 
in terms of treatment and cure, but rather, in terms of respect for the patient. Failure to 
respect a patient’s wishes, provided that they have the capacity to make that decision, 
is arguably to cause harm to the patient. Similarly, a doctor deciding to accept the 
                                                 
8 Gillon, R (1986) Philosophical Medical Ethics; Wiley Medical Publications Chichester at 81; see also 
Gifford, R W (1977) Primum Non Nocere; Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol 238(7), 
589-590 at 589.  
9 See O’Neill, O (2001) Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics: The Gifford Lectures; Cambridge University 
Press, at 35.  
10 Ibid at 83-84.  
11 [1994] 1 All E.R 819.  
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decision of a patient who does not have the capacity to make such a decision will not 
be acting positively for the patient, nor will he/she prevent harm to the patient12  
 
The principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence do not relate to the obligations or 
the rights of the patient but rather, to what the doctor is expected to offer the patient. 
How this is done will depend upon the capacity of the patient; if capacity is present, 
the principle of autonomy is of highest importance and the doctors obligations 
regarding beneficence and nonmaleficence will centre around respecting this right. If 
however, a patient lacks the capacity to make a treatment decision, the obligations of 
beneficence and nonmaleficence will centre round the doctor acting more 
paternalistically in the best interests of the individual, whilst also ensuring that harm 
does not come to the patient as a result of invalid treatment decisions.  
 
The substantive principles which will be discussed below underpin the law of capacity 
and, as will be seen in later chapters, form an integral part of both the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 and the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000. These 
substantive principles are given greater weight by virtue of the fact that they have 
been endorsed by both the United Nations and the Council of Europe.  
 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006 was 
devised in order to “promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of 
all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and 
to promote respect for their inherent dignity.”13 It essentially updates the 
principles laid down in the 1971 U.N Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded 
Persons and the 1975 U.N Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons. Article 3 of 
the Convention contains the following general principles: 
“(a) Respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the freedom 
to make one’s own choices, and independence of persons; 
  (b) Non-discrimination; 
(c) Full and effective participation and inclusion in society; 
                                                 
12 See Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 38 B.M.L.R 175, the facts of which will be discussed in 
Chapter 3.1 of this thesis. 
13 U.N Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006, Article 1.  
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(d) Respect for difference and acceptance of persons with disabilities as part 
of human diversity and humanity; 
(e) Equality of opportunity; 
(f) Accessibility; 
(g) Equality between men and women; 
(h) Respect for the evolving capacities of children with disabilities and 
respect for the right of children with disabilities to preserve their identities.” 
 
Of particular relevance in the above principles are the references to individual 
autonomy (principle (a)) and non-discrimination (principle (b)), both of which are 
cornerstone principles and will be discussed below.  
 
In addition to the United Nations, the Council of Europe has published a number of 
documents which provide international guidance on issues pertaining to protection of 
incapable individuals. The 1997 European Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine emphasises the primacy of the individual14 and guarantees everyone 
“without discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and 
fundamental freedoms with regard to the application of biology and medicine.”15 
In addition, Article 6 of the Convention states that any interventions in the health field 
may only be carried out for the direct benefit of the incapable individual if they are 
unable to consent to the proposed course of treatment. 
 
In 1999, the Council of Europe formulated Recommendation (99)4, which concerned 
the legal protection of incapable adults. Sjaak Jensen explains why such an 
international instrument was necessary in this area of the law: 
“The second half of the twentieth century has seen a greatly increased 
emphasis on human rights. There is a clear recognition that existing 
freedoms and capacities of incapable people should be preserved as much as 
possible and that those measures which needlessly take away people’s rights 
are indefensible. And no less important, there is also a much greater 
emphasis on personal welfare as opposed to the preservation of property. 
Measures of protection are nowadays often taken in order to protect and to 
                                                 
14 Council of Europe (1997) European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine at Article 2 
15 Ibid at Article 1. 
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promote some or all of the personal affairs of the person concerned, an 
example being decisions taken in the medical field.”16 
 
It can be seen that the Council of Europe was particularly mindful of the human rights 
issues surrounding vulnerable adults. As will be discussed below, an important aspect 
of human rights for an incapable adult is the endorsement of an approach that 
empowers the individual as much as is practicable.  
Recommendation (99)4 first outlines the scope of its application. Unlike many 
member states, the Council of Europe stated that an ‘adult’ for the purposes of the 
instrument would be anybody who had attained the age of eighteen years. (99)4 would 
apply to any individual who is unable to make any personal or economic decisions by 
virtue of “an impairment or insufficiency of their personal faculties.”17 The 
phrase ‘personal faculties’ could be interpreted as being comparable to the definition 
of incapacity as contained in s.2(1) of the English Mental Capacity Act 2005, which 
states that incapacity must be caused by an impairment of or a disturbance in the 
functioning of the mind or brain. According to (99)4, such incapacity may be caused 
by mental disability, disease or similar medical conditions18. This clarifies the 
definition of ‘personal faculties’ to some extent, by linking it to medical conditions.  
Part II of Recommendation (99)4 lists ten governing principles which member states 
would be required to incorporate into capacity legislation. The list is useful as a 
yardstick against which England and Scotland’s capacity law can be compared. The 
governing principles of (99)4 can be summarised as follows: 
Principle 1: Respect for human rights – This is arguably the most important and 
significant of the governing principles. The Council of Europe strongly emphasise the 
need to respect the dignity of each individual as a human being in his/her own right, 
and that all procedural aspects of the law in member states must promote the dignity 
of the individual. 
Principle 2: Flexibility in legal response – The manner in which member states 
protect the interests of the individual must be sufficiently flexible to allow a legal 
response to be made in various situations and concerning individuals with varying 
                                                 
16 Jansen, S (2000)  Recommendation No. R (99)4 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on 
Principles Concerning the Legal Protection of Incapable Adults: An Introduction in Particular to Part 
V Interventions in the Health Field; European Journal of Health Law Vol. 7: 333-347 at 334. 
17Council of Europe(1999): Recommendation No. R (99)4 of the Committee of Ministers to Member 
States on Principles Concerning the Legal protection of incapable adults; s.1(1). 
18 Ibid at s.1(2). 
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degrees of incapacity. There should also be adequate procedures in place to pursue 
legal action in emergency cases, and legal protection should be simple and affordable. 
Individuals wishing to rely upon legal protection should not find their legal capacity 
restricted, whilst the legal protection available should include those which are limited 
to a specific act, albeit without the need to appoint a representative with continuing 
powers. Finally, consideration should be given to the need to provide for and regulate 
legal arrangements for capable individuals wishing to make provisions for future 
incapacity. 
Principle 3: Maximum preservation of capacity – Any legislative framework must 
take into consideration the varying degrees of incapacity that might exist in different 
individuals, and also that incapacity might fluctuate. Therefore, any legal protection 
provided must not assume incapacity across the board in any given individual, and 
any restriction on an individual’s rights must only be done for the protection of the 
individual.  
Principle 4: Publicity – Any disadvantage of publicising measures of legal protection 
must be weighed up against the level of protection that such publicity would afford to 
the individual. 
Principle 5: Necessity and Subsidiarity – The principle of necessity states that no 
measure of protection must be initiated until it is deemed to be necessary. In doing 
this, account must be taken of the specific circumstances of the individual in each 
case.  
The principle of subsidiarity states that any measures of protection must take into 
account any less formal procedures which may be possible in order to protect the 
individual e.g. care provided by family members.  
Principle 6: Proportionality – Any measures of protection must be proportionate to 
the level of incapacity of the individual in question, and consideration must be given 
to any specific circumstances which may influence the manner in which this 
protection is given. Any interference with the legal capacity of the individual must be 
kept to a minimum.  
Principal 7: Procedural fairness and efficiency – A fair procedural system must be 
in place alongside for the protection of incapable adults, as well as a system of 
procedural safeguards of the protection of the individual’s human rights.  
Principal 8: Paramountcy of interests and welfare of the person concerned – In 
all measures of protection the welfare of the individual must be kept as a paramount 
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concern at all times. Any potential representative of an incapable individual must be 
judged on their ability to safeguard the welfare and interests of the individual.  
Principle 9: Respect for wishes and feelings of the person concerned – Throughout 
any measures of protection which have been put in place, the past and present wishes 
and feelings of the individual must be considered as much as is practicable. 
Principle 10: Consultation – When a measure of protection has been implemented, 
those having a close interest in the welfare of the individual must be consulted so far 
as this is reasonable and practicable. The individuals who are suitable for this duty 
will be determined by the law of the respective member state.  
 
As can be seen, a clear endorsement of the principle of autonomy is prevalent 
throughout principles 1-10. The human rights of the individual have been emphasised 
from the outset, in particular, the right to be recognised as an individual. Part of this 
process necessitates respect for the individual’s decision. The presumption of capacity 
in principle 4 is also an explicit endorsement of the principle of autonomy, as the 
Council of Europe have specified that the individual must not be assumed to be 
incapable simply by virtue of suffering from a mental illness or impairment19. Here, 
the emphasis has been placed on allowing the individual to make decisions for 
themselves, presumably unless a thorough assessment shows this to be impractical. 
Principle 9 is arguably the strongest endorsement of the autonomy principle, as it 
emphasises the need to respect the wishes and feelings of the person concerned. 
Although the principles contained within Recommendation (99)4 ostensibly deal with 
the correct way to initiate and carry through measures of protection on behalf of 
incapable adults, the Council of Europe have made it clear that the commencement of 
any such measure of protection does not mean that the individual’s wishes, feelings 
and decisions are to become of secondary importance20.  
 
In addition to Recommendation (99)4, European endorsement of the relevant ethical 
principles is also contained within a number of articles of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. 
                                                 
19 The presumption of an individual’s capacity has been explicitly stated in the Mental Capacity Act 
2005, s.1(2). See Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
20 The importance of the individual’s wishes and decisions has been emphasised in both the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 s.4(6) and the Adult’s with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 s.1(4). See Chapters 3 
and 4 of this thesis.  
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Article 2(1) of the Convention pertains to the right to life and states that “No-one 
shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a 
court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by 
law”. Exceptions to this are; in defence from unlawful violence, in order to effect 
lawful arrest or prevent escape of those lawfully detained and for the purpose of 
preventing riot or other acts of insurrection.  
Article 2 provides protection against various issues relating to the life and death of 
prisoners and abortion. More relevant to this thesis however, the scope of Article 2 
extends to issues of end-of-life issues and the refusal of life-saving treatment. The 
case of Pretty v United Kingdom21 provides guidance on this issue.  Dianne Pretty 
was a sufferer of motor neurone disease who wrote to the Department of Public 
Prosecutions requesting that her husband be lawfully permitted to assist in her suicide 
without risk of prosecution. When this request was denied, Mrs Pretty applied to the 
European Court of Human Rights claiming, amongst other things, that there had been 
a violation of Article 2 of the E.C.H.R. She argued that since Article 2 guaranteed the 
right to life, as opposed to simply life itself, this implied that the individual had the 
right not to continue living if so they wished22. Put another way, the individual had 
the right to commit suicide and assisting in this should not be considered a criminal 
act. The court however disagreed with this and held that Mrs Pretty’s argument was 
based upon misconstruction of the law: 
“The law confers no right commit suicide. Suicide was always, as a crime, 
anomalous, since it was the only crime with which no defendant could ever be 
charged… While the 1961 [Suicide] Act abrogated the rule of law whereby it 
was a crime for a person to commit (or attempt to commit) suicide, it 
conferred no right on anyone to do so. Had that been its object there would 
have been no justification for penalising by a potentially very long term of 
imprisonment one who aided, abetted, counselled or procured the exercise or 
attempted exercise by another of that right. The policy of the law remained 
firmly adverse to suicide, as section 2(1)23 makes clear.”24 
                                                 
21 [2002] 35 E.H.R.R 1.  
22 Ibid at Para 35. See also Sanderson, M A (2002) Pretty v United Kingdom; American Journal of 
International Law; Vol. 96(4), 943-949 at 943.  
23 Suicide Act 1961, s.2(1): “A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the suicide of another, 
or an attempt by another to commit suicide, shall be liable on conviction on indictment to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years.” 
24 Pretty v United Kingdom [2002] 35 E.H.R.R 1 at Para 35.  
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It can be seen that Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights does not 
confer upon the individual a right to take their own lives aided by another. However, 
this must be distinguished from a situation whereby treatment is refused or 
discontinued in order to prevent a life being unduly prolonged. Mathieu explains: 
“Undue prolongation of life can be defined as the administration of treatment 
that is manifestly disproportionate to its expected therapeutic impact. This 
occurs where medical apparatus entirely replaces the natural functioning of 
human organs, or where life is prolonged without any medical treatment to 
prevent an inevitable progression towards death.”25 
As will be discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis, the right not to prolong life 
unnecessarily without breaching Article 2 has been confirmed by the U.K law. It was 
held in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland26 that doctors were not obliged to continue life 
prolonging treatment for patients in a persistent vegetative state when the chances of 
recovery were effectively nil. It could be argued that the differences between a case 
such as Bland and one such as that of Dianne Pretty are negligible; the latter was not 
going to recover from her condition, and it was her fear of an undignified and painful 
death that triggered her application to the European Court of Human Rights. 
However, Mrs Pretty also advanced the argument that she was discriminated against 
because her condition meant that she could not end her life without assistance, 
whereas those of full health could end their own lives if they wished. However, 
Mathieu dismisses this argument. He states that those who are physically capable of 
committing suicide do not have their right to do so enshrined in Article 2, but rather, 
the act of committing suicide is tolerated because of the individual’s right to exercise 
their autonomy27. This is perhaps an overstatement; it is submitted that the 
decriminalisation of suicide is less about promotion of autonomy and more about 
avoiding the stigma and complications that may arise from criminalising it. This is 
illustrated by the case of Daniel James who, in 2008 with the aid of his parents, ended 
his life in Swiss assisted suicide clinic Dignitas following a rugby accident which left 
him paralysed. The Director of Public Prosecutions stated that although charges 
against Daniel James’s parents had been considered for the part they had played in 
their son’s death, no further action would be taken: 
                                                 
25 Mathieu, B (2006) The Right to Life; Council of Europe Publishing Strasbourg at 76.  
26 [1993] 1 A.C 789. See Chapter 4.1.1 of this thesis at 136 for discussion of this case.  
27 Mathieu, B (2006) The Right to Life; Council of Europe Publishing Strasbourg at 77. 
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“This is a tragic case involving as it does the death of a young man in difficult 
and unique circumstances. While there are public interest factors in favour of 
prosecution, not least of which is the seriousness of this offence… these are 
outweighed by the public interest factors that say that a prosecution is not 
needed. In reaching my decision I have given careful consideration to the 
Code for Crown Prosecutors. In particular, but not exclusively, I would point 
to the fact that Daniel, as a fiercely independent young man, was not 
influenced by his parents to take his own life and the evidence indicates he 
did so despite their imploring him not to.”28 
 
Article 3 of the Convention states that: “No individual shall be subjected to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Although Article 3 is 
specifically aimed at the prevention of torture, it may ostensibly be invoked in relation 
to medical treatment. Elizabeth Wicks suggests that the provision of medical 
treatment without valid consent could constitute degrading treatment and thus 
potentially be a violation of Article 3: 
“The lowest form of prohibited treatment i.e. that which is degrading – may 
be of relevance to the imposition of medical treatment without consent. It has 
been defined in the following terms: ‘Treatment or punishment of an 
individual may be said to be degrading if it grossly humiliates him before 
others or drives him to act against his will or conscience’.29 This emphasis on 
the humiliation caused by the treatment is consistent with an ordinary 
dictionary meaning of degrading treatment. The key to prohibited treatment 
under Article 3, therefore, appears to be the concept of human dignity rather 
than individual self-determination or autonomy… The right and ability to 
make a free choice as regards what is done to one’s body is a fundamental 
aspect of the dignity of a human being.”30  
                                                 
28 Director of Public Prosecutions Statement (09/12/2008) No Charges Following Death by Suicide of 
Daniel James; accessed on 17/04/09; available online at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/press_releases/179_08/index.html. See also R (On the Application of 
Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] E.W.C.A Civ 92.  
29 See Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v Greece [1969] 12 Y.B. 1 at 186.  
30 Wicks, E (2001) The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment Under the European Convention on Human 
Rights; Medical Law Review; Vol. 9(1), 17-40 at 21-22.  
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It was held in Herczegfalvy v Austria31, which concerned the forced feeding and 
restraint of a mentally ill patient, that measures which are deemed a therapeutic 
necessity cannot be a violation of Article 3, although the necessity must be 
appropriately proven32. Any treatment carried out for therapeutic reasons without 
consent will only invoke Article 3 if a minimum level of severity is proven. Kudla v 
Poland33 states that in order to invoke Article 3, any suffering involved “must in any 
event go beyond that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected 
with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment.”34 Many therapeutic 
procedures may ostensibly involve some degree of discomfort, and this would not be 
sufficient to come under the scope of Article 3. The issue is whether the discomfort or 
suffering involved is so disproportionate so as to be classed as inhuman or degrading. 
Bartlett, Lewis and Thorold also refer to the court’s judgment in Herczegfalvy, in 
which reference was made to preserving the physical and mental health of patients 
who are “entirely incapable of deciding for themselves”35. They further submit that 
on this interpretation, Article 3 may, prima facie, not be invoked in the context of 
capable adults who simply choose to refuse treatment. However, this is in itself a 
potentially complex issue, given that involuntary medical treatment may be carried 
out on capable individuals in exceptional circumstances, e.g. emergencies and when 
the patient poses a danger to themselves or others: “If the essence of this apparent 
violation is intrusive treatment over the objection of the competent person, it is 
at best questionable whether these exceptions would be allowed under Article 
3.”36  
 
Article 8(1) states that: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence”. Wicks states that the right to a 
private life should be distinguished from the right to privacy: “A right to ‘privacy’ 
suggests the protection of confidential information; a right to a ‘private life’ 
suggests the freedom to live life as one chooses.”37 Wicks interprets this right in the 
                                                 
31 [1993] 15 E.H.R.R 437.   
32 Ibid at Para 82.  
33 [2002] 35 E.H.R.R 11.  
34 Ibid at Para 92.  
35 Herczegfalvy v Austria [1992] 15 E.H.R.R 437 at Para 82. 
36 Bartlett, P, Lewis, O and Thorold, O (2006) Mental Disability and the European Convention on 
Human Rights; Martinus Nijhoff Publications, Leiden and Boston at 127.  
37 Wicks, E (2001) The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment Under the European Convention on Human 
Rights; Medical Law Review; Vol. 9(1), 17-40 at 26.  
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context of medical treatment, stating that Article 8 in essence grants the right to make 
one’s own decisions. However, Article 8(2) allows exceptions “in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.  
The European Court of Human Rights has held that Article 8 can theoretically be 
invoked in relation to any compulsory medical treatment, whether the individual in 
question has capacity or lacks it, since the concept of ‘private life’ would cover the 
“physical and psychological integrity of a person.”38 The relevant question would 
therefore be whether an infringement would be justified under Article 8(2). The court 
held in Y.F v Turkey that interference with a person’s physical integrity should be 
prescribed by law with the consent of the individual39. However, as Bartlett, Lewis 
and Thorold point out, this statement would presuppose that the individual had the 
requisite capacity to consent in the first place. The question then remains as to the 
situation for incapable individuals.  
Guidance on this point is provided by the Council of Europe’s Recommendation 
(2004)10 which concerns the protection of the human rights and dignity of persons 
with mental disorder. Article 12(2) of the Recommendation states that: 
“…treatment may only be provided to a person with mental disorder with 
his/her consent if he/she has the capacity to give such consent, or, when the 
person does not have the capacity to consent, with the authorisation of a 
representative, authority, person or body provided for by law.” 
It will be seen in subsequent chapters of this thesis that the capacity legislations of 
England and Scotland both contain provisions allowing for persons to be appointed as 
representatives for the incapable individual, who may be consulted in the event of 
treatment being needed. Bartlett, Lewis and Thorold highlight potential complications 
with respect to Article 8 if the representatives who have been appointed are family 
members; Given that Article 8 involves respect for both family and private life, 
conflict may occur if the individual does not wish their family to become involved in 
their private affairs vis a vis medical and welfare decisions. However, the authors also 
highlight the fact that under E.C.H.R law, an application to the court may be made in 
                                                 
38 See Y .F v Turkey [2004] 39 E.H.R.R 34. 
39 Ibid at Para 43.  
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order to have the designated nearest relative replaced40, meaning that the individual 
has their needs met without having their right to private life infringed under Article 8.  
 
Article 9(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights pertains to the right to 
freedom of thought and religion and reads as follows: 
“1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, 
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest 
his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.” 
In terms of medical treatment decisions, Wicks argues that Article 9 becomes relevant 
when medical treatment is refused on the basis of religious beliefs41. Under Article 9, 
treatment may be refused on religious grounds even if doing so will result in death or 
deterioration of health. Any doctor who overrides such a decision because they 
themselves are not of the same faith as the patient, will be deemed to have violated 
Article 9. To illustrate this point, Wicks refers to Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical 
Treatment)42 which concerned the refusal of a blood transfusion by a patient whose 
mother was a Jehovah’s Witness. The court held in that case that the patient’s refusal 
of the transfusion was invalid because she had been unduly influenced by her mother. 
Crucial to the decision was the fact that T herself was not a Jehovah’s Witness. Had 
she been of the faith herself, it is entirely possible that her decision would have been 
valid. Wicks explains the decision of the case in relation to Article 9: 
“In respect of Article 9, the significant point in Re T is that T did not regard 
herself as a Jehovah’s Witness. It seems doubtful therefore, that her refusal 
of a blood transfusion was a manifestation of her religion. What Re T 
demonstrates most clearly in respect of religious-based refusals of treatment 
is that the belief is rarely shared by other people concerned: in this case, the 
medical staff and most of the patient’s family. A refusal of treatment based 
on religion may appear irrational to others (indeed, any religious belief may 
be irrational to non-believers) and, although it has been clearly stated that 
                                                 
40 Bartlett, P, Lewis, O and Thorold, O (2006) Mental Disability and the European Convention on 
Human Rights; Martinus Nijhoff Publications, Leiden and Boston at 133. See also JT v United 
Kingdom [2000] 1 F.L.R 909.  
41 Ibid at 30.  
42 [1992] 4 All E.R 649.  
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this will not vitiate a refusal of consent, it may cause a reluctance to accept 
the decision by others.”43 
Although Article 9 appears to be most relevant to medical decisions made on religious 
grounds, it can ostensibly be invoked in relation to any system of belief. It is 
submitted that the reference made in Article 9(1) to ‘freedom of thought’ in effect 
pertains to any beliefs that may extend beyond religion, which, as discussed above, 
has specifically been accounted for in Article 9(1).  As an illustration of this, consider 
the principle of communitarianism as discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis. Let us say 
for the sake of argument that an individual is part of a family with a long held 
tradition of deferring important medical treatment decisions to the elders in the 
family. Upon requiring a medical treatment, the individual tells the doctor that he has 
decided to allow his father to make the decision, as he has complete faith in his 
father’s ability to make decisions in his best interests. Provided that there is no 
evidence to suggest that the individual has been coerced or manipulated into giving 
this statement, the individual could argue that the act of deferring decisions to other 
family members is a manifestation of belief which is protected under Article 9(1). 
This would therefore be of potential relevance to persons of Indian origin living in the 
United Kingdom, who may be used to a communitarian approach to decision-making.  
Article 9 and the notion of freedom of thought was another issue raised in Pretty v 
United Kingdom. Mrs Pretty argued that her desire to commit suicide came under the 
cope of Article 9 and her husband should therefore not be prosecuted for assisting her 
in exercising her freedom of thought44. The Government rejected this argument 
stating that “Article 9… did not confer any general right on individuals to engage 
in any activities of their choosing in pursuance of whatever beliefs they may 
hold.”45 The Court agreed with this viewpoint and held that Article 9 had not been 
breached. Dianne Pretty’s case therefore illustrates that Article 9 guarantees the right 
to hold a particular belief, but it does not follow from this that one will always be 
permitted to actually carry out their beliefs in all circumstances, particularly when in 
relation to highly contentious issues such as suicide.  
 
                                                 
43 Wicks, E (2001) The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment Under the European Convention on Human 
Rights; Medical Law Review; Vol. 9(1), 17-40 at 32.  
44 Pretty v United Kingdom [2002] 35 E.H.R.R 1 at Para 80.   
45 Ibid.  
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The documents which were formulated by the United Nations and The Council of 
Europe highlight a number of important principles which will be drawn out and 
discussed below. The central message is clear: unless one is sure that an individual is 
incapable of making a particular decision or performing a particular action, the 
autonomy of the individual is paramount. In the light of this, discussion on the 
substantive ethical principles which underpin the law of capacity will begin with the 
most important principle of all: the principle of autonomy. 
 
1.1: THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTONOMY 
 
The principle of autonomy can be defined as follows: “…the capacity to think, 
decide and act on the basis of such thought and decision freely and 
independently and without, as it says in the British passport, let or hindrance.”46 
It is synonymous with the notion of respect for the person, which John Harris states as 
being “the fundamental basis of any ethics involving human beings.”47As an 
ethical concept, particularly in the light of changes made to the law within the United 
Kingdom, autonomy is inseparable from any discussion relating to capacity. The 
principle of autonomy necessitates treating people as individuals and as ends within 
themselves, rather than simply as a means to an end for another individual. This was 
summed up by Justice Cardozo in the American case of Schloendorff v New York 
Hospital: 
“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine 
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an 
operation without his patient’s consent, commits an assault.”48 
 
One of the leading proponents of the principle of respect for Autonomy was John 
Stuart Mill, who wrote extensively on the subject in his seminal work On Liberty. 
Mill argued that every human being must be treated as an individual in their own 
right, which includes the right to “form opinions, and to express their opinions 
without reserve.”49 More importantly, Mill stated that individuals should be allowed 
                                                 
46 Gillon, R (1986) Philosophical Medical Ethics; Wiley Medical Publications Chichester at 60 
47 Harris, J (2003) Consent and End of Life Decisions; Journal of Medical Ethics, Vol. 29, 10-15 at 10. 
48 [1914] 211 N.T 125 per Cardozo J at 126.  
49 Mill, J S (1859) On Liberty and Other Essays; Oxford University Press at 62. 
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to live their lives and make decisions as they see fit, but with one proviso – any 
opinions and actions should not in any way result in harm to others: 
“No one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions… even opinions 
lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which they are expressed are 
such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some 
mischievous act… Acts of whatever kind, which, without justifiable cause, do 
harm to others, may be, and in more important cases absolutely require to 
be, controlled by the unfavourable sentiments, and, when needful, by the 
active interference of mankind.”50 
To put Mill’s assertions into a medical context, the self-protective principle would 
ethically permit individuals to make their own decisions regarding medical treatment, 
and to have their own opinions regarding what they feel would be best for them in the 
circumstances. Gillon further states that in the context of medical treatment, there are 
essentially three forms of autonomy: Autonomy of thought (“thinking for oneself… 
making decisions, believing things… aesthetic preference, making moral 
assessments.”51); Autonomy of will (“the freedom to decide to do things on the 
basis of one’s deliberations.”52); and Autonomy of action (“Specific actions may be 
autonomous even though they are not the immediate or direct results of a 
thought process.”53) All three of these sub-categories relate directly to capacity and 
decisions on medical treatment. Autonomy of action has a particular resonance with 
English capacity law, in as much as Lord Donaldson specified in Re T (Adult: Refusal 
of Medical Treatment)54 that an individual has the right to decide whether to accept or 
refuse medical treatment, and need not provide a rational reason or even a reason at 
all55. Provided that the individual has the requisite capacity to make a particular 
decision, the reasons and the decision itself must be respected.  
 
Autonomy of thought can be considered in terms of both positive and negative 
obligation. With regards to positive obligations, it is the moral duty of the relevant 
healthcare professional to foster an environment of autonomy in the workplace, by 
giving their patients as much information as possible about any proposed treatment, 
                                                 
50 Ibid. 
51 Gillon R (1986) Philosophical Medical Ethics; Wiley Medical Publications Chichester at 61. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 [1992] 4 All E.R 649. 
55 per Donaldson MR at 663. 
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and letting the patient know that the ultimate decision as to whether to accept or 
refuse treatment is theirs, provided that they have the requisite capacity. Beauchamp 
and Childress state that healthcare professionals would successfully promote the 
autonomy of the individual by actually probing for understanding from the patient56, 
thereby ensuring that the decision the patient gives is in fact fully autonomous. This 
necessitates a thorough assessment of the individual’s capacity and ergo, an 
assessment of whether the individual is capable of exercising their right to autonomy.  
 
Developments in the law of capacity have provided assessment criteria for 
determining whether the individual is autonomous to the level which is required for 
making treatment decisions. Grisso and Appelbaum have provided arguably the most 
authoritative criteria through their MacArthur project57. Four core criteria are 
identified for determining an individual’s decision-making capacity: The individual 
must be able to communicate a choice, understand relevant treatment information, 
appreciate the nature of the situation and its likely consequences and be able to 
manipulate the information given in a rational manner58. It will be seen in Chapter 2 
that these criteria have been adapted to a great extent into the law of capacity in 
England59. Through their work on decision-making ability, Grisso and Appelbaum 
have identified that it is essential for individuals to be assessed properly without their 
incapacity being simply assumed. Incapacity in one sphere of life does not necessarily 
equate to incapacity in another and the assessment criteria proposed by Grisso and 
                                                 
56 Beauchamp T L and Childress J F (2009) Principles of Biomedical Ethics 6th Ed; Oxford University 
Press at 104. 
57 See Cairns, R et al (2005) Reliability of Mental Capacity Assessments in Psychiatric In-patients; 
British Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 187, 372-378 and Kitamura, F et al (1998) Method for Assessment of 
Competency to Consent in the Mentally Ill; International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, Vol. 21(3), 
223-224. Both articles highlight the importance of Grisso and Appelbaum’s work in competency 
assessment.  
58 Grisso, T and Appelbaum, P (1995) MacArthur Treatment Competence Study I: Mental Illness and 
Competence to Consent to Treatment; Law and Human Behaviour; Vol. 19(2); 105-126. For further 
information on the work of Grisso and Appelbaum in the field of capacity assessment, see also; Grisso, 
T, Appelbaum, P.S, Mulvey, E.P and Fletcher, K (1995) MacArthur Treatment Competence Study II: 
Measures of Abilities Related to Competence to Consent to Treatment; Law and Human Behaviour, 
Vol. 19(2), 127-146; Grisso, T and Appelbaum, P.S (1995) MacArthur Treatment Competence Study 
III: Abilities of Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and Medical Treatments; Law and Human 
Behaviour, Vol. 19(2), 149-174; Grisso, T and Appelbaum P (1995) Comparison of Standards for 
Assessing Patient’s Capacities to Make Treatment Decisions; American Journal of Psychiatry; Vol. 
152(7), 1033-1037; Appelbaum, P.S and Roth, L H (1982) Competency to Consent to Research; 
Archives of General Psychiatry, Vol. 39, 951-958. 
59 See Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1994] 1 All E.R 819; Re MB (Medical Treatment) 
[1997] 38 B.M.L.R 175.   
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Appelbaum takes into account the various issues surrounding a treatment decision. As 
they explain: 
“After the middle of the twentieth century, the assumption that people with 
mental illness were uniformly deficient in decision-making abilities and 
should be legally incompetent began to be called into question. Advocates 
argued that persons with mental illness… often suffered selective impairment 
of decision-making abilities or none at all, with retention of competence for 
many purposes. It was unfair therefore, to deprive them of decision-making 
rights, especially about treatment, without an individualised determination of 
their residual capacities.”60 
 
Alisdair Maclean identifies three criteria for determining decision-making 
competence: 
“1. They must hold beliefs supported by evidence that is acceptable to a 
responsible body of persons who share the required expertise to evaluate the 
evidence. 
  2. They must be capable of making some, but not necessarily all, of the 
sound inferences appropriate to their beliefs. 
  3. Any decision must be based on the patient’s acceptable belief set and will 
necessarily involve balancing social, emotional, spiritual and economic 
concerns with any physical effects that may follow from their decisions.”61 
 
Certain aspects of Maclean’s exposition of the assessment criteria are logical enough; 
Maclean’s reference to balancing concerns is a salient one and has been emphasised 
in the common law of England62. However, Maclean’s criteria are ultimately 
unconvincing due to his recommendation that the individual must hold a set of beliefs 
which are deemed acceptable to a responsible body of persons. Such a statement is 
difficult to support, as it is akin to saying that an individual who refuses medical 
treatment on religious grounds can have their will overborne if the doctor is not of the 
same faith as the patient. Lord Donaldson’s statement in Re T is considerably more 
                                                 
60 Grisso T and Appelbaum P S (1995) The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study I: Mental Illness 
and Competence to Consent to Treatment ; Law and Human Behaviour Vol. 19(2) 105-126. 
61 Maclean A (2000) Now You See It, Now You Don’t: Consent and the Legal Protection of Autonomy; 
Journal of Applied Philosophy; Vol. 17(3); 277-289 at 281.  
62 See Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1994] 1 All E.R 819 and Re MB (Medical 
Treatment) [1997] 38 B.M.L.R 175.   
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compelling than Maclean’s: provided that the individual has the requisite capacity to 
make a decision i.e. satisfied the criteria set out by Grisso and Appelbaum, the fact 
that the doctor might not find this acceptable is of no relevance at all.  
 
It has been seen that exercising one’s autonomy in relation to a treatment decision is 
possible without having to make a well thought out argument. However, this will only 
be the case if the individual has the ability to make a rational decision; the decision 
itself need not have a rational reason behind it, but the ability to make it should be 
present. In the light of this, it is important to analyse the issue of rationality, and how 
it relates to the principle of autonomy. 
 
The issue of rationality is discussed in depth by Marc Stauch, who illustrates it by 
way of three fact-based examples: 
“1) a patient who will, in the event of the treatment survive only in great pain 
and without many of his mental or physical faculties; 2) a Jehovah’s Witness 
who believes that the form of treatment (a blood transfusion) will bar his 
eternal salvation63; 3) a patient who is under the delusion that she is or will 
be a great actress and the treatment would have the effect of preventing 
this”64 
because of the stigma attached to the idea of voluntarily ‘choosing death’. However, it 
                                                
 
Stauch asserts that there are three grounds for refusal of treatment which relate to 
rationality: Rational grounds, non-rational grounds and irrational grounds. Example 1) 
above is an example of a decision made on rational grounds, defined by Stauch as 
“being founded upon commonsense… a set of beliefs which are derived from 
concepts given to us in our normal everyday experience of the world”65. In the 
event of a patient refusing treatment on the grounds that he will be in great pain and 
with diminished faculties, the question arises as to whether such a decision would be 
rational or not. It could be argued that such a decision would not be rational simply 
 
63 For discussion on the validity of the tenets of the faith on this issue, see Muramoto, O (1998) 
Bioethics of the Refusal of Blood by Jehovah’s Witnesses; Journal of Medical Ethics; Vol. 24; 223-230 
and Ridley, D T (1999) Jehovah’s Witnesses’ Refusal of Blood: Obedience to Scripture and Religious 
Conscience; Journal of Medical Ethics; Vol. 25; 469-472. 
64 Stauch, M (1995) Rationality and the Refusal of Medical Treatment: A Critique of the Recent 
Approach of the English Courts; Journal of Medical Ethics; Vol. 21, 162-165 at 163. 
65 Ibid. 
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is submitted that cases such as the one just described are nonetheless illustrative of a 
rational decision. Marc Stauch explains thus:  
“In the case of a choice which results in death, such as a decision by a patient 
to refuse life-saving treatment, a difficulty arises in that the nature of the life 
foregone cannot be compared with a state which remains unknown. 
Nevertheless, in certain… circumstances, we may be justified in regarding 
such a choice as rational. This would be the type of case where the quality of 
life to be renounced is certain to be intolerable”66. 
Ultimately, it is too one-dimensional to consider a life or death decision without 
considering the quality of life that is at stake. A more pragmatic approach to the 
concept of rationality would be to say that an individual might be perfectly justified in 
giving up a life which they themselves consider to be so lacking in quality as to be no 
longer desirable.  
 
Example two in Marc Stauch’s article – the Jehovah’s Witness refusing a blood 
transfusion – is deemed to be a decision made on ‘non-rational grounds’. Note 
carefully the phrase ‘non-rational’, which is not to be confused with the term 
‘irrational’: “[Non-rational grounds]… are founded upon ideas that are not given 
to us in our normal experience of the world…[but] are typically found within 
systems of religious faith, where reference is made to ‘truths’ which lie ‘beyond’ 
our experience of the world”67. There is cogency in the argument that treatment 
refusal on the grounds of religious belief, is effectively in a special category of its 
own. Michael Wreen is one of those who subscribes to such a line of reasoning. 
Wreen directs our attention first to the argument that a decision based on religious 
beliefs is not an autonomous one, and is therefore invalid: 
“Despite its [religious freedom’s] widespread use, someone may ask, ‘isn’t the 
concept really self-contradictory, or at least self-undermining?’… The 
argument for this view is that religion is actually antithetical to autonomy, 
because it psychologically limits the number of possible causes of action that 
the believer considers, and more importantly, makes him unable even to 
                                                 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
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entertain causes of action proscribed by his convictions… The result is not 
autonomy, but heteronomy”68 
 
Wreen highlighted the argument in order to refute it, which he does by stating that a 
refusal of treatment based on religious views does not contravene the principle of 
autonomy, because a belief in something such as religion involves exercising a free 
choice in order to arrive at that belief69. Opponents of this viewpoint may argue that 
following a particular religion is not in fact an autonomous process because many 
people do not ‘select’ a religion as such but instead follow the religion that they have 
been brought up in i.e. a person born into a Hindu family will invariably follow the 
example of their parents or guardian by practising Hinduism; this could be argued as 
not being a choice as such, but rather, something which is done without an in-depth 
examination of whether the religion of one’s parents is in fact the right religion for the 
individual themselves. This argument is logical, but it is nonetheless submitted that 
following the religion that one has been brought up in is not automatically in conflict 
with the principle of autonomy. It is accepted that one is less likely to explore the 
merits of different religions during childhood, simply because the majority of children 
defer to parents or guardians in most aspects of life. The issue of whether religious 
(and indeed, non-religious beliefs) involves the exercise of a free choice is perhaps 
more applicable to adulthood, when an individual is in more of a position to act and 
think independently of parents or primary caregivers. At this point, although religious 
beliefs may be significantly ingrained into the mind of the individual, there is far 
greater scope for investigating and practising different religions should the individual 
wish to do so. For example, an individual raised as a Hindu may choose to continue 
practising the religion they were brought up with, or if they are unhappy with this, 
may also choose to study the tenets of Buddhism and convert if this proves to be a 
preferable option. The fact that many elect to continue practising the religion that they 
were brought up with does not make it any less of an autonomous process. The point 
where such a decision ceases to be autonomous is when an individual is under such 
control of the parent or primary caregiver that they are in effect denied the right to 
exercise the beliefs of their choice.  
                                                 
68 Wreen, M J (1991) Autonomy, religious views and the refusal of lifesaving treatment; Journal of 
Medical Ethics; Vol. 17, 124-130 at 126. 
69 Ibid at 127. 
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Such a scenario could be indicative of being brainwashed, something which, 
according to Wreen, has become, “a caricature of the great majority of the world’s 
religions”70. This is an interesting point which is worthy of further elaboration. In 
situations where an individual’s religious beliefs may lead to a refusal of life-saving 
treatment, the temptation on the part of the doctor might be to denounce the 
individual’s decision as invalid on the grounds that it was not made autonomously – it 
was the tenets of religion which demanded that the patient make that decision. 
However, this is only really likely to be the case if the patient had been visibly 
‘brainwashed’, by which it is meant that ideas had been so forcibly implanted into the 
patient’s head, that there is no longer any sense of rationale or objectivity left71. The 
difficulty in distinguishing between those who have been brainwashed from those 
who merely hold strong beliefs should not be underestimated. Consider for example, a 
Jehovah’s Witness who refuses a life-saving blood transfusion on the basis of their 
beliefs, and a member of a religious splinter group who is admitted to hospital having 
consumed large quantities of bleach at the behest of their leader and is refusing all 
treatment because they have been told that accepting treatment would be contrary to 
God’s will? Essentially, is there any difference between a religion and a cult in the 
context of medical treatment decisions? 
Take the real-life example of the members of the Peoples Temple organisation who, 
in 1978, took part in a mass poisoning at the behest of their leader, the Reverend Jim 
Jones. Suppose for the sake of argument that one of the members who had consumed 
the poison had not died and had been admitted to hospital, but refused treatment 
because that is not what their leader would have wanted; should their wishes be 
respected in the way as those of a Jehovah’s Witness refusing a blood transfusion? It 
is submitted that the issue is not whether an individual is a member of an ‘organised’ 
religion or a cult, but whether a particular treatment decision is ultimately an 
autonomous one. It is submitted that this is what Wreen is essentially referring to 
when he writes about being ‘brainwashed’; the term relates to an individual being 
subjected to a high level of outside influence which would result in a treatment 
decision being vitiated. However, it would be incorrect to say that a Jehovah’s 
Witness, Christian or Muslim, by virtue of being part of more ‘established’ religions, 
                                                 
70 Ibid at 127. 
71 See Schwab, A P (2006) Formal and effective autonomy in healthcare; Journal of Medical Ethics; 
Vol. 32; 575-579 at 576, where the author briefly but clearly dismisses the idea that decisions made by 
‘brainwashed’ individuals are autonomous.  
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are always less susceptible to outside influence than less established, ‘cult’ 
organisations. Specific circumstances in cases involving both groups can make the 
difference between an autonomous decision and a decision that is invalid because of 
outside influence or brainwashing.  
 
Difficulty may present itself if healthcare professionals construe a strong passionate 
belief as meaning that the patient has been brainwashed. Add to this the fact that the 
patient has elected to die, and the ability of the individual to make an autonomous 
informed decision may be called into question. However, Stauch states that religious 
beliefs can be described as non-rational because “such ideas do not derive from 
claims about the world of objective experience… the effect of this is that such 
beliefs are empirically unverifiable”72. However, just because a belief cannot be 
scientifically proven does not mean that it is devoid of validity:  
“Religion has to do with… explaining the human condition at its most 
fundamental level; providing a person with a unique concept of personal 
identity, in the fullest sense of the term; and making sense of ourselves and 
the world around us in a complete and satisfying way… it [religion] 
reconciles us, at a deep existential level, to ourselves to our world, to each 
other, and most of all, to our limitations and relative impotence. Religious 
beliefs… are therefore not on a par with other beliefs and values a rational 
person might have… [they] circumscribe and infuse other beliefs and values, 
and permeate all of them to some extent”73 
 
The fact that religion is not scientifically verifiable does not mean that its tenets are 
devoid of rationality. From an ethical standpoint, if a doctor were to attempt to 
persuade a patient that his decision was wrong simply on the basis that he himself 
subscribed to a different religious view, it would be tantamount to telling the patient 
that his religion and his faith are factually inaccurate or invalid. This would clearly be 
a violation of the principle of respect for autonomy, as there would simply be no way 
in which the patient’s beliefs could be proven to be demonstrably false. Indeed, the 
right to freedom of religion is provided for under Article 9 of the European 
                                                 
72 Stauch, M (1995) Rationality and the refusal of medical treatment: a critique of the recent approach 
of the English Courts; Journal of Medical Ethics; Vol. 21, 162-165 at 163 
73 Wreen, M J (1991) Autonomy, religious values and refusal of lifesaving medical treatment; Journal 
of Medical Ethics; Vol.17; 124-130 at 128. 
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Convention on Human Rights, and as previous discussion in this thesis highlights74, 
this right could encompass the right to make medical treatment decisions on the basis 
of religious and other beliefs. It could even be argued that failure to respect religious 
beliefs would be tantamount to discrimination, in as much as it involves dismissal of 
an opinion which may be considered different from the norm. However, does the non-
verifiable nature of religion mean that the right to make treatment decisions on 
religious grounds can never be questioned? There may be circumstances in which the 
right to religious freedom will clash with other fundamental freedoms such as the 
right to bodily integrity. Arguably the most contentious example of this is the issue of 
female genital mutilation which, according to the World Health Organisation, is a 
procedure which carries serious health risks which are entirely disproportionate to the 
benefits, which, from a clinical context, are essentially nil75. The primary motivations 
for such procedures taking place are generally thought to be related to cultural and 
religion, rather than medical reasons, although the British Medical Association does 
state that no existing religion actually demands female genital mutilation76. By 
contrast, male circumcision although not uncontroversial, is more accepted and has 
not been condemned in the same way, despite the fact that, like for females, the 
procedure is also often motivated by cultural and religious reasons. This is ultimately 
because the operation is comparatively more straightforward for men and is less likely 
to have severe health risks. However, cases such as Re J (A Minor) (Prohibited Steps 
Order: Circumcision)77 illustrate that circumcision for male children will not be 
granted simply as a matter of course; in J’s case, the court held that the operation was 
not justified because he was unlikely to be brought up in the Muslim religion and 
more crucially, that the medical and psychological risks of the operation outweighed 
any benefits of the procedure. This shows that although religion is undoubtedly a 
crucial issue in many medical procedure decisions, it will not always be an overriding 
factor. Other factors will be important in deciding whether a particular procedure can 
and should be carried out and, as will be discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the 
                                                 
74 See this Chapter of this thesis at 18.  
75 World Health Organisation (2008) Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency 
Statement at 9.  See also British Medical Association (2006) Female Genital Mutilation: Caring for 
Patients and Child Protection; accessed online on 13/09/08; available online at 
http://bma.org.uk/ap.nsf/Content/FGM.   
76 British Medical Association (2006) Female Genital Mutilation: Caring for Patients and Child 
Protection at 2; accessed online on 13/09/08; available online at 
http://bma.org.uk/ap.nsf/Content/FGM.  
77 [2000] 52 B.M.L.R 82.  
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most important issue is whether the proposed treatment will be in the best interests of 
the child. As the British Medical Association explain, it is possible that a procedure 
that has no medical benefit can still be considered to be in a child’s best interests from 
a socio-cultural perspective: 
“It is important that doctors consider the child’s social and cultural 
circumstances. Where a child is living in a culture in which circumcision is 
required for all males, the increased acceptance into a family or society that 
circumcision can confer is considered to be a strong social or cultural benefit. 
Exclusion may cause harm by, for example, complicating the individual’s 
search for identity and sense of belonging. Clearly, assessment of such 
intangible risks and benefits is complex.”78 
This links in to Stauch’s discussion of the non-rational; the risks and benefits 
associated with procedures carried out for religious or cultural reasons cannot be 
directly verified in the way that procedures designed to preserve life or prevent 
deterioration in health can be.  
 
Further weight will also be added to a decision based upon religious grounds if there 
is a consistency of belief – that is, the patient has been asked his opinion on a given 
treatment on more than one occasion, and the decision has remained the same. This 
would show that the patient has given a lot of consideration and thought over a 
sustained period of time, and that there has at least been an established belief system 
influencing the decision. The words of John Stuart Mill are once again analogous to 
this particular scenario: 
“It is important to give the freest scope possible to uncustomary things, in 
order that it may in time appear which of these are fit to be converted into 
customs… If a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and 
expertise, his own mode of laying out his existence is best, not because it is the 
best in itself, but because it is his own mode.”79 
One might argue that a decision made on religious grounds is really not an 
autonomous decision, since the individual has in effect allowed someone or 
something else i.e. religion, to shape their way of life. However, this argument can 
                                                 
78 British Medical Association (2006) The Law and Ethics of Male Circumcision at 2; accessed online 
on 13/09/08; available online at http://www.bma.org.uk/images/Circumcision_tcm41-147277.pdf.  
79 Mill, J S; On Liberty taken from On Liberty and other essays (1998) Oxford University Press at 75. 
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easily be negated. In most cases, an individual will have been presented with, or 
sought out the tenets of one or more religions, after which the individual has chosen to 
follow them. In this way, autonomy has been exercised, and thus making treatment 
decision based upon religious belief is merely an extension of this.  
 
Going back to Marc Stauch’s assertions on rationality, example three – the patient 
who believes that she will be a great actress if she refuses treatment – is an illustration 
of a decision made on irrational grounds; that is, “where the decision involves a 
belief of some form, but one based upon concepts that fly in the face of our 
normal experience of the world”80. Herein lies the difference between irrational and 
non-rational grounds: non-rational grounds for refusal may not be verifiable, but they 
often cannot be proven as false either. On the other hand, irrational grounds for 
refusal can be proven to be patently false. A patently false belief which actively 
interferes with an individual’s decision-making could be indicative of the presence of 
a mental disorder. In such a case, the precise effect of the belief on the individual’s 
decision-making capacity requires review. The English common law approaches the 
issue of patently false belief by considering whether the belief is the product of a 
delusion brought about by the presence of a mental disorder. Saks elegantly highlights 
the reasons why delusions may be indicative of a lack of decision-making capacity:  
“The law defines a delusion as a belief for which there is no evidence. 
According to this definition, only extreme distortions, or patently false 
beliefs, count as delusions… If the standard reliably singles out patent 
falsehoods, it is not finding incompetency on the basis of unusual ways of 
looking at the world – or worse yet, prescribing beliefs that misconstrue 
reality. Rather, it rules out beliefs that plainly fail to do what they purport to 
do, that is, portray the world accurately. These beliefs are the kinds that pose 
a serious impediment to adequate decision-making.”81  
However, the presence of a delusion is not necessarily enough to render an individual 
incapable. The issue is whether the delusion has a significant enough impact upon the 
                                                 
80 Stauch (1995) Rationality and the Refusal of Medical Treatment: A Critique of the Recent Approach 
of the English Courts; Journal of Medical Ethics; Vol. 21, 162-165  at 163. 
81 Saks, E R (1991) Competency to Refuse Treatment; North Carolina Law Review; Vol. 69; 945-999 at 
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decision-making process so as to render the individual incapable82. This is illustrated 
in the English case of NHS Trust v Ms T83, which concerned a sufferer of borderline 
personality disorder who refused blood transfusions through an advance directive on 
the grounds that her blood was evil and that the transfused blood would become 
corrupted once it entered her body. The refusal was deemed to be invalid due to a 
patently false belief which could in turn be attributed to a disorder of the mind84 and 
ultimately, the delusion was deemed to have sufficiently impacted upon Ms T’s 
capacity85.  
 
Ultimately, the current shift towards promoting patient autonomy means that patients 
are far more likely to have their views respected in relation to treatment than ever 
before. However, this is not to say that doctors will, and indeed should respect the 
decision of an individual whose treatment decision is completely removed from 
reality. In such cases, it is essential to assess whether the belief is indicative of the 
presence of a delusion brought about by mental disorder. If this is the case, it is then a 
matter of ascertaining whether the delusion has sufficient impact upon the decision-
making process so as to indicate incapacity. If an individual is deemed incapable of 
making a valid treatment decision, the doctor is then able to intervene on the patient’s 
behalf. At this point, the principle of autonomy gives way to the principle of 
paternalism. 
 
1.2: THE PRINCIPLE OF PATERNALISM 
 
Paternalism has been defined by Beauchamp and Childress as follows: 
“The intentional overriding of one person’s known preferences or actions by 
another person, where the person who overrides justifies the action by the 
                                                 
82 See Banks v Goodfellow [1870] L.R. 5 Q.B 549 at 565, in which the court stated the following with 
regards to testamentary capacity: “It is essential to the exercise of such a power that a testator shall 
understand the nature of the acts and effects; shall understand the extent of the property of 
which he is disposing; shall be able to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which he ought 
to give effect; and with a view to the latter object, that no disorder of the mine shall poison his 
affections, perverts his sense of right, or prevent the exercise of his natural faculties – that no 
insane delusion shall influence his will in disposing of his property and bring about a disposal of 
it which, if the mind had been sound, would not have been made.” See also Gunn, M J (2005) 
Decision-Making Capacity and the Mental Capacity Act 2005: Some Difficult Issues and some Possible 
Means of Resolution; unpublished.  
83 [2004] E.W.H.C 1279. 
84 Ibid per Charles J at Para 62.   
85 See also Doncaster and Bassetlaw Hospitals NHS Trust v C [2004] E.W.H.C 1657. 
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goal of benefiting or avoiding harm to the person whose preferences or 
actions are overridden.”86  
As the definition suggests, the principle of paternalism exists in direct conflict to the 
principle of autonomy, and proponents of the principle would argue that the duty to 
act in the best interests of the patient by overriding a treatment refusal should take 
priority over respecting the patient’s refusal87. However, this approach is not accorded 
real priority in capacity law, with the principle of paternalism only becoming 
important if an individual is incapable of exercising their autonomy.  
 
Paternalism can be divided into two sub-categories: soft paternalism and hard 
paternalism. Soft paternalism involves intervention only when an individual’s 
decisions are not, or cannot be based upon, a particular rationale. In other words, the 
individual is incapable of making fully autonomous decisions. 
Hard paternalism involves intervention even when an individual is fully capable of 
making autonomous decisions, but makes a decision which the paternalist does not 
consider to be in the best interests of that person: “The hard paternalist will restrict 
forms of information available to the person or will otherwise override the 
person’s informed and voluntary choices”88 
 
While both soft and hard paternalism are both relevant from a mental health context, 
soft paternalism is far easier to justify ethically. Consider the hypothetical example of 
an individual with severe learning disabilities who is unable to comprehend the nature 
of his proposed treatment sufficiently enough to make an autonomous decision. If the 
treatment would provide great benefit to the patient with very little or no distress, one 
could argue that the doctor in fact has a duty to adopt a paternalistic approach in order 
to fulfil his obligation to improve the patient’s health. It would be difficult to argue 
                                                 
86 Beauchamp, T L and Childress, J F (2009) Principles of Biomedical Ethics 6th Ed; Oxford University 
Press at 208. 
87 See Savulescu J (1995) Rational Non-Interventional Paternalism: Why Doctors Ought to Make 
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Treatment; Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine; Vol. 97; 415-420.  
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this as morally indefensible. There cannot be a duty to respect autonomy when the 
individual in question is not capable of exercising his right to it.  
 
Hard Paternalism presents a greater ethical dilemma. Opponents of the paternalistic 
approach might argue that it would be a violation of fundamental human rights such 
as freedom of speech or freedom of choice. Attempting to impose a particular 
decision upon individuals capable of making that decision themselves, say anti-
paternalists, would be to show that person disrespect, because it would be giving the 
impression that their decisions and opinions were less valid. Beauchamp and 
Childress state that opponents of hard paternalism believe the concept to be too 
broad89. This is a point worthy of consideration. If the overall motivation for adopting 
a paternalistic approach were for the prevention of harm to the individual, then this 
would mean that there were innumerable scenarios which would suddenly be regarded 
as morally indefensible. One could argue for instance, that a paternalist would have a 
moral duty to stop another individual defending the country by going to fight in a war, 
on the grounds that it may result in the loss of that individual’s life. However, anti-
paternalists might conversely argue that if that individual has made a clear and 
rational decision to fight for his country, it would be disrespectful to prevent them 
doing so. In a healthcare context, opponents of paternalism argue that “it 
[paternalism] would authorise health-care institutions, physicians and nurses to 
override patient’s plans and preferences in many cases”90. Again, this assertion 
appears logical. Healthcare law contains many cases where patients have made 
treatment decisions that were perceived to have gone against ‘the norm’. Individuals 
have refused life-saving blood transfusions because of religious beliefs91; refused 
Caesarean operations on the grounds of ‘needle-phobia’92, and refused life-saving 
treatment for a gangrenous leg because of a desire to die with two legs rather than 
one93, to name but a few examples.  
 
According to Beauchamp and Childress, hard paternalism is morally defensible if: the 
patient is at risk of significant, preventable harm; if the act of paternalism is likely to 
                                                 
89 Ibid at 213. 
90 Beauchamp, T L and Childress, J F (2009) - Principles of Biomedical Ethics 6th Ed; Oxford 
University Press at 213. 
91 See Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All E.R 649. 
92 See Re MB (Adult: Medical Treatment) [1997] 38 B.M.L.R 175. 
93 See Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1994] 1 All E.R 819. 
  36   
prevent the harm; if the benefits of the act outweigh the risks to the patient; there is 
not viable alternative to limiting the patient’s autonomy and if a least-autonomy 
restrictive alternative is adopted wherever practicable.94  
 
Decisions based on religious beliefs can also be controversial in this respect. In the 
case of a Jehovah’s Witness who refuses a life-saving blood transfusion, the doctor’s 
overwhelming desire might be to override the patient’s wishes and administer the 
transfusion regardless95. However, a doctor would not be ethically justified in 
administering a blood transfusion to a Jehovah’s Witness on the grounds of hard 
paternalism, providing that the patient had made a conscious decision to join the faith 
themselves, and had not been coerced by a third party. If a belief is deeply held and it 
is clear that the patient made their decision based upon these beliefs, the decision is 
autonomous and does not warrant a strongly paternalistic stance from the doctor, 
regardless of how well intentioned the doctor’s motives were. Marc Stauch’s analysis 
of non-rational beliefs becomes relevant here; a deeply held religious belief is in 
complete contrast to a patently false belief; the former can be neither proven nor 
disproved and has a sound basis through well-established tenets. By contrast, patently 
false beliefs can demonstrably be proven false and potentially indicate a lack of 
decision-making capacity. It is in such a case where a doctor will be justified in acting 
paternalistically in order to safeguard the welfare and interests of the individual.  
 
1.3: THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRMINATION 
 
The principle of non-discrimination states that an individual suffering with a mental 
disorder or mental impairment should retain the same rights as those who are not 
suffering with any such conditions. This principle has been given great importance in 
recent years in relation to mental health provisions. The 1999 Richardson Committee 
Report highlighted the importance of the principle as follows: 
“We [the Richardson Committee] regard the principle of non-discrimination 
as central to the provision of treatment and care to those suffering from 
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mental disorder and by non-discrimination in this context we are referring to 
non-discrimination on grounds of mental health.”96 
 
The Richardson Committee, in highlighting the importance of non-discrimination, 
stated strongly that any powers used under mental health legislation should be 
exercised without any direct or indirect discrimination on the grounds of disability, 
age, gender, sexual orientation, race, colour, language, religion or ethnic origin97. 
In examining the importance of non-discrimination, it is submitted that a significant 
aspect of this is the stigma that surrounds mental illness, in terms of attitudes and 
preconceptions. In order for the principle of non-discrimination to be adequately 
satisfied within capacity law, it is essential that work is done to increase awareness of 
the link between mental health and capacity, this ideally eliminating any stigma that 
may be attached to individuals suffering with mental disorder or impairment. 
 
According to Mukherjee et al, “Stigmatisation of psychiatric illness has been 
evident for as long as illness has existed. Despite efforts to try to change attitudes 
by both individuals and by groups such as Mind and the World Health 
Organisation, it still exists.”98 Jim Bolton defines stigma as follows: 
“Stigma marks an individual out as being different and evokes some form of 
sanction. Illnesses can often be the stigmatising characteristic. However, 
whereas the stigma of physical conditions such as cancer and epilepsy has 
declined, mental disorders remain some of the most stigmatised illnesses.”99 
The stigma of mental illness often outweighs that of physical illness where in some 
cases, stigma may not exist at all. Bolton further states that societal attitudes play an 
important part in explaining the cause of this stigma. He then highlights a number of 
beliefs commonly associated with mental illness sufferers. The following are of 
particular relevance to the issue of mental capacity: “Mental illness reflects a 
weakness of character... Outcome is poor… Disorders are incurable… It is 
difficult to communicate with people with mental illnesses.”100 Such preconceived 
ideas regarding the capabilities of those suffering with mental illness or impairment 
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99 Bolton, J (2003) Reducing the stigma of mental illness; Student BMJ; Vol. 11, 104-105 at 104. 
100 Ibid 
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ultimately means that such individuals will be deemed unable to voice their wishes, 
opinions and feelings, and also incapable of making important life decisions.  
In order to highlight the scale of the issue, Mukherjee et al presented a questionnaire 
in 2002 to 832 medical students and 441 doctors at a London teaching hospital with 
the intention of ascertaining attitudes and opinions towards psychiatric illness. The 
results showed that individuals suffering with schizophrenia drew the most significant 
amount of negative opinion101, with more than fifty per cent of respondents 
considering sufferers of the illness to be dangerous. Beyond this however, negative 
attitudes towards mental illness sufferers diminished: 
“More often doctors and medical students were less likely to blame the 
individual and, with the exception of dementia where there appears to be a 
general pessimism despite recent symptomatic advances, felt that the 
conditions listed would improve and the individual would eventually 
recover.”102 
The above response can be seen as positive in as much as that there appeared to be 
some recognition of the fact that not all mental illnesses and impairments are 
incurable. Ergo, this can be applied in principle to conditions affecting capacity, in the 
sense that if a condition is curable, the resulting incapacity would also be reduced or 
disappear. However, it should be noted that the respondents to the questionnaire were 
all doctors or medical students, and therefore can hardly be considered representative 
of the general public. Indeed, it is perhaps telling that even respondents educated in 
matters of mental illness still have negative preconceptions of certain mental 
disorders. By this token, it cannot be assumed that the general public will not have 
similar, if not increased negative preconceptions of mental illness/impairment 
sufferers. Jim Bolton highlights the fact that stigma of mental illness within the 
medical profession is an issue which should not be taken lightly: 
“Fear and ignorance of mental illness can result in an insufficient focus on a 
patient’s physical health needs… The belief that mental illness is incurable or 
self-inflicted can also be damaging, leading to patients not being referred for 
appropriate mental health care.”103 
                                                 
101 This view of schizophrenia was also found in a survey conducted by Crisp et al amongst the British 
adult population in 2000. See Crisp et al (2000) Stigmatisation of people with mental illness. 
102 Mukherjee R et al (2002) The stigmatisation of psychiatric illness: the attitudes of medical students 
and doctors in a London teaching hospital ; Psychiatric Bulletin Vol. 26, 178-181 at 179. 
103 Bolton, J (2003) Reducing the stigma of mental illness; Student BMJ; Vol. 11, 104-105 at 104. 
  39   
This exposition can certainly be applied to the issue of capacity. If an individual is 
deemed incapable without any investigation as to the duration of that incapacity, this 
might ostensibly result in an individual being unnecessarily deprived of the right to 
make important decisions vis a vis medical treatment. It is therefore essential that any 
education relating to mental disorders and mental impairment be directed at 
healthcare professionals as well as the general public. 
Hayward and Bright also comment that the stigma of mental illness may also be 
prevalent amongst sufferers themselves. If an individual is aware that they are a 
sufferer of a mental disorder, then any negative opinion of this group will ultimately 
have a negative effect upon that individual’s ability to cope with the condition104. 
Again, the key to improving this situation is to educate sufferers as to the true nature 
of their illness, as Hayward and Bright explain: 
“By this argument, patients who do not believe that that they are mentally ill 
should cope better. However, there is an opposite view, which we might call 
‘the medical model’, which holds that acceptance of the fact of illness should 
lead to a better outcome. The argument here would be that patients who 
accept that they suffer from mental illness will show better adherence to 
treatment and better understanding of how to cope with their illnesses.”105 
 
The above comments from Hayward and Bright highlight the fact that sufferers of a 
mental disorder or impairment must not simply be ignored or treated as incapable of 
understanding the nature of their condition. Through empowering the individual to 
recognise that they suffer from a mental disorder or impairment, it is hoped that the 
stigma associated with the particular condition will be alleviated, providing the 
individual with greater awareness and thus potentially greater autonomy to handle 
their condition in a manner best suited to them.  
 
This notwithstanding, Hayward and Bright acknowledge that the results of research 
conducted in this area have produced contradictory results: 
“On the one hand, there is considerable research evidence to confirm the 
early findings that those who suffer from mental illness have stigmatising 
                                                 
104 Hawyard, P and Bright, J (1997) Stigma and Mental Illness: A Review and Critique; Journal of 
Mental Health, Vol. 6(4), 345-354 at 349. 
105 Ibid. 
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views very similar to those of the general public. When asked to offer ratings 
of approval or social distance to ‘mental patients’ or the ‘mentally ill’, many 
findings suggest that patients will be just as negative as the general public… 
One might therefore assume that a diagnosis of mental illness would lead to a 
sharp decline in self-esteem, as labelling theory would predict. In fact, this 
does not seem to be the case, as is indicated by a number of studies… 
Further, those patients who have received relief from troubling symptoms 
seem to evaluate the experience of being in hospital positively. The key point 
here would seem to be that those who suffer from mental illness evaluate 
themselves much more positively than they do ‘the average mental 
patient’.”106 
 
The above comments can be applied via analogy to capacity issues. Ultimately, if 
patients suffering from mental illness react positively to symptomatic treatment vis a 
vis self-image, the same effect is likely to occur when individuals are encouraged to 
take decisions for themselves in important areas, subject to assessment as to whether 
this is practical. If stigma can be linked to self esteem within sufferers of mental 
disorder/impairment, then it is submitted that the best way of alleviating this stigma is 
for policy-makers to acknowledge that sufferers of mental conditions must be treated 
as ‘normally’ as is practicable. Later chapters will discuss the extent to which the 
relevant jurisdictions have been successful in achieving this.  
 
It is submitted that the principle of non-discrimination will be best upheld through 
increased education and awareness of the issues relating to mental illness and 
capacity. A review of the literature relating to India shows that there is stigma still 
attached to mental illness which would ultimately make it more difficult for the 
principle of non-discrimination to be upheld. The Constitution of India makes vague 
reference to the right of persons with disabilities to work107, but interestingly does not 
include them within Article 15, which relates to prohibition of discrimination on the 
grounds of “religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth”. This suggests that the 
                                                 
106 Ibid. 
107 Constitution of India, Article 41: “The State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and 
development, make effective provision for securing the right to work, to education and to public 
assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases of 
undeserved want.” 
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potential for the mentally disordered and impaired to be discriminated against has not 
been adequately recognised. Literature on the subject suggests that those suffering 
with mental disorder or impairment are thought of as having little or no capacity for 
understanding108 and have very little chance of living life unaided109. However, the 
literature also highlights the attempts made by Non-Governmental Organisations to 
increase awareness and education which will lessen the stigma attached to mental 
disorders and impairments. Padmavati explains: 
“While the mentally ill patients do elicit negative responses such as fear, 
disgust, pity or hostility from society, families continue to take care of them. 
Temples and other religious institutions have also helped shelter these 
patients, who are left there by relatives who cannot cope. Rural communities 
have offered refuge to many patients who have wandered into their localities. 
Thus non-institutional care, a core concept of community psychiatry, has 
always been practiced in India through the ages, although this has been 
rather disorganised in structure and in function.”110 
Padmavati states also that it is the work of Non-Governmental Organisations rather 
than the government itself which is helping to increase awareness, which in turn can 
be attributed to a significant lack of resources. Padmavati states that as of 2005, there 
were approximately 3500 psychiatrists, 1000 social workers and 900 psychiatric 
nurses for the whole of India and its billion plus population111. The practicalities of 
healthcare provision in India means that increasing awareness and providing 
education becomes more difficult. Consequently, it becomes harder to dispel the 
myths surrounding mental illness and impairment that may stigmatise sufferers.  
U.K capacity law112 now emphasises the need to recognise that the presence of mental 
disorder or impairment does not necessarily equate to an inability to make all 
decisions relating to medical treatment. Although this has yet to happen in India to a 
significant extent, there is evidence to suggest that progress is being made in this area.  
                                                 
108 Varma, L.P; Mental Disorders: Some Misconceptions; Souvenir III Conference of Eastern Zone; 
I.P.S, Guwahati. 
109 Tilak, D (1992) Mentally Handicapped: Care, Financial Security and Guardianship Needs; Indian 
Journal of Social Work; Vol. 53(1), 1-15.  
110 Padmavati, R (2005) Community Mental Health Care in India; International Review of Psychiatry; 
Vol. 17(2), 103-107 at 103.  
111 Ibid. 
112 See Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis.  
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In 1999, India passed the National Trust for the Welfare of Persons with Autism, 
Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation and Multiple Disabilities Act 1999 (known as the 
National Trust Act 1999). The objectives of the Act were stated as follows: 
“a) to enable and empower persons with disability to live as independently 
and as fully as possible within and as close to the community to which they 
belong; 
b) to strengthen facilities to provide support to persons with disability to live 
within their own families; 
c) to extend support to registered organization to provide need based services 
during the period of crises in the family of persons with disability; 
d) to deal with problems or persons with disability who do not have family 
support; 
e) to promote measures for the care and protraction of persons with disability 
in the event of death of their parent or guardian; 
f) to evolve procedure for the appointment of guardians and trustees for 
persons with disability requiring such protection; 
g) to facilitate the realisation of equal opportunities, protection of right and 
full participation of persons disability; and 
h) to do any other act which is incidental to the aforesaid object”113 
Despite references to the empowerment of the individual, critics of the 1999 Act have 
argued that it does not fully acknowledge that those persons with disabilities may 
retain full capacity in some or many areas of their lives. Dhanda and Gambos 
highlight the fact that in 2008, India ratified the U.N Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities 2006, and as a result, all relevant domestic legislation must 
be in line with it. Given that the 2006 U.N Convention emphasises that persons with 
disabilities are not automatically incapable and in need of intervention114, Dhanda and 
Gambos criticise the National Trust Act 1999 for its failure to include similar 
provisions: “The N.T.A accepts that in a particular case, persons with disability 
could be found to possess capacity; but it does not presume that persons with 
                                                 
113 National Trust for the Welfare of Persons with Autism, Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation and 
Multiple Disabilities Act 1999, Chapter 3; see also Guha, A (date unspecified) The National Trust Act: 
Legislation for the New Milennium; accessed online on 24/01/09; available online at: 
www.unescap.org/esid/psis/disability/decade/otsujapan2002/doc/A_Guha.doc.  
114 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006, Article 12(3): “States 
Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the 
support they may require in exercising their legal capacity.” 
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disability possess capacity like non-disabled persons.”115 Whilst the 1999 Act 
might indeed fail to recognise that those affected by mental illness or impairment may 
retain some or all of their decision-making capacity, the issue has nevertheless been 
recognised and critiqued by academics in the field and there is thus scope for this 
awareness to develop further and ideally, influence the law. English law itself did not 
recognise that persons with disabilities could retain capacity until the case of Re C 
(Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment)116 in 1994. Similarly, one cannot discount the 
possibility of the law in India developing in the same way, particularly given that 
discussion of the issue is already underway.  
 
1.4: THE PRINCIPLE OF LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE 
 
The 1999 Richardson Committee Report highlighted the principle of least restrictive 
alternative as one of the express principles which should be included in any future 
mental health legislation. The principle was defined in the report as follows: 
“Service users should be provided with any necessary care, treatment and 
support both in the least invasive manner and in the least restrictive manner 
and environment compatible with the delivery of safe and effective care, 
taking into account the safety of other patients.”117 
The principle of least restrictive alternative has two aspects: first, any treatment or 
care given to the individual should be administered in as unrestrictive a method as 
possible. Examples of this could be, say, leaving the door unlocked in a patient’s 
room if they pose no danger or problem. The second aspect to this principle is that 
treatment should always be administered proportionately to the nature of the patient’s 
condition. This principle has been supported by both the English and Scottish 
Governments and enshrined in the respective capacity legislations in both 
jurisdictions.  
 
 
 
                                                 
115 Dhanda, A and Gambos, G (2008) Harmonising National Laws with U.N.C.R.P.D: Suggested 
Amendments to the National Trust Act 1999; accessed online on 25/01/09; available online at 
http://uncrpdandlaw.nileshsingit.org.  
116 [1994] 1 All E.R 819.  
117 Review of the Mental Health Act 1983: Report of the Expert Committee (1999) at Para 2.21(ii).  
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1.5: THE PRINCIPLE OF COMMUNITARIANISM 
 
The principle of communitarianism states that the needs and wishes of the individual 
are subordinate to the promotion of the values and relationships pertaining to the 
community in general. Beauchamp and Childress state that in this theory, “communal 
values, the common good, social goals, traditional practices and cooperative 
virtues are fundamental in ethics.”118 
 
In addition, Beauchamp and Childress argue that to the communitarian, the ethics 
which bind the healthcare professional are too focussed upon the protection of the 
individual’s rights119. In the context of capacity law (and particularly the ethical 
underpinnings of the English and Scottish law), a greater emphasis upon patient 
autonomy is in essence a contravention of a communitarian outlook. Consider the 
hypothetical example of a Jehovah’s Witness who refuses a blood transfusion, but 
whose family are not members of the religion and are not in favour of refusing 
treatment which could save the life of the individual. A communitarian might 
ostensibly consider the needs and wishes of the family to be as, if not more important 
than the right of the individual to refuse the treatment, in as much as the individual 
must not simply consider their own needs, but also the impact that the decision might 
have on others. In this way, it is submitted that communitarianism need not 
specifically involve the community at large, but could also involve a group of persons 
close to the individual, such as family.  
 
In the context of this thesis, it is submitted the principle of communitarianism plays a 
potentially crucial role in the context of decision-making in India. Laungani highlights 
the importance of community in Indian society: 
“A community in India is not just a collection of individuals gathered 
together for a common purpose. A community in the sense in which it is 
understood in India has several common features. People within a group are 
united by a common caste rank, religious grouping and linguistic and 
geographical boundaries. The members within a community generally 
                                                 
118 Beauchamp, T L and Childress, J F (2009) Principles of Biomedical Ethics 6th Ed; Oxford 
University Press at 356.  
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operate on a ranking or a hierarchical system. Elders are accorded special 
status within the community and their important role is very clearly 
recognised. On important issues the members of a community may meet and 
confer with one another, and any decisions taken are often binding on the 
rest of the members within the community”120 
This view of the hierarchical family structure is given further exposition by Ahmad: 
“A joint household is not simply a number of unitary families living together. 
It is, instead, a structure of various hierarchical relationships. Norms relating 
to joint family living and strong extended family ties are traditionally kept up 
when the family is living in unitary households. For instance, members of a 
joint family may still share or jointly own many of their resources. They rely 
on family elders for major decisions and keep up mutual obligations to each 
other… Moreover, the hierarchical relationships within the unitary 
households are usually modelled after the basic structural paradigm of the 
extended family.”121 
 
Such an approach to decision-making could be argued to conflict with Mill’s notion 
that the decisions of the individual should take maximum priority. As stated above, 
Mill commented that human beings had the right to form opinions and to express 
these opinions without reserve122. He does not specifically mention that others have 
the right to collaborate in this process. Laungani also contrasts the communitarian 
approach with the Western approach, which he says espouses a more individualistic 
way of life: 
“At an abstract level, the concept itself has come to acquire several different 
meanings: an ability to exercise a degree of control over one’s life, the ability 
to cope with one’s problems, an ability to change for the better, reliance upon 
oneself, being responsible for one’s actions, self-fulfilment and self-realisation 
of one’s internal resources.”123   
                                                 
120 Laungani, P (1997) Mental Illness in India and Britain: Theory and Practice; Medicine and Law; 
Vol. 16(3), 509-540 at 522. 
121 Ahmad, I (2003) Between the Ideal and the Real: Gender Relations within the Indian Joint Family; 
chapter in Pernau, M; Ahmad, I and Reifeld R (2003) Family and Gender: Changing Values in 
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122 Mill, J S (1859) On Liberty and Other Essays; Oxford University Press at 62.  
123 Ibid at 518. 
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In the light of these comments, it is submitted that to the communitarian, any decision 
making should essentially be a collaborative process, in particular with those closest 
to the individual, such as the family. Venkoba Rao states that the role of elders is 
accorded great importance within the family and their opinions and blessings will 
often be sought after124. Laungani’s submissions on the importance of family should 
be noted in the context of collaborative decision-making: 
“In an Indian family’s life, one’s individuality is subordinated to collective 
solidarity, and one’s ego is submerged into the collective ego of the family 
and one’s community. Consequently when a problem – financial, medical, 
psychiatric or whatever – affects an individual, it affects the entire family. 
The problem becomes one of concern for the whole family”125 
 
How then does a communitarian approach impact upon the decision-making process? 
Suppose for the sake of argument that a second or third generation family member, 
i.e. a son or daughter, requires a particular course of treatment and needs to take a 
decision over whether to accept or refuse the treatment. If Rack and Venkoba Rao are 
correct in their assertions about the emphasis placed upon the opinions of family 
members, particularly the elders, then this ostensibly informs the manner in which the 
treatment decision of the individual is made. The individual would be expected to 
consider the impact of the decision upon other family members, and it is possible that 
the views of the elders will be considered very important to the overall decision. It 
must be stressed that this does not mean that such an approach to decision-making 
equates to the presence of coercion by other family members upon the individual. If 
an individual is required to make a treatment decision, and in doing so, chooses either 
to collaborate extensively with his family, or defer the decision to his family entirely, 
this is no less an autonomous decision than if the individual had made a decision 
entirely on their own. It simply means that the individual has chosen to exercise their 
autonomy in a different way. Hellsten further comments on the link between the 
principles of communitarianism and autonomy: 
“Any conception of an individual presupposes always some view of society 
and community, since all individuals are social beings. All the values and 
                                                 
124 Venkoba Rao A (1981) Mental Health and Ageing in India; Indian Journal of Psychiatry; Vol. 
23(1), 11-20 at 13. 
125 Laungani, P (1997) Mental Illness in India and Britain: Theory and Practice; Medicine and Law; 
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norms we have chosen as members of a particular community, ethnic group 
or social collective. More often than not, these social attachments are 
involuntarily acquired during the course of our upbringing and socialisation, 
independent rational choice having played no role whatsoever in this. We do 
not choose the society we are born in, and thus we have not voluntarily 
chosen our culture and traditions either. Social influence, communitarians 
argue is not merely a contingent fact of our social and morel identities, but 
the original social context of a human life which shapes it to be the kind of 
life it is.”126 
Hellsten is essentially refuting the individualist premise that a communitarian 
approach to decision-making cannot be autonomous and is therefore invalid. He 
argues that one’s individuality does not exist in spite of community influence, but 
rather, exists because of it. The practices and beliefs that we accrue as the result of 
being brought up in a particular community or group become part of us and will 
ostensibly serve as the catalyst for many of the decisions that are made in everyday 
life. Hellsten explains further: 
“Despite their methodological differences, both liberals and communitarians 
base their emphasis on the importance of culture and community on the 
assumption that culture and community provide the common good and value 
standards for its members. For the communitarians, membership of a 
community is seen to have its own intrinsic value for an individual as a social 
being. Being a part of a community is an essential part of human life and 
human flourishing. The community, as a body with some common values, 
norms and goals, in which each member regards the common goals as his or 
her own, is intrinsically good, because it is a precondition of the moral 
autonomy of the individual.”127 
Hellsten’s analysis could arguably be summed up by John Donne’s famous statement 
that “No man is an island”128. It is ultimately unrealistic to expect the individual to 
conduct their life entirely independently of others, and by the same token, unrealistic 
to expect decisions to be made entirely in isolation without giving any consideration 
to how a decision may affect community or family members. One of course may wish 
                                                 
126 Hellsten, S; Cultural Diversity and the Limits of Tolerance; chapter can be found in Parker, M 
(1999) Ethics and Community in the Healthcare Professions; Routledge Publications London at 120.  
127 Ibid at 124.  
128 Donne, J (1623) Meditation XVII as can be found in Devotions upon Emergent Occasions.  
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to make a decision in this way, but it is submitted that decisions made in any other 
way should not be deemed invalid on the grounds of not being autonomous.  
 
The process of actively choosing to collaborate or defer a decision to family members 
must be distinguished from a scenario whereby an individual is coerced or 
manipulated into making a decision they might not have otherwise made. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 3, the latter scenario means that a decision is not fully 
autonomous and the decision is therefore not valid. However, being unduly influenced 
by family members through coercion or manipulation must not be confused with 
accepting sound advice in order to aid in the decision-making process129. The Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 states that account should be taken of beliefs and values that would 
be likely to influence a particular decision130. It is submitted that this must also 
include situations where the individual chooses to adopt a more communitarian 
approach to decision-making, by considering the impact of the decision upon their 
family and any opinions of family members. Jones states that as well as factor such as 
cultural and religious background, one’s beliefs and values can include “past 
behaviour and expressions of conviction”131 which, it is submitted, would include 
evidence of a consistently used communitarian approach to decision-making. If such a 
process forms part of a deeply held system and the individual is entirely comfortable 
with it, then there is no reason why the principle of communitarianism should conflict 
with the principle of autonomy. If however, an individual has been unduly influenced 
by another family member, and thus makes a treatment decision which considers the 
wishes and needs of the family in this manner; this is contrary to the principle of 
autonomy and is not a valid decision.  
It is difficult to provide a blueprint for the components of a communitarian approach 
to decision-making that is also sufficiently autonomous. This is because different 
families will have different approaches to decision-making and each case must 
therefore be decided on the individual facts. However, it may be possible to identify 
different aspects of communitarian decision-making and distinguish between them. 
First, although communitarianism requires the wishes, opinions and feelings of others 
                                                 
129 For an illustration of this contrast, see the cases of Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) 
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to be taken into account, the question remains as to who retains the right to the final 
decision. It is submitted that for a communitarian approach to be valid, there must be 
sufficient evidence to show that the individual has exercised their autonomy in 
making the decision, even if in doing so, they have chosen to give greater weight to 
the opinions of other family members. The manner in which collaborative decision-
making takes place within families will vary; the individual may retain the final say, 
with the views of other family members being considered more as persuasive 
authority; the views of all family members may be given equal weight, or the views of 
the elders in the family may be given the highest priority if a hierarchical family 
structure is in place.  It is also possible, although by no means definitive, that the 
views of the male members of the family may be accorded greater importance than 
that of the female family members. A United Nations report published in 2001 
suggests that women may little say in the decision-making process: 
“Indian women are marginalised in decision-making and leadership by a 
variety of processed that begin in infancy. In contrast to boys, girls are 
encouraged to play passive roles and given little opportunity to make 
decisions or develop leadership skills outside the family context. Instead, they 
are taught to accept the decisions that others – parents, teachers, brothers – 
make on their behalf.”132 
In the context of medical treatment, Menon-Sen and Shiva Kumar’s report provides 
statistics regarding the percentage of women in India that were involved in decisions 
regarding medical treatment. The figures vary from state to state, with 81% of women 
in the state of Himachal Pradesh being involved in healthcare decisions, compared to 
just 45% in Uttar Pradesh133. Figures however, varied in relation to other spheres of 
decision-making. 97% of women in Punjab were involved in decisions regarding 
cooking for example, compared to Uttar Pradesh which had the lowest percentage in 
this category with 78%. It could be inferred that the involvement of women in familial 
decision-making will vary depending on the ‘seriousness’ of the material decision and 
the ‘gender’ aspects of it – healthcare is a serious issue which may in turn lead to 
women having less involvement, whereas cooking is an issue which stereotypically 
comes under the domain of the female family members.  
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Nations at 61; accessed on 03/01/09; available online at http://www.un.org.in/IMAGES/kmsbk_1-
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In the same way that female and younger family members may choose, or be expected 
to collaborate on important family decisions with the family, such a scenario is 
arguably more likely if the family member in question is incapable. Depending upon 
the degree of incapacity, the individual may still retain some or most of their decision-
making ability. However, because of the prevailing condition that resulted in the 
individual’s incapacity, this decision-making ability may not be recognised, and the 
individual in turn seen as too vulnerable to be able to cope with making important 
decisions. Again, it is possible that some form of coercion may take place, which 
would invalidate any treatment decision, or alternatively, the individual may fully 
accept the role of the family in aiding with making important decisions.  
 
Whatever the basis on which a collaborative decision-making process is predicated, it 
is submitted that this is not the crux of the matter. The central issue regarding a valid 
communitarian approach is whether the individual in question has themselves made 
the choice to defer decisions to others or to collaborate extensively with them. The 
above quote from Menon-Sen and Shiva Kumar refers to the fact that women are 
taught to accept the decisions that are made on their behalf. One could interpret their 
statement as meaning that women are effectively denied the right to exercise their 
autonomy. Whilst such a situation is of course possible, it is submitted that this need 
not be the case. Menon-Sen and Shiva Kumar’s report details the percentage of 
women across India that are involved with decisions in various aspects of family life. 
What the statistics do not tell us is the extent to which the women accepted this. Just 
as one cannot rule out the possibility of coercion in some families, one equally cannot 
rule out the possibility that individuals may accept that their position within the 
family would necessitate the involvement of other family members in important 
decision-making. 
Similarly, consider the hypothetical example of an eighteen year old who lives with in 
a joint family household along with his parents and grandparents. He has attained the 
age of majority and so is an adult in the eyes of the law and entitled to make decisions 
for himself. Since birth, this individual has been brought up in an environment where 
important welfare decisions are shared with the entire family, with the final say often 
being with the grandfather as the eldest in the family. The individual has complete 
faith in the ability of the elders to make important decisions wisely, and has never had 
any issue with this process even after he has attained the age of majority and is legally 
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permitted to make decisions himself. Opponents of a collaborative approach to 
decision-making may argue that such a scenario is not indicative of an autonomous 
decision, because the individual has not had the opportunity to experience making his 
own decisions and has simply become accustomed to deferring to the family elders. It 
is submitted however, that this is ultimately an invalid criticism. It is of course 
possible that family members may be coerced into adopting a certain way of life or 
making certain decisions, in which case decisions made in such circumstances would 
not be autonomous. However, it is also entirely possible for an individual to follow a 
particular way of life and continue to do so after attaining majority, on the grounds 
that they are happy with the status quo and therefore see no reason to question it. If 
the individual states clearly that they have chosen to defer to their elders and the 
relevant healthcare professional is satisfied with this, the decision should be regarded 
as autonomous and therefore valid. In deferring to the elders in the family, the 
individual has in effect chosen not to make a decision. If an individual grows up 
incorporating their family’s religion into their own belief system, this is not usually 
seen as indicative of a lack of autonomy on their part, since their upbringing in effect 
shapes their personality. Also, if an individual is brought up to believe that in their 
family, the elders or the males should be given a greater say in important decisions, 
this may also be accepted and form part of their overall personality in the same way. 
 
 It is submitted that a communitarian approach to decision-making is not in conflict 
with an autonomous one, and is potentially equally as valid as a decision made on an 
individualistic basis.  
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CHAPTER 2: LEGAL AND PROCEDURAL CONCEPTS 
 
LEGAL CONCEPTS 
 
2.1: CAPACITY 
 
Capacity is the cornerstone concept behind the law relating to healthcare134. From an 
ethics perspective, respect for one’s decision-making capacity underpins the 
substantive principle of autonomy, which as discussed in Chapter 1, is the most 
fundamental of ethical principles relating to human beings.  
According to Bellhouse et al: “The concept of capacity lies at the heart of an 
adult’s right to make legally significant decisions such as giving or withholding 
consent to treatment, making a will, entering into a contract and marrying.”135 
Gunn highlights the fact that giving maximum priority to capacity is often difficult, 
particularly when the decision is thought by others to be questionable from an 
objective point of view136.  
In order to be deemed legally competent to make decisions, it is necessary to satisfy 
the prescribed criteria for mental capacity. The existing definitions of capacity have 
undergone significant developments over the last two decades. A useful starting point 
is the definition given by Bristow J in the case of Chatterton v Gerson137. In that case, 
his Lordship stated that in order to demonstrate capacity, the individual must be 
provided with enough information to be able to understand the broad terms of any 
proposed medical treatment. It will be seen that the threshold proposed by Bristow J is 
not of a high level, which ensures that individuals do not have their decision-making 
rights overridden unnecessarily. This ethos has remained constant throughout the 
development of both the common law and the legislation relating to capacity, and is 
undoubtedly important. Nevertheless, the ‘broad terms’ principles espoused by 
Bristow J came at a time when capacity was still a nascent concept in the eyes of the 
law and, as a result, it is vague in as much as it contains no assessment criteria for 
determining capacity. Further guidance was provided by the Law Commission of 
                                                 
134 Report of the Expert Committee (1999) Review of the Mental Health Act 1983. See also Szmukler, 
G and Holloway, F (2000) Reform of the Mental Health Act: Health or Safety?  British Journal of 
Psychiatry; Vol. 177, 196-200 at 196.  
135 Bellhouse, J et al (2001) Decision-Making Capacity in Adults: Its Assessment in Clinical Practice; 
Advances in Psychiatric Treatment; Vol. 7; 294-301 at 294.  
136 Gunn, M J (2005) Decision-Making and the Mental Capacity Act 2005: Some Difficult Issues and 
Some Possible Means of Resolution; unpublished.  
137 [1981] 1 All E.R. 257.  
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England and Wales who outlined three possible broader approaches to capacity in 
their 1995 report Mental Incapacity. These were the status, outcome and functional 
approaches138. Both the status and outcome approaches have been rejected outright in 
favour of the functional approach for reasons which will be explained below. First, it 
is necessary to define the three approaches. 
 
The status approach places emphasis upon an individual’s place within society i.e. as 
a minor or as a sufferer of mental illness. This approach carries with it a significant 
risk, namely that it may lead to a generalised conclusion that an individual suffering 
from a mental disorder or impairment will be incapable of taking any important 
decisions relating to their lives. The status approach was ultimately rejected because, 
according to the Law Commission, it was “quite out of tune with the policy aim of 
enabling and encouraging people to take for themselves any decision which they 
have capacity to take.”139 It is submitted that the Law Commission was entirely 
correct to reject the status approach; it is antiquated and perpetuates the stereotype 
that individuals suffering with mental disorder or impairment have no decision 
making capacity whatsoever140. From an ethics point of view, adopting a status 
approach to capacity would also contravene the substantive principle of non-
discrimination, which states that sufferers of a mental disorder or impairment should 
not be treated differently from those who are not suffering with such conditions. To 
adopt a status approach is thus to erroneously discount the notion that an individual 
suffering with a mental disorder or impairment could be capable of making treatment 
decisions in the same way as any other person. Dhanda highlights the potentially 
damaging effect of a status approach: 
“A label of incompetence can often play out as a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Once a finding is reached that a person is incompetent to perform certain 
tasks, such a person shall not be given any opportunity to engage in or learn 
those tasks. It follows… that if a person is denied the opportunity to fulfil 
                                                 
138 see Law Commission Report No. 231 (1995) Mental Incapacity.  
139 Ibid.  
140 See Carson D (1993) Disabling Process: The Law Commission’s Proposals on Mentally 
Incapacitated Adults’ Decision-Making; Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law; 304 at 309, where 
the author states that “disability is caused in part, by non-disabled people. It is not something real 
experienced by individuals, but something affected by our responses to it.” See also Freeman, M 
(1994) Deciding for the Intellectually Impaired; Medical Law Review; Vol. 2, 77-91 at 81. 
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certain life activities, he or she fails to develop the capabilities required to 
perform those activities.”141 
 
The second approach which was outlined and rejected was the outcome approach. 
According to the Law Commission: 
“[The outcome approach] focuses on the final content of an individual’s 
decision. Any decision which is inconsistent with conventional values, or with 
which the assessor disagrees, may be classified as incompetent. This penalises 
individuality, and demands conformity at the expense of personal 
autonomy.”142 
The main disadvantage with this approach is that the opinions, wishes and feelings of 
the individual are deemed invalid or of secondary importance if they contradict 
established opinion or conventional norms. In the context of medical treatment 
decisions, a doctor permitted to adopt the outcome approach could, hypothetically 
speaking, override the wishes of a Jehovah’s Witness who is refusing a blood 
transfusion; this could be done on the grounds that the patient’s decisions conflicted 
with the doctor’s own beliefs. The Law Commission also stated that such an approach 
had been indirectly adopted by doctors in the past, in as much as if a patient’s 
decision matched that of the doctor, he/she would be deemed to have capacity. If on 
the other hand, a patient’s decision conflicts with that of the doctor, despite having 
been reached with all due care and consideration, the patient could be ruled as 
incapable and their decision subsequently overruled143. It will be seen in Chapter 3 
that this approach is incompatible with the common law position in the U.K, in 
particular, the judgment in Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) which stated 
that the reasons for making a treatment decision may be rational, irrational or non-
existent provided the individual has the capacity to make the decision144. This was 
subsequently confirmed in the s.1(4) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005.  
 
                                                 
141 Dhanda, A (2007) Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the past or 
lodestar for the future? Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce; Vol. 34, 429-462 at 436.  
142 Law Commission Report No. 231 (1995) at Para 3.4.  
143 Ibid.  
144 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All E.R 649 at 663.  
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The functional approach was the test which had garnered the most support by 
respondents to the Consultation process and is now the standard approach for 
assessing capacity. The Law Commission defined this approach as follows: 
“In this approach, the assessor asks whether an individual is able, at the time 
when a particular decision has to be made, to understand its nature and 
effects. Importantly, both partial and fluctuating capacity can be recognised. 
Most people, unless in a coma, are able to make at least some decisions for 
themselves, and many have levels of capacity which vary from week to week 
or even from hour to hour.”145 
The functional approach is the only test which does justice to the objectives given by 
the Law Commission. It fully considers the various states of capacity which exist, and 
does not treat capacity as an ‘all or nothing’ concept146. This allows for the possibility 
that adults with incapacity may be able to make certain decisions for themselves. The 
overriding of an individual’s right to make decisions is something which should never 
be done unless the incapacity of the individual has been confirmed. In order for this to 
happen, it is essential that a thorough assessment of capacity takes place. Adopting 
the functional approach necessitates this assessment, and requires that it is carried out 
for each particular decision, rather than simply requiring a general non-specific 
assessment of an individual’s capacity.  
 
Further guidance on a functional approach to capacity was provided through the 
MacArthur Treatment Competence study, conducted by Thomas Grisso and Paul 
Appelbaum in 1995. The objective of the MacArthur project was to “develop reliable 
and valid clinical information with which to address clinical and policy questions 
regarding the abilities of persons with mental illness to make decisions about 
psychiatric treatment.”147 In order to achieve this objective, the authors proposed 
four legal standards which should be used to determine whether an individual has the 
ability to make treatment decisions.  
                                                 
145 Law Commission Report No. 231 (1995) at Para 3.5.  
146 see Bellhouse et al (2003) Capacity-based mental health legislation and its impact on clinical 
practice 1) Admission to hospital and 2) Treatment in Hospital; Journal of Mental Health Law; August 
2003, 9-37 and Bellhouse et al (2001) Families and new medical dilemmas – capacity to make 
decisions; Child and Family Law Quarterly; Vol. 13(4), 383-398, all of which concern research 
conducted utilising the functional approach to capacity.  
147 Appelbaum, P.S and Grisso, T (1995) MacArthur Treatment Competence Study I: Mental Illness 
and Competence to Consent to Treatment; Law and Human Behaviour; Vol. 19(2); 105-126 at 105.  
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First, the individual must demonstrate the ability to communicate a particular choice. 
This, according to Grisso and Appelbaum, is the least strict of the four standards. The 
standard requires simply that an individual must be able to communicate a particular 
decision to the relevant caregiver. Those who are unable to do so will have failed to 
satisfy this particular standard148.  
 
Secondly, the individual must be able to understand relevant information presented to 
them. This standard “emphasises the importance of patients’ comprehension of 
information related to the issue at hand.”149 This is somewhat comparable to Lord 
Thorpe’s requirement that the individual be able to take in and retain the information 
given to them. In order for somebody to be able to retain information, it is necessary 
that they first be able to understand it. 
 
Thirdly, the individual must be able to appreciate the nature of the situation and its 
likely consequences. According to Grisso and Appelbaum:  
“This standard differs from an ability to understand information in 
requiring that patients be able to apply the information abstractly 
understood to their own situation. Thus, patients who understand that their 
physicians believe they are ill, but, in the face of objective evidence to the 
contrary, deny that this is so, or who understand that an effective treatment 
exists, but refuse to believe that it is likely to help them, will be said to lack 
appreciation.”150 
Grisso and Appelbaum’s exposition of the appreciation requirement makes reference 
to patients ‘denying’ that they are ill when doctors state otherwise, which could be 
construed as indicative of a patient not believing the information presented to them. In 
addition, Grisso and Appelbaum refer directly to the issue of belief in relation to 
patients not acknowledging that a particular course of treatment will help them and 
how this would be an indication of a failure to appreciate the information.  
 
Finally, Grisso and Appelbaum state that the individual must have the ability to 
manipulate any information given in a rational manner. Furthermore: 
                                                 
148 Ibid at 109. 
149 Ibid.  
150 Ibid at 110.  
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“This standard emphasises patient’s abilities to employ logical processes to 
compare the benefits and risks of treatment options. Even in the presence of 
good understanding and appreciation, decision-making still might be 
impaired if patients fail to process information logically. Conversely, the 
rational manipulation standard might be met even by patients who have 
impaired understanding or defective appreciation is their reasoning 
processes are intact.”151 
 
The key element to this standard is the ability to compare the benefits and risks of any 
proposed treatment. Note however that the ability to manipulate information 
rationally is what is necessary here, and this should be distinguished from the 
individual actually being required to manipulate information in a rational manner. For 
example, an individual who is both mentally and physically healthy would ostensibly 
have the ability to balance up benefits and risks of a particular treatment. However, he 
may choose to make a decision based on the flip of a coin. In this way, the individual 
is making a conscious choice not to manipulate the information rationally, but instead 
leave the decision to chance. As long as he/she has at some point demonstrated the 
ability to balance up the information available, this need not necessarily be utilised in 
the final decision. Grisso and Appelbaum state that a decision is not irrational simply 
by virtue of being unconventional152, an ethos which has also been applied in U.K 
capacity law153. The irrationality, say Grisso and Appelbaum, comes from the 
inability to process the information logically154. It is also worth noting that under the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.3(1)(c) stipulates that the individual must be able to “use 
or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision.” 
However Grisso and Appelbaum do not make reference to belief of information as 
one of their four assessment criteria specifically, although they do highlight this as 
being one aspect of an individual appreciating the information.  
 
 
                                                 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid. See also the American case of Re Maida Yetter [1973] 96 D & C 2d 619.  
153 See Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All E.R 649 and Mental Capacity act 2005 
at s. 1(4).  
154 Ibid at 110.  
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2.2: DECISION-MAKING FOR THE INCAPABLE ADULT: THE CONCEPTS 
OF BEST INTERESTS AND BENEFIT 
 
The issue of decision-making for the incapable adult becomes relevant only when a 
capacity assessment has revealed conclusively that the individual is incapable of 
making treatment decisions without assistance. In such a case, the relevant healthcare 
professional must make a decision based on what they consider to be in the best 
interests of the individual. This concept has undergone significant development over 
the last two decades, more in terms of content than definition. 
 
In England and Wales, the common law position on best interests held that a proposed 
treatment will be in a patient’s best interests only if that treatment is carried out with a 
view to saving the patient’s life, or to ensure an improvement or prevent deterioration 
in the patient’s condition155. The common law has also confirmed that even though a 
medical procedure will be at the heart of a best interests determination, the concept 
must extend beyond mere therapeutic medical interests156. The common law of 
England has thus interpreted best interests in the light of non-therapeutic issues, such 
as the desire not to cause emotional distress to the individual. On this point, the Law 
Commission stated that the principles of least restrictive alternative and 
normalisation157 were in essence based upon non-medical interpretations of best 
interests158. 
 
The concept of best interests is to be utilised to help individuals who cannot make 
decisions for themselves and the discussions relating to the reform of English capacity 
law which have ultimately led to the implementation of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
have resulted in an ideological shift for the best interests test.  
 
During the consultation process, the Law Commission highlighted two possible 
methods of making treatment decisions on behalf of incapable adults. These were the 
                                                 
155 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 A.C 1 per Lord Brandon at 55.  
156 See Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation  [1990] 2 A.C 1; Re A (Medical Treatment: Male 
Sterilisation) [2000] 53 B.M.L.R 66; Re SL (Adult Patient: Medical Treatment) [2000] 2 F.C.R 452, all 
of which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
157 See Chapter 1 of this thesis.  
158 Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 129 (1993) Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-
Making: Medical Treatment and Research at Para 3.47.  
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best interests tests and the substituted judgment test. Whilst the best interests test 
places the opinion of the decision-maker very much at the centre of the decision, the 
substituted judgment test places more importance upon the wishes and feelings of the 
individual, with the decision-maker acting more as an agent of the individual. 
According to the Law Commission, “Under the substituted judgment standard, 
decisions made for an incapacitated person attempt to arrive at the choice that 
particular person would have made had he been competent to do so.”159 
However, the fact that both best interests and substituted judgment appear to have 
separate approaches does not mean that they are mutually exclusive. Indeed, the 
manner in which the best interests test has been laid down in the Mental Capacity Act 
2005 shows this clearly. 
 
During the consultation process for the Mental Capacity Act 2005, the Law 
Commission discussed whether it would be appropriate to adopt either the best 
interests or substituted judgment test exclusively. With regards to the appropriateness 
of the two tests, the Law Commission stated that the substituted judgment test was in 
principle preferable to the best interests test, the latter being thought of as too 
restrictive and paternalistic in nature. In practice however, the Commission felt that a 
blanket application of the substituted judgment test would also be problematic: “It 
[the substituted judgment test] is more difficult to apply in the case of someone 
who has never had capacity… most significant decisions in such a person’s life 
will invariably have been taken by others and any choices made by him will have 
been from a very restricted range of options.”160 Ultimately, the best interests test 
included in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 was an amalgamation of both the common 
law best interests test and the substituted judgment test. While best interests under the 
2005 Act retains the primary objective of allowing intervention on behalf of an 
incapable adult, it also requires the decision-maker to ascertain the individual’s past 
and present wishes, feelings, beliefs and values as far as is practicable161. It is here 
where elements of the substituted judgment test can most clearly be seen. As stated 
above the Law Commission’s definition of substituted judgment stated that the 
decision-maker using the test must try and arrive at the choice that the incapable adult 
                                                 
159 Law Commission Consultation Paper No.119 (1991) Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-
Making: An Overview at Para 4.22.  
160 Ibid at Para 4.23.  
161 Mental Capacity Act 2005 s.1(6).  
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would have arrived at were they capable of taking this decision themselves162.  If the 
decision-maker is required to ascertain the person’s wishes, feelings, beliefs and 
values, the ultimate purpose of doing so is to help the decision-maker ‘substitute’ their 
own wishes, feelings and opinions for that of the individual. Wrigley criticises a pure 
substituted judgment approach from a philosophical perspective: “we have neither 
the ability to mentally simulate another person’s thought process not an 
adequate psychological theory to represent and predict their thoughts and 
wishes.”163 Wrigley is correct inasmuch as decision-making on the basis of 
substituted judgment decision-making can never be as effective as if a decision had 
been made by the individual themselves. However, the fact remains that this will not 
always be possible, and it is thus essential that measures for making decisions on 
behalf of incapable adults are provided for in capacity legislation. No system can be 
perfect, but an imperfect system does not necessarily equate to an ineffective system.  
 
In essence, the decision-maker making a best interests decision is an agent for the 
incapable adult who should use the wishes, feelings and beliefs of the individual to 
make the decision if possible, rather than come to their own conclusions as a purer 
best interests model would permit. It is submitted that this was the correct approach 
for two reasons: First, discarding the best interests test completely would fail to 
safeguard the needs of individuals who are profoundly or entirely incapable of making 
treatment decisions themselves. Secondly, discarding the substituted judgment test 
entirely fails to uphold the pro-autonomy ethos of the legislation by failing to 
acknowledge the wishes and feelings of the individual. In this way, the best interests 
test in its current form represents a departure from the common law version, and is as 
much about promoting the autonomy of the individual as it is about intervening on 
their behalf. Ultimately, it can be seen that both tests contain aspects which are useful 
and pertinent to incapable adults. McCubbin and Weisstub state that the difference 
between best interests and substituted judgment is ultimately a question of mere 
semantics: “The [best interests test] involves an external assessment and 
balancing of interests, while the [substituted judgment test] requires the 
decision-maker to stand in the shoes of the incompetent person… in reality any 
                                                 
162 Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 119 (1991) Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-
Making: An Overview at Para 4.22.  
163 Wrigley, A (2007) Proxy Consent: Moral Authority Misconceived; Journal of Medical Ethics; Vol. 
33, 527-531 at 529.  
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decision made for a mentally incompetent person will inevitably rely on a 
combination of the two patterns of decision-making.”164 
 
Scottish capacity law, whilst being ideologically very similar to English capacity law, 
has elected to discard best interests in favour of an alternative test for deciding how to 
intervene on behalf of the incapable adult. This was referred to as the benefit test, and 
the term has been also been adopted by the Council of Europe in the 1997 Convention 
on Human Rights and Biomedicine, in which Article 6(1) states that any intervention 
carried out on a persons incapable of consenting may only be carried out “for his or 
her direct benefit”.  While the Scottish Law Commission stressed that the concept of 
benefit was distinguishable from the concept of best interests, the differences between 
the two are perhaps more apparent than real.  
 
In the 1995 Report on Incapable Adults, the Scottish Law Commission explained its 
reasons for rejecting the best interests test: 
“We consider that ‘best interests’ by itself is too vague and would require to 
be supplemented by further factors which would have to be taken into 
account. We also consider that ‘best interests’ does not give due weight to the 
views of the adult, particularly to wishes and feelings which he or she had 
expressed while capable of doing so. The concept of best interests was 
developed in the context of child law where a child’s level of understanding 
may not be high and will usually have been lower in the past. Incapable 
adults such as those who are mentally ill, head injured or suffering from 
dementia at the time when a decision has to be made in connection with them, 
will have possessed full mental powers before their present incapacity. We 
think it is wrong to equate such adults with children and for that reason 
would avoid extending child law concepts to them. Accordingly, the general 
principles… are framed without express reference to best interests.”165 
                                                 
164 McCubbin, M and Weisstub, D N (1998) Toward a Pure Best Interests Model of Proxy Decision 
Making for Incompetent Psychiatric Patients; International Journal of Law and Psychiatry; Vol. 21(1), 
1-30 at 12, quoting Tomossy, G F and Weisstub, D N (1997) The Reform of Adult Guardianship Laws: 
The case of Non-therapeutic Experimentation; International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, Vol. 20, 
113-139. See also Hale, B (1997) Mentally  Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: The English 
Perspective; International Journal of Law and Psychiatry; Vol. 20 (1), 59-75 at 65. 
165 Scottish Law Commission Report No. 151 (1995) Incapable Adults at Para 2.50.  
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As an alternative to best interests, the Scottish Law Commission elected to introduce 
the concept of ‘benefit’ into the new legislation as the first general principle. The 
Scottish Law Commission said the following: 
“Our first general principle is based on benefit to the incapable adult. The 
person intervening should be satisfied that the intervention will benefit the 
adult and that the benefit cannot reasonably be obtained without the 
intervention.166 By intervention we mean any decision by a court, a guardian 
or any other person on whom functions are conferred under our 
recommendations which directly affect the welfare or affairs of the incapable 
adult. The category of ‘any other person’ would include the Public Guardian 
and managers of establishments who are looking after the finances of their 
incapacitated patients or residents.”167 
The two crucial elements of the concept of benefit are thus: First, any intervention on 
behalf of the incapable adult must provide some tangible benefit, and secondly, the 
one making the intervention must be satisfied that the same benefit cannot achieved 
without having to intervene on behalf of the individual168. It was held in M, 
Applicant169 that “benefit can accrue even though the adult may now have lost the 
capacity to appreciate or understand the benefit.”170  
 
In terms of the ethical principles that underpin ‘benefit’ as a concept, successful 
application of the concept necessitates a paternalistic approach to some extent. Like 
the best interests test, the concept of benefit is intended to provide proxy decision 
makers with a benchmark against which decisions can be made. If the individual is 
capable of making their own decisions on treatment, the concept of benefit in essence 
becomes irrelevant, as the doctor must respect the reasons for the decision made by 
the patient171. 
Beyond this, very little guidance has been given in the legislation and in the Code of 
Practice, as to what constitutes ‘benefit’. This could be explained on the grounds that 
                                                 
166 for the briefest of descriptions of this concept, see Kay, A (2001) Changes in the Legal Framework 
for incapacity in Scotland; Primary Health Care; Vol. 11(3), 20-21. 
167 Ibid at Para 2.51. 
168 see Wilkinson, H (2001) Empowerment and decision-making for people with dementia: the use of 
legal interventions in Scotland; Aging and Mental Health; Vol. 5(4), 322-328 at 326. 
169 [2007] S.L.T (Sh Ct) 24. 
170 per Sheriff Baird at 26. 
171 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All E.R 649 per Donaldson M.R at 663.  
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The Scottish Law Commission intended the concept to be given as broad an 
interpretation as possible by the courts. As stated earlier, The Scottish Law 
Commission emphasised clearly that assessments of capacity must be done according 
to the individual circumstances in each case. Therefore, it could be argued that 
deliberately opting for a broad interpretation of the benefit concept would in fact help 
the relevant third party to take into consideration whatever circumstances he or she 
feels is appropriate to the case being dealt with at the time. This is in contrast to 
having to defer to a list of guidelines devised by the legislators. Adrian Ward provides 
one possible interpretation of the term:  
“With due caution, ‘benefit’ can be reasonably be interpreted as 
encompassing overcoming the limitations created by incapacity, so as to 
permit something which the adult could reasonably be expected to have 
chosen to do if capable, even though of a gratuitous or unselfish nature.”172 
If one were to concur with Ward’s interpretation, then s.1(2) could be argued to be 
endorsing some form of substituted judgment, as it would require ascertaining what 
the individual might have chosen if he/she had the requisite capacity. However, it is 
submitted that such an interpretation would not necessarily be accurate. As s.1(2) 
refers to ‘benefit’, it cannot always be assumed that an individual, if capable, would 
always make a decision that would be of benefit to themselves. A Jehovah’s Witness 
requiring a blood transfusion for instance might refuse the operation on religious 
grounds, and it would be within his/her right to do so173. However, such a decision 
could not necessarily be argued to be of benefit to the patient in the traditional sense 
of the term. One might argue that greater benefit would be achieved in accepting the 
operation and returning to health. However, this would not be justifiable ethically, 
particularly considering the emphasis placed on autonomy throughout the consultation 
process and the 2000 Act itself. This raises the question of whether acting in order to 
benefit the individual is in fact the same as acting in the best interests of the 
individual. Given that both concepts have been given a wide interpretation, the answer 
to this question ultimately depends upon one’s interpretation of benefit. 
 
                                                 
172 Ward, A.D (2003) Adult Incapacity; W. Green/Sweet and Maxwell Edinburgh at Para 4.8. 
173 See Malette v Schulman [1990] 67 D.L.R (4th) 321 (Ontario CA) and R v Blaue [1975] 1 W.L.R 
1411. 
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As stated earlier, the concept of benefit becomes most relevant in proxy decision-
making, which is paternalistic by nature. However, if a doctor is required to consider 
what a patient would have done if they had the requisite capacity, this dilutes the 
paternalistic aspect somewhat, since the doctor would in essence be carrying out the 
will of the individual, rather than base the decision upon his/her own opinions and 
feelings. It is of course unrealistic to expect that proxy decision-making can ever be 
fully autonomous; that is an impossibility. However, the Scottish approach to proxy 
decision making allows for a balance to be struck between the duty to promote the 
autonomy of the individual and, if this is not practicable due to the severity of the 
individual’s incapacity, the duty to intervene in order to provide a tangible benefit.  
 
When analysing the concept of benefit as adopted in Scottish capacity law, one 
important factor should be immediately apparent; there is very little difference 
between the ethos behind both the benefit test and the best interests test. Both tests 
require any intervention to be solely in furtherance of the individual’s welfare, and 
both require consideration of what the individual would have chosen to do if capacity 
was present. It will be recalled that one of the main reasons for the rejection of the 
best interests test in Scottish capacity law was that it failed to consider the wishes and 
feelings of the individual174. Given that Report No. 151 was published in 1995 before 
the best interests test had developed to the extent that it has, the Scottish Law 
Commission’s statement was more than likely true at the time. However, the best 
interests test as laid down in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 explicitly requires the 
decision-maker to consider the wishes and feelings of the individual175, which 
ultimately means that there is little substantive difference between the best interests 
and benefit tests as both appear in the English and Scottish capacity statutes.  
 
2.3: PROCEDURAL PRINCIPLES 
 
The purpose of procedural justice in the context of capacity law is essentially twofold: 
First, mechanisms must be in place to permit the individual to exercise their autonomy 
over relevant healthcare decisions. Schwab explains thus: “A procedural account 
defines autonomy in terms of following certain procedures. If the appropriate 
                                                 
174 Scottish Law Commission Report No.151 (1995) Report on Incapable Adults at Para 2.50.  
175 Mental Capacity Act 2005 s.4(6).  
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procedures are followed, then the outcome is autonomous – regardless of the 
content of the outcome or the characteristics of the decision-maker.”176 In 
addition to this, procedural justice must exist to protect the welfare of the individual. 
In essence, procedural justice is integral to the upholding of the substantive principles 
outlined in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
 
Procedural justice has been defined by Lawrence Solum as follows: 
“In the context of a modern nation-state, procedural justice is concerned with 
the adjudicative methods by which legal norms are applied to particular 
cases and it is also concerned with the legislative processes by which the 
shares of social benefits and burdens and divided.”177 
 
This section will engage in a discussion of the important principles of procedural 
justice which underpin the law of capacity alongside the substantive ethical principles 
discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis. Given that both England and Scotland now have 
specific capacity legislation in place, the principles which will be discussed are at his 
time are more pertinent to the United Kingdom than India. As will be seen in Chapter 
5 of this thesis, capacity law in India has not yet developed to the extent that it has in 
the United Kingdom. However, one of the issues which will be addressed in this 
thesis is whether India will develop a system of capacity law in a similar manner to 
that of the United Kingdom. In the light of this, it is submitted that any developments 
in the law of capacity that may take place in India in the future should be underpinned 
by the procedural principles discussed below. However, before examining the 
methods in which procedural justice is administered in both jurisdictions, it is 
important to discuss the elements of an effective system of justice. Once this has been 
done, it will then be possible to examine whether England Scotland have adequately 
discharged their duties vis a vis effective procedural justice.  
 
John Rawls writes extensively on procedural justice in his book A Theory of Justice. 
In his book, Rawls divides procedural justice as a concept into three sub-categories: 
perfect, imperfect and pure procedural justice. Perfect procedural justice essentially 
                                                 
176 Schwab, A P (2006) Formal and effective autonomy in healthcare; Journal of Medical Ethics; Vol. 
32, 575-579 at 576.  
177 Solum, L.B (2004) Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 04-02: Procedural 
Justice at 50. Accessed on 23/03/2007; Can be found online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=508282. 
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states that a just outcome will occur in every case, and deals also with the mechanisms 
whereby such a scenario might come about. According to Rawls, perfect procedural 
justice has two important components: 
“First, there is an independent criterion for what a fair division,  a criterion 
defined separately from and prior to the procedure which is to be followed. 
And second, it is possible to devise a procedure that is sure to give the desired 
outcome… The essential thing is that there is an independent standard for 
deciding which outcome is just and a procedure guaranteed to lead to it.”178 
Ultimately, perfect procedural justice can merely be considered as a theoretical model 
of justice. It is unworkable in practice as it necessitates not only an acceptable system 
of procedure to be in place, but also that the system always produce a just result. This 
is of course impossible to guarantee in reality.  
 
By contrast, a system of imperfect procedural justice involves a procedural system 
which aims to deliver justice, for example, through the punishment of a criminal.179 
The important aspect of imperfect procedural justice is that an acceptable system of 
procedures must be in place, irrespective of the result that derives from the system. 
While a just outcome would be ideal, the delivery of justice in an imperfect 
procedural system derives from the right to pursue a just result through an acceptable 
system.  
 
Pure procedural justice rejects the notion that, unlike perfect and imperfect procedural 
justice, there should be independent criteria for what a just result it. Instead, whatever 
result occurs will be deemed fair provided that the procedure in that particular 
situation has been followed correctly. As Rawls explains, “a distinctive feature of 
pure procedural justice is that the procedure of determining the just result must 
actually be carried out; for in these cases there is no independent criterion by 
reference to which a definite outcome can be known to be just.”180 
 
The notion of pure procedural justice appears to be distributive rather than retributive 
in nature, i.e. it is concerned mainly with appropriate distribution of assets as opposed 
                                                 
178 Rawls J (1971) A Theory of Justice; Harvard University Press London at 85. 
179 Ibid at 85-86. 
180 Ibid at 86. 
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to delivery of punishment for criminals/compensation for victims. It is perhaps 
therefore inapplicable to capacity law. It is submitted that the procedural system 
which was implemented under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 in October 2007, could 
best be equated to one of imperfect procedural justice. Although John Rawls 
contextualised the concept in terms of a criminal trial, it is submitted that any system 
whereby independent criteria of justice are specified, could potentially be considered 
as imperfect systems of procedural justice.  
 
There are three documents which must be considered when addressing the issue of 
procedural justice and capacity law. Once these are analysed, it will then be possible 
to extract the key principles which must underpin the procedural aspects of the law. 
These documents are: The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities 2006, The European Convention on Human Rights and Recommendation 
(99)4 on Principles concerning the Legal Protection of Incapable Adults. The 
relevance of each of these will now be discussed in turn. 
 
The U.N Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006 is a document 
that deals predominantly with substantive ethical principles and its relevance is 
discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis. With regards to procedural principles, Articles 
12 and 13 should be noted. Article 12 states that any persons with disabilities have the 
right to be recognised anywhere as persons before the law, and should enjoy legal 
capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life. In addition, Article 12(4) 
states that States Parties must provide for effective safeguards to prevent any abuse of 
the individual, and any such measures relating to the rights, will and preferences of 
the individual must be proportional and consider the specific circumstances of the 
individual. Article 13 of the U.N Convention states that individuals with disabilities 
must have access to an effective system of justice, which is on an equal basis with 
others. This must be achieved through “the provision of procedural and age-
appropriate accommodations, in order to facilitate their effective role as direct 
and indirect participants, including as witnesses, in all legal proceedings, 
including at investigative and other preliminary stages.”  
 
As can be seen, Articles 12 and 13 of the 2006 U.N Convention acknowledge the 
vulnerability of persons with disabilities and should thus be safeguarded against any 
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potential abuse. In order to achieve this, it is vital that appropriate procedural 
mechanisms are put in place. In addition, Article 13 of the U.N Convention refers to 
the role of the individual as a direct or indirect participant; a clear endorsement of the 
right of the individual to participate in any proceedings relating to him/her as much as 
is practicable. This principle will be discussed in detail below.  
 
Another important aspect of procedural justice in the context of European 
jurisdictions is compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 
6(1) of the Convention relates to the right of access to court and reads as follows: 
“1) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. 
Judgment shall be pronounced publicly by the press and public maybe 
excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public order or 
national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or 
the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or the extent strictly 
necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity 
would prejudice the interests of justice.” 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights in essence grants the 
individual the right of access to a court. Therefore, any provisions relating to 
procedural issues must allow for challenge within the European Court of Human 
Rights within a reasonable time.  Adrian Ward explains the importance of Article 6 in 
relation to the right to decision-making: 
“The right to act for oneself and make one’s own decisions in matters of one’s 
own personal welfare, or about one’s own property and financial affairs, is a 
fundamental civil right. A determination that one is incapable of acting 
deciding, and that someone else should take over, is a matter which one is 
entitled to have determined by a fair and (except for the qualifications) 
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal established by 
law… The imposition of such a determination de facto or by a court or 
tribunal without a fair hearing, breaches Article 6.”181 
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One interpretation of Ward’s statement is that Article 6 will only be satisfied if a court 
or tribunal hearing takes place prior to a decision being taken on behalf of an 
incapable individual. Evidence for this could be found through Ward’s reference to 
‘de facto’ determinations of individuals’ capacity. However, it is unlikely that this 
interpretation of Ward’s statement is correct; ultimately, it is not practical for hearings 
to take place in a court or tribunal every time a decision needs to be made on behalf of 
an incapable individual, and if failing to do so infringes Article 6, that is a 
disproportionately high burden to place upon member states. The relevant issue is 
whether cases can be brought before the courts without unnecessary barriers to access. 
With regards to Ward’s use of the term ‘de facto’, it is submitted that he was referring 
to determinations of incapacity which are made effectively at random, without any 
consideration of the relevant assessment criteria or the procedural mechanisms that 
capacity legislation has in place to ensure that the individual’s right to decision-
making is not overridden without just cause.  
 
In the context of the law of capacity, compliance with Article 6 means that individuals 
must have the right to challenge a finding of incapacity and whether an action 
undertaken on behalf of an incapable adult is lawful. Article 6 will be breached if 
there is anything which prevents the individual from accessing the court within a 
reasonable period of time. The case of Airey v Ireland182 concerned a plaintiff seeking 
separation from her abusive husband. Mrs Airey was unable to secure the judicial 
separation she required due to high costs that were involved. The European Court of 
Human Rights subsequently held this to be a violation of Article 6 because the 
plaintiff was effectively prevented from accessing the court183. In the context of 
capacity law, a breach of Article 6 might take place if an individual with some from 
of incapacity wishing to apply to the court, is prevented from doing so effectively 
because of a difficult applications process which fails to adequately take into account 
the incapacity of the individual. If for example, the individual is unable to 
communicate wishes and opinions, he/she must be provided with means of 
overcoming this, such as an advocate.  
                                                 
182 [1979] 2 E.H.R.R 305.  
183 See also the case of Golder v United Kingdom [1975] 1 E.H.R.R 524, which concerned a prisoner 
wishing to sue for libel who was denied access to a solicitor. In this case, the court held that the denial 
of access to a solicitor impeded the plaintiff’s ability to access the court, this breaching Article 6.  
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The case of X and Y v Netherlands184 is a further useful illustration of this by way of 
analogy. The case concerned a mentally impaired girl, Y, who was raped on the day 
after her sixteenth birthday. Following this incident, her father, X attempted to file a 
complaint and asked for criminal proceedings to commence. Since Y’s condition 
meant that she was not capable of signing the complaint, X was informed that he 
himself could do this. Subsequently, X was informed that Y did not seem capable of 
expressing her wishes on the issue of criminal proceedings185. An application was 
then made to the European Court of Human Rights. Although Article 6 was not at the 
heart of the application, the grounds for the case nevertheless could be applied to it. X 
alleged that the right to respect for family life, guaranteed under Article 8, meant that 
the parents of abuse victims should have adequate recourse to remedy through the 
courts. The fact that criminal proceedings were not brought against Y’s attacker 
meant that this remedy was effectively not available. As stated, the application was 
not made under Article 6, yet the facts of the case suggest that it is relevant; 
ultimately, Y’s condition, and the fact that her father was unable to commence 
criminal proceedings on her behalf, meant that she was prevented from accessing the 
court within a reasonable time. The issue at the heart of Article 6 is not that the 
individual would ever be expressly stopped from making an application to the court, 
but rather, whether the procedural mechanisms in place are such that the individual 
would be able to make an application effectively.  
 
Of the E.C.H.R articles that are pertinent to capacity law, it is submitted that Article 6 
is the most significant. Although Articles 3, 8 and 9 of the Convention are ostensibly 
relevant, they are not so closely linked to it so as to make challenges to the European 
Court particularly likely. What is crucial however, is that the individual is always 
provided with access to the court within a reasonable time should they wish to 
challenge a finding of incapacity.  It is submitted that the crucial aspect of challenges 
to the court in capacity law is whether the individual is actually capable of making 
treatment decisions themselves and consequently, if an individual is unable to bring a 
case to court in the first place, it makes little difference which Article of the 
Convention has been breached in the process.  
 
                                                 
184 [1986] 8 E.H.R.R 235.  
185 Ibid at Para 10.  
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Extensive guidance on important procedural principles relevant to capacity law has 
been provided by the Council of Europe. In 1999, the Council formulated 
Recommendation (99)4 of the Committee of Member States on Principles Concerning 
the Legal Protection of Incapable Adults (hereafter referred to as Recommendation 
(99)4). The Recommendation contained guidelines relating to both substantive186 and 
procedural principles. The most relevant procedural principles of the 
Recommendation are numbered from 11-14187 and can be summarised as follows: 
Principle 11: Institution of proceedings – the list of individuals entitled to institute 
proceedings for the protection of incapable adults must be exhaustive enough to 
guarantee that all circumstances which may arise during proceedings have been taken 
into consideration. Provisions must be in place to allow proceedings to be initiated by 
a public body.  
The individual concerned must be informed of the institution of proceedings 
promptly, and in a manner or language which he/she will understand. Furthermore, 
the individual must be informed that the proceedings may affect his/her legal capacity 
and the exercise of rights, unless informing him/her of this may cause a severe danger 
to the health of the individual.  
Principle 12: Investigation and assessment – Appropriate procedures must be in 
place to facilitate the investigation and assessment of the individual’s personal 
faculties. No measures of protection must be undertaken which restricts the legal 
capacity of the individual unless the individual has been seen by the person 
undertaking the measure of protection. In addition, at least one suitably qualified 
expert must publish an up-to-date report which must be in writing.  
Principle 13: Right to be heard in person – The individual concerned has the right 
to be heard in person during any proceedings which relate to his/her legal capacity. 
Principle 14: Duration, review and appeal – Any measures of protection must 
ideally be of limited duration, reviewed upon any change in circumstances, and 
terminated if the requisite conditions for protection no longer apply. There must also 
be appropriate rights of appeal. 
 
The above three documents have provided information that can be used to extract 
fundamental principles that should be applied to any procedural mechanisms relating 
                                                 
186 see Introduction to Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
187 See also Gunn, M (2005) Decision Making; unpublished. 
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to the incapable individual. These principles are discussed below and are: The 
principle of participation, the principle of accuracy and the principle of conciliation.  
 
2.3.1: THE PRINCIPLE OF PARTICIPATION 
 
The principle of participation requires that the individual who is the subject of 
proceedings should be able to participate in the proceedings in question. Lawrence 
Solum argues that this principle is essential for a legitimate system of procedural 
justice. Specifically, Solum states that legitimate proceedings do not necessarily 
require the presence and participation of the individual, but rather, it is the presence of 
the option and the right of the individual to do so which provides this legitimacy188. In 
addition, Solum submits that the option of participation must be exercisable at 
important stages of proceedings, and also, that this participation is in essence 
important in its own right; that this participation may not result in a favourable 
outcome for the individual does not devalue it189. As stated earlier, the U.N 
Convention on the Rights on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006 emphasises 
the role of the individual as a direct or indirect participant. Similarly, the participation 
principle can be found in principle 13 of Recommendation (99)4, where it states that 
the individual has the right to be heard in person during any proceedings which relate 
to his/her capacity. The principle also appears to echo Solum’s assertion that it is the 
right to be heard in person which is crucial, and principle 13 does not specifically 
state that the individual must be present at proceedings in order to legitimise them. 
Indeed, there may be genuine issues of welfare which dictate that an individual would 
not be able to attend hearings in person. Ultimately, no procedural principles relating 
to capacity should compromise the welfare of the individual. The crux of the principle 
of participation is therefore simply that the incapable adult has the right to be heard if 
circumstances allow.  
 
Of central importance in capacity law is the need to promote the autonomy of the 
individual as far as is practicable. This is the substantive principle which drives the 
law of capacity forward. However, the procedural principle of participation is 
                                                 
188 Solum, L (2004) Procedural Justice; Berkley Electronic Press Paper 141 at 65; accessed online on 
23/10/2007, available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/141.  
189 Ibid.  
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necessary in order to better ensure that the substantive principle of autonomy is 
upheld as much as is practicable. As discussed earlier, it is unrealistic to expect that 
the inclusion of an exhaustive set of procedural and substantive principles will always 
produce a just result. The presence of procedural principles, however, help to increase 
the possibility of a just result occurring, and subsequently, the principle of 
participation arguably makes a great contribution to this end. As well as helping to 
safeguard the substantive principle of autonomy, the principle of participation in the 
context of incapable adults will also help to safeguard the procedural principle of non-
discrimination. Encouraging adults with varying degrees of incapacity to participate 
in their own proceedings would ideally normalise the individual and reduce stigma by 
dispelling the idea that incapable adults automatically lack the ability to make 
valuable contributions to issues in their own lives.  
 
2.3.2: THE PRINCIPLE OF ACCURACY 
 
The principle of accuracy corresponds to the idea that the structure of any proceedings 
should be designed in such a way so as to “maximise the likelihood of achieving the 
legally correct outcome in each proceeding.”190 In essence, the accuracy principle 
corresponds to the Rawlsian notion of perfect procedural justice, which relates to a 
just outcome being achieved in each case, and the procedures which are utilised to 
bring this about. However, Solum highlights a number of circumstances in which the 
principle of accuracy need not and perhaps should not be prioritised, thus arguably 
rendering its workability as unrealistic in practice: 
 
First, Solum states that the principle of accuracy must not take priority over the 
substantive rights of the individual191. In the context of the incapable adult therefore, 
this means that substantive principles, such as the autonomy and the welfare of the 
individual, cannot be devalued in order to ensure that proceedings relating to him/her 
produce a just result.  
Secondly, Solum submits that the accuracy of outcome is subordinate to systemic 
accuracy: “… so long as the procedures are announced in advance and create 
general rules with which parties can comply by making a reasonable good faith 
                                                 
190 Ibid at 86.  
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effort…”192 This is somewhat related to the principle of participation, in that 
although the inclusion of the participation principle may not guarantee an accurate 
outcome, it essentially contributes to the guarantee of systemic accuracy. Solum 
further states that the proviso of systemic accuracy is important, as it  
                                                
“…attempts to strike a fair balance between systemic accuracy and accuracy 
in the particular case. On the one hand, the basic statement of the accuracy 
principle expresses the judgment that procedural justice aims to resolve the 
case that is being decided accurately; the baseline notion is that case accuracy 
takes priority over system accuracy. Our notion of procedural justice 
requires the fair treatment of individuals, and making systemic accuracy the 
baseline would fail to take the differences between individuals seriously. On 
the other hand, there are situations in which systemic accuracy can be 
promoted without treating the individual unfairly. Where a rule promoting 
systemic accuracy is announced in advance and parties can reasonably 
comply with the rule, imposing a case-accuracy distorting sanction is not 
unfair to those affected – the opportunity to comply places the responsibility 
for the distortion on the party who disobeyed the procedural rule.”193 
Thirdly, Solum argues that the accuracy principle should not result in disproportionate 
costs in relation to the interests which are at stake in a particular set of proceedings.194  
With regards to the law of capacity, it could be argued that the traditional methods of 
dispute resolution through the courts may not always be suitable for resolving 
capacity issues. One of the reasons is that such a system is perhaps too adversarial, 
and this principle will be discussed below. Another reason relates to the cost of court 
proceedings versus the accuracy principle. Since case accuracy cannot be guaranteed 
in every case, it is arguably better to consider a system of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution which may help to reduce costs whilst potentially providing as much 
possibility of a favourable outcome as traditional court proceedings. 
The essence of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) schemes are that they provide 
further avenues for resolving disputes which do not necessarily involve financial 
redress195. This is of particular relevance to cases pertaining to capacity, since cases in 
this field are ostensibly more likely to concern the challenge of treatment decision, or 
 
192 Ibid.  
193 Ibid at 87.  
194 Ibid.  
195 see Lord Woolf (1996) Access to Justice Final Report at Para 15.50.  
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findings of incapacity. Financial redress is therefore unlikely to be a significant 
priority, although encouraging more informal methods of dispute resolution such as 
mediation schemes, might help to avoid disproportionate court costs.  
Another important aspect of the accuracy principle as it relates to capacity law is the 
need to thoroughly investigate the capacity of the individual. This is particularly 
important if the proceedings are concerned with a possible intervention on behalf of 
the individual for the purposes of safeguarding their welfare. This must only be done 
if the decision-maker is entirely satisfied that the individual is in fact incapable of 
making the relevant decision. To intervene when this is not the case would clearly be 
contravening the principle of accuracy and would thus compromise the legitimacy of 
the proceedings.  
 
Of the three key documents discussed at the beginning of this section, 
Recommendation (99)4 provides arguably the most in-depth exposition of the 
principle of accuracy. First, principle 12 states that appropriate procedures must be in 
place to facilitate the investigation and assessment of the individual’s personal 
faculties. Furthermore, no measures of protection must be undertaken which restricts 
the legal capacity of the individual, unless the individual has been seen by the person 
undertaking the measure of protection. In addition, at least one suitably qualified 
expert must publish an up-to-date report which must be in writing. This pertains to the 
principle of accuracy by virtue of the fact that inadequate investigation of an 
individual’s faculties might lead to an individual being deemed as incapable of 
making a particular decision, when in fact this might not be the case. Consequently, 
measures of intervention may be implemented unnecessarily and more importantly, 
inaccurately. Such a scenario effectively nullifies the chances of an accurate result 
being achieved, and the fact that inadequate investigation measures have been 
implemented would also illustrate a lack of systemic accuracy.  
 
Principle 14 relates to duration, review and appeals during proceedings, and states that 
any measures of protection must be of a limited duration, reviewed upon any change 
of circumstances, and terminated if the requisite conditions for protection no longer 
apply. There must also be appropriate rights of appeal for all proceedings. The link to 
the principle of accuracy comes from the fact that as with principle 12, it is essential 
that as well as an investigation into the faculties of the individual, procedural 
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mechanisms must be in place to review the individual’s capacity in order to ascertain 
whether the incapacity that triggered an intervention is still present. This is obviously 
of particular importance when the incapacity is of such a nature that it may fluctuate 
or disappear entirely. It is therefore essential to satisfy the principle of accuracy by 
regularly investigating and reviewing an individual’s capacity and withdrawing any 
intervention measures made on their behalf if these are no longer needed.  
 
2.3.3: THE PRINCIPLE OF CONCILIATION 
 
The objective of this section of this thesis is to highlight the important principles of 
procedural justice as they relate to capacity law in England, Scotland and India. As 
will be discussed later in this section, it is submitted that the law of capacity does not 
lend itself particularly well to an adversarial system of justice, and would arguably 
benefit more from a more inquisitorial system of procedural justice. To this end, the 
principle of conciliation plays an important role, as it requires any proceedings to be 
conducted in such a way so as to promote compromise between parties, and 
emphasises any common ground that may exist, rather than the difference between the 
parties.  
 
Thibaut et al identify five models of adjudicatory systems which encompass the 
important aspects of both adversarial and inquisitorial justice. The authors write with 
specific reference to the United States of America, throughout whose system the five 
models discussed below are featured. However, Thibaut et al’s discussion of these 
five models are worthy of inclusion here in order to show the advantages and 
shortcomings of the current systems adopted by the three jurisdictions which provide 
the focus for this thesis. The discussion is also useful in order to see how the principle 
of conciliation fits into these models.  
 
The first model highlighted by Thibaut et al is the purely inquisitorial model. This 
system, as defined by the authors: “is characterised by an activist decision-maker 
directly developing the facts in interaction with involved persons and then 
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reaching a decision.”196 The emphasis of the inquisitorial model is upon the 
decision-maker, i.e. the judge, interacting with the parties in the form of interviewing, 
rather than simply listening to the biased testimonies of the parties and making a 
decision on that basis. In effect, there is more direct involvement from the decision-
maker in an inquisitorial system.  
 
The second model is a variant on the pure inquisitorial system, and is entitled ‘the 
single investigator model’. Thibaut et al define this model as follows: 
“Here, a moderately activist decision-maker is assisted by an investigator 
whose rewards are controlled by the decision-maker and whose role 
definition is that of an impartial and unbiased truth-seeker. The disputants 
are largely restricted to furnishing requested information, though the 
opportunity to interact with an investigator may slightly increase the 
disputants’ opportunity to control the procedure.”197 
The ‘single investigator’ model derogates slightly from the pure investigator model in 
as much as the primary decision-maker has an assistant investigator to oversee the 
important aspects of the proceedings. The investigator is impartial and is therefore an 
extension of the primary decision-maker. As with a purely inquisitorial model, the 
parties are restricted to answering questions which are put to them, rather than being 
given the opportunity to present their case in the traditional manner.  
 
The third model is known as the ‘double investigator’ system. As the name suggests, 
this model involves a primary decision-maker and two investigators who are 
responsible for investigating the claims of both parties and who must then report back 
to the primary decision-maker for a ruling. By way of reference to the court-martial of 
the United States, Thibaut et al illustrate the fact that the primary decision-maker (in 
that case, the military judge) has less of a pivotal role in proceedings: 
“Military judges are relatively passive; they are not charged with planning or 
developing the case nor with interrogating the witnesses. Considerable 
responsibility is assigned to the representatives of the Government and the 
accused, but both representatives of the Government and the accused, but 
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both representatives are paid by the same authority, which also employs the 
decision-maker. Thus a considerable amount of cooperative behaviour is 
facilitated.”198 
 
The fourth model is referred to as the ‘adversary system’ and represents more of a 
significant derogation from the variants of the inquisitorial model described above. In 
the ‘adversary system’, the primary decision-maker again has less of a pivotal role, 
and instead, the parties control much of the proceedings by arguing their cases 
through advocates. This model leaves considerable room for bias through the 
testimonies of the opposing parties. This system is the model of choice for the civil 
procedure system of the United Kingdom.  
 
The fifth and final model of adjudicatory systems is the ‘bargaining system’, which, 
like the adversary system, is predominantly controlled by the parties. However, it is 
also different in the sense that the parties attempt to resolve their disputes without the 
aid of an independent third party.  
 
As can be seen, the five models of adjudicatory systems can be placed along a 
spectrum which each model requiring less involvement from the primary decision 
maker: 
“At one end of the continuum is the inquisitorial procedure in which nearly 
all of the control over the hearing process is allocated to the decision-maker; 
at the other end is the bargaining procedure from which the decision-maker 
has vanished, leaving total control over the process in the hands of the 
disputants.”199 
Following Thibaut et al’s discussion of these five models, the question arises as to 
which model might be the more appropriate for promoting the principle of 
conciliation.  
 
It is submitted that a purely adversarial system is inappropriate in the context of 
capacity law and the principle of conciliation. Cases relating to capacity law are rarely 
about seeking retribution upon the other party. Upholding the principle of conciliation 
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therefore requires a shift away from apportioning blame to the other party and 
fostering a confrontational atmosphere during proceedings, particularly because in the 
context of capacity law, both parties are in essence fighting for the same objective, 
namely safeguarding the best interests of the incapable adult.  Take for instance the 
hypothetical example of a health authority who wishes to stop the administration of 
artificial nutrition and hydration to patient in a persistent vegetative state. In such a 
case, the purpose of seeking court involvement is simply to seek the opinion of an 
impartial observer who will listen to both sides of the argument and rule accordingly. 
In such a case, there is arguably no real need for an adversarial process of justice to 
take place. The issue is not retribution; it is simply a matter of dispute resolution. In 
the light of this, is an overtly adversarial system of procedural justice appropriate for 
dealing with cases relating to incapacity? It could be argued that a shift towards a 
more inquisitorial system would be more beneficial to litigants involved in capacity 
cases. This is in contrast to adversarial justice, in which the judge in essence acts as an 
‘umpire’ between two parties, and is “expected to listen to what the opposing 
partiers present to him by way of their respective positions and to pronounce the 
winner at the end of the day.”200  
 
In theory, a purely inquisitorial model is likely to be the simplest and most effective 
model for promoting the principle of conciliation. In cases involving the health and 
welfare of an individual, where emotions are likely to be heightened, the most will be 
achieved by having one primary decision-maker interact with the disputing parties as 
informally as is practicable, rather than encourage a more adversarial, confrontational 
form of dispute resolution. Furthermore, although court involvement may often be 
necessary for resolving disputes relating to medical treatment for incapable adults, i.e. 
through the process of court declarations, an effective way of utilising a more 
inquisitorial process of dispute resolution may be to do so without the involvement of 
the courts, with the involvement of a judge being used as an option of last resort. As 
with the principle of accuracy, Alternative Dispute Resolution schemes may also be 
extremely useful in promoting a less formal and less adversarial atmosphere, which 
may ultimately be more conducive to promoting the welfare of the individual in a 
manner which would ideally place less pressure upon and cause less stigma to the 
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individual. However, whilst this may be the case in theory, the fact remains that 
attempts at resolving disputes on an inquisitorial basis will not always be successful. 
In highly controversial or difficult cases, relying upon a more traditional court system 
which may utilise more adversarial processes may be the most effective way of 
safeguarding the best interests of the individual, and therefore, the adversarial system 
cannot realistically be done away with entirely. However, this does not mean that any 
formal court system cannot uphold the principle of conciliation during any 
proceedings. As will be discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis, it is envisaged that the 
new Court of Protection set up under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 will deal with 
disputes in a more informal manner; it is an official court and has all the requisite 
powers of one, but at the same time, is intended to be used as an option of last resort, 
with the main objective being to uphold the general principles of the Mental Capacity 
Act, including promoting the interests of the individual in a manner which will cause 
minimum discomfort and stigma.  
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CHAPTER 3: CAPACITY ASSESSMENT IN ENGLISH, 
SCOTTISH AND INDIAN LAW 
 
3.1: CAPACITY ASSESSMENT IN ENGLISH LAW 
 
3.1.1: CAPACITY ASSESSMENT IN ENGLAND AND WALES PRIOR TO 
THE MENTAL CAPACITY ACT 2005 
 
Prior to the implementation of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 in October 2007, any 
guidance on the issues of capacity were derived from the common law. This thesis 
focuses upon these issues in relation to medical treatment and this chapter will 
therefore provide a history of the common law developments in relation to decision-
making in relation to medical treatment, as well as an in-depth analysis of the relevant 
provisions of the Mental Capacity Act 2005.  
However, it should first be noted that the common law of England and Wales has only 
provided guidance in relation to medical treatment in the last two decades. Prior to 
this, capacity issues had been brought before the court, but in relation to issues such 
as testamentary capacity and capacity to marry. It is therefore important to provide a 
brief history of common law guidance in relation to these matters before examining 
the common law position in relation to decision-making and medical treatment. 
 
The case of Banks v Goodfellow201 concerned the testamentary capacity of John 
Banks, who had made a will in favour of his niece, Margaret Goodfellow. The 
plaintiff in the case challenged the validity of the will on the grounds that the testator 
did not have the requisite capacity to make the will. John Banks, prior to the making 
of the will, had been confined to an asylum as a result of mental disorder. His 
condition manifested itself through the delusional belief that he was being pursued 
and molested by a recently deceased individual as well as devils and evil spirits. 
These delusions had been attested by a medical practitioner and a member of the 
clergy and these attestations formed an important part of the evidence against Banks’ 
capacity to make the will. The central issue in the case was whether at the time of 
making the will, the testator was capable of appreciating the relevant facts and was 
                                                 
201 [1870] L.R. 5 Q.B 549.  
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“so far master of his intentions, free from delusions, as would enable him to have 
a will of his own in the disposition of his property, and act upon it.”202 
 
It was held that the will was entirely valid on the grounds that the testator’s delusions 
had no bearing or influence upon the making of the will at the time that he had made 
it. As well as the evidence which illustrated the severity of Banks’ delusions, evidence 
was also provided which showed that he managed his own financial affairs and was 
diligent when doing so. Evidence from a witness who had collected rent on Banks’ 
behalf from his properties stated that he had always been capable of conducting 
business with the agent203. Although it had been admitted that the testator had been 
incapable of making a will on some occasions, there was ultimately no evidence to 
suggest that he lacked capacity at the material time: 
“In the case before us two delusions disturbed the mind of the testator; the 
one that he was pursued by spirits, the other that a man long since dead came 
personally to molest him. Neither of these delusions… could have had any 
influence upon him in disposing of his property. The will, though in one sense 
an idle one, inasmuch as the object of his bounty was his heir at law, and 
therefore would have taken the property without its being devised to her, was 
yet rational in this, that it was made in favour of a niece, who lived with him, 
and who was the object of his affection and regard. And we must take it on 
the finding of the jury that irrespectively of the question of these dormant 
delusions, the testator was in possession of his faculties when the will was 
executed.”204 
 
The case of Banks v Goodfellow, though not related to one’s capacity to decide on 
medical treatment, is nevertheless significant, as it is an early endorsement of the 
functional approach to capacity. It will be recalled that the Law Commission of 
England and Wales considered this to be the only appropriate approach for dealing 
with issues of capacity, as it requires an assessment of an individual’s decision-
making capacity in relation to a particular decision, rather than allow an assumption 
of incapacity by virtue of the status of the individual as a sufferer of mental disorder 
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or impairment205. Similarly, the court in Banks v Goodfellow did not simply assume 
that the will created by Mr. Banks was automatically invalid because he suffered from 
delusions; the crux of the matter was whether these delusions were instrumental in the 
construction of the will, which they were not206.  
 
The case of Park v Park 207 similarly endorsed a functional approach in the context of 
capacity and marriage. In the case, the defendant, one Peter Park, sought to establish 
that his deceased father Robert Park was incapable of entering into a contract of 
marriage with the plaintiff, Mrs. Wyn Park, on the grounds that he did not appreciate 
the nature of the contract and the duties and responsibilities which it created. The 
deceased had made a will prior to marrying and the plaintiff sought to establish that 
the marriage was valid and the will thus revoked. The deceased suffered with heart 
problems which impaired blood flow to his brain, and thus on occasion hampered his 
decision-making faculties. It had been held at first instance that the deceased was 
capable of entering into the marriage with the plaintiff and thus died intestate, a 
decision which the defendant subsequently appealed. At appeal, the question arose as 
to whether the judge at first instance, Karminski J, had applied the correct test for 
capacity to enter into a marriage; namely, was the deceased, on the morning of his 
marriage, capable of understanding the nature of the contract into which he was 
entering, or was his condition such that he was incapable of understanding it?208 It 
was held on appeal that Karmimski J had asked the right question and that there was 
therefore no reason why the decision should be overturned. The court confirmed that 
in order for a marriage to be valid, the parties must understand the nature of the 
marriage, understand the rights and responsibilities that the marriage creates and be 
able to take care of their own property and person. However, the court also confirmed 
that the marriage contract should not be difficult to comprehend, despite the 
requirements of the test209. In the case of the deceased, there was no evidence that he 
did not understand that he was about to embark upon a lifelong contract of marriage, 
nor was there any evidence to suggest that he “thought himself to be other than he 
                                                 
205 Law Commission Report No. 231 (1995) at Para 3.5. 
206 See also Scammell v Farmer [2008] E.W.H.C 1100 (Ch).  
207 [1954] P. 112.   
208 Ibid at 128.  
209 See also Baldwin v Baldwin [1919] The Times; Durham v Durham [1885] 10 P.D 80; Park v Park 
[1913] OH 19/12/1913; Hunter v Edney [1881] December 16th. 
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was; there was no confusion of identity of matters of that kind; and the position 
on the evidence of the medical men was really his.”210  
 
The case of Park v Park again illustrates the importance of a functional approach to 
capacity; in this case, was the deceased capable of understanding the nature of the 
marriage contract, along with the responsibilities that went along with it? It was not 
enough to simply assume that because the deceased had a condition which had the 
potential to affect his decision-making ability, he would automatically be incapable of 
understanding the contract of marriage211. The case was also important by virtue of 
the fact that it highlighted the usefulness of assessment criteria. This is particularly 
crucial to the issue of capacity assessment in the context of medical treatment, as will 
be seen below through discussion of the common law relating to the issues of capacity 
assessment and best interests.  
 
An appropriate starting point for a discussion on the English common law is the case 
of Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment)212. The case does not provide a 
working model for of assessment criteria as such, but is nevertheless important as it 
provides preliminary guidance on the definition of capacity.  
The case concerned a heavily pregnant woman, T, who had become involved in a road 
traffic accident. The mother of T was a devout Jehovah’s Witness although T herself 
was not of the faith and upon receipt of the news that T required a blood transfusion 
(forbidden for Jehovah’s Witnesses under the tenets of the faith), T’s mother spent 
some time alone with her daughter. Following on from this meeting, T told the 
doctors in charge that she was refusing the transfusion. T maintained her stance on 
this issue, despite being told that an emergency Caesarean section would be necessary 
in order to deliver her baby. Upon deterioration of her condition, T was placed in an 
Intensive Care Unit, where the consultant anaesthetist was hesitant to administer a 
blood transfusion in the light of T’s previous statement. T’s father and boyfriend both 
took the matter to court where the judge granted a declaration authorising a blood 
transfusion on the basis that she had been unduly influenced by her mother, and that 
this had this invalidated her refusal of the treatment. The same conclusion was 
                                                 
210 Park v Park [1954] P. 112 per Birkett L.J at 130.  
211 See also Sheffield City Council v E [2004] E.W.H.C 2808, which applies the judgment in Park v 
Park.  
212 [1992] 4 All ER 649.  
  85   
reached on a second hearing, after which T appealed. Dismissing the appeal, the court 
held that there were two main issues at the heart of the appeal: Did T have the 
requisite capacity to refuse the blood transfusion in the first place, and was this 
decision ultimately her own, or subject of influence from a third party? It was at the 
appeal that Lord Donaldson made his keynote statement on the issue of refusal of 
treatment: 
“Every adult has the right and capacity to decide whether or not he will 
accept medical treatment, even if a refusal may risk permanent injury to his 
health or even lead to premature death… it matters not whether the reasons 
for the refusal were rational or irrational, unknown or even non-existent.”213 
On the issue of T’s ability to refuse the treatment, her assessment showed no signs of 
long-term mental incapacity at the time of her admission to hospital. It is therefore 
clear that the reason for the dismissal of T’s appeal centred on the conversation 
between T and her mother.  
 
The judgment in Re T highlighted the complexities of capacity assessment. Lord 
Donaldson made the following statement on this point: “What matters is whether at 
that time the patient’s capacity was reduced below the level needed in the case of 
a refusal of that importance.”214 Although it had been argued that T was not fully 
competent at the time of making the decision due to the drugs she had been given, this 
was still not the deciding factor in the case. The influence of T’s mother was 
considered to be significantly more prevalent. According to Lord Donaldson: 
“…if at the time the decision is made, the patient has been subjected to the 
influence of some third party… this is by no means to say that the patient is 
not entitled to receive and indeed invite advice and assistance from others… 
but the doctors have to consider whether the decision is really that of the 
patient.”215 
Ultimately, it is entirely possible that T was in such a vulnerable state that it was easy 
for the mother to override her daughter’s will and get her to refuse the transfusion. 
Therefore, it is submitted that an individual who is put under sufficient duress can 
lack the requisite capacity to make a treatment decision. As stated earlier, the 
                                                 
213 per Donaldson M.R at 663. See also St George’s Healthcare Trust v S [1998] 3 W.L.R 936.  
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principle of autonomy is integral to the issue of treatment decisions. To give 
disproportionate weight to outside influence, even from a family member, is not to 
make an autonomous decision. Lord Donaldson was therefore correct in his assertion 
that undue influence is distinguishable from advice or assistance. However, the 
difficulty lies in proving the extent of the influence of the third party:  
“…the real question in each case is ‘does the patient really mean what he says 
or is he merely saying it for a quiet life, to satisfy someone else or because the 
advice and persuasion to which he has been subjected is such that he can no 
longer think and decide for himself?’”216 
 
It is submitted the Court of Appeal in Re T was correct to rule that T had been unduly 
influenced by her mother. Crucial factors in this decision were the physical and 
mental state of T after the Caesarean operation (“… One who is very tired, in pain 
or depressed will be much less able to resist having his will overborne than one 
who is rested, free from pain and cheerful.”217) , and more importantly, the fact 
that the third party involved was a parent who happened to have strong religious 
view
sibility… that the patient’s capacity 
                                                
s: 
“Persuasion based upon religious beliefs can also be much more compelling, 
and the fact that arguments based upon religious beliefs are being deployed 
by someone in a very close relationship with the patient will give them added 
force, and should alert doctors to the pos
or will to decide has been overborne.”218 
It must be stressed however, that every case will be different on its facts. As Lord 
Donaldson stated, it would be incorrect to suggest that the existence of a parent with a 
dominant personality and/or strong religious views automatically means that undue 
influence will be present in a treatment decision. Kennedy and Grubb suggest that the 
Court of Appeal ruled that undue influence was present because of the gravity of the 
case219 (T’s life was ultimately at risk). This position is entirely logical, and indeed, it 
is unclear as to whether a court would be so quick to rule on the presence of undue 
influence over a comparatively minor procedure such as a blood test. However, the 
issue in relation to procedures which may be deemed ‘simple’ must be considered 
 
216 Ibid at 666. 
217 Ibid at 661. 
218 Ibid. 
219 Kennedy and Grubb (2003) Medical Law; 3rd edition; Butterworths Press London  at 757. 
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carefully, as there may be cases where the implications of a minor procedure may be 
more serious. Taking the above example of a blood test for example, the implications 
of consenting to or refusing such a procedure might ostensibly vary according to the 
purpose; a test intended to determine one’s cholesterol level arguably has less serious 
implications than a blood test carried out to determine whether an individual carries 
the HIV virus. Therefore, one could argue that courts would consider whether an 
individual has been unduly influenced on the basis of the consequences of that 
decision.  Therefore, it could be argued that the court applied the undue influence 
approach in Re T because the presence of strong religious views in the mother added 
con
at Miss T had reached her decision under the 
influence of the mother.”220 
                                                
siderable weight to this. Given the facts of the case, this is understandable: 
“It is an irresistible inference that before 5pm the mother had discussed the 
question of blood transfusions with her daughter because Miss T ‘out of the 
blue’ according to the nurse raised the subject. The mother was also alone in 
the ambulance with her daughter when she was transferred about 11pm to 
the labour ward… the judge referred to the ‘mother’s fervent belief in the sin 
of blood transfusion’ and th
 
The issue of undue influence is an important issue in the context of capacity, as it can 
ultimately invalidate a treatment decision irrespective of whether the individual is 
actually capable or not. However, the term has not been given a concrete definition as 
such221. This makes undue influence hard to prove, since different judges would most 
likely have their own interpretations of what would constitute undue influence. The 
case of Mrs U v Centre for Reproductive Medicine222 also concerned undue influence, 
but in a manner which contrasts sharply with Re T. In the case, Mrs U went with her 
husband to the Centre for Reproductive Medicine in Bristol in order to receive 
fertility treatment. The treatment involved the removal of Mr U’s sperm which would 
be used to fertilise his wife’s eggs. Mr U subsequently signed a consent form stating 
that he did not want his sperm to be destroyed upon his death, which would allow Mrs 
U to have a baby by him even if he should unexpectedly die at any time. However, the 
practice of posthumous insemination was contrary to the policy of the Centre, on the 
 
220 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649 at 665. 
221 See Allcord v Skinner [1887] 36 Ch D 145, in which Lindley J stated at 183 that “as no court has 
ever attempted to define fraud, so no court has ever attempted to define undue influence.”  
222 [2002] E.W.C.A Civ 565.  
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grounds that a child born in such circumstances would technically be fatherless. 
Following further consultation with a nurse, Mr U withdrew his consent for 
posthumous insemination and permitted his sperm to be destroyed upon his death. A 
few months later, Mr U died following an asthma attack. Subsequently, Mrs U wished 
to use her husband’s sperm to achieve pregnancy and brought a case arguing that her 
husband’s original consent should stand because he had been unduly influenced by 
the specialist training nurse. The court held that Mr U had not been unduly influenced, 
stating that although he had been pressurised to an extent, the pressure was not so 
gre
 undue influence, Mr U has to show 
                                                
at so as to override his will: 
“when one stands back and looks at the facts of the case, it seems… that it is 
difficult to say that an able, intelligent educated man… could have his will 
overborne so that the act of altering the form and initialling the alterations 
was done in circumstances in which Mr U no longer thought and decided for 
himself… it is likely that he and his wife did not really think there was any 
likelihood that this part of the form would ever be necessary. He succumbed 
to the firmly expressed request of [specialist training nurse] Ms Hinks and 
under some pressure. But to prove
something more than pressure…”223 
The circumstances of Mr U are far removed from those of T in Re T. In the latter case, 
T was extremely unwell and was therefore in a significantly more vulnerable position 
than Mr U. In contrast, Mr U was in no such state, and though Ms Hinks is likely to 
have been emphatic in her opinions, it does not follow that Mr U would feel so 
overwhelmed by her testimony that he would feel compelled to alter the consent form. 
Furthermore, the fact that Ms Hinks was not a close relative meant that Mr U would 
not be compelled by any emotional factors such as those which T might have felt with 
her mother. It is submitted that the emotional link between T and her mother in Re T 
makes undue influence a more complicated issue in terms of application. On the one 
hand, it could be argued that the influence and opinions of a close family member can 
bring a fresh perspective to a particular decision, thus helping the individual to make a 
more autonomous decision. If for example, an individual is required to make an 
important decision on medical treatment and has a family member who is in the 
medical profession, it could be of great benefit to the individual to hear the opinions 
 
223 Ibid at Para 15; quoting the President of the High Court of Justice Family Division at first instance. 
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of that family member to help make a more informed decision. The emotional ties 
with that family member may in many cases be helpful as the individual may be more 
likely to accept sound advice from somebody they trust. Conversely however, this 
emotional bond, as shown in Re T, can be detrimental if the outside party is using this 
to essentially manipulate a family member who is in a vulnerable state. In T’s case, 
she herself was not a Jehovah’s Witness although her mother was. If for the sake of 
argument T was also of the faith and this was the deciding factor in her decision to 
refuse treatment, it is submitted that the case would have been considerably more 
straight-forward224. The fact that T was seriously unwell, coupled with the fact that 
her final decision reflected the religious views of her mother, meant that the validity 
of her decision had to be questioned. These factors were of little relevance in Mr U’s 
case. As stated earlier, undue influence has not been defined in the common law, but 
would a clear definition be practical? While Re T has shown that family members can 
be a barrier to making a fully autonomous decision, it would be untenable to suggest 
that this would always be the case. Similarly, it cannot always be assumed that those 
with whom one has no emotional connection will always provide advice from an 
entirely objective perspective. Therefore, guidance on the issue of undue influence is 
est approached on the facts of each individual case. 
 
is issue, and it is thus necessary to examine the common law position on this issue. 
                                                
b
 
Having seen the potential impact of outside influence on decision-making capacity, it 
is also necessary to discuss existing guidance on assessment criteria. The 
implementation of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 means that statute can now be used 
as the source of this guidance. However, the assessment criteria laid down in sections 
2 and 3 of the 2005 Act have been directly influenced by common law guidance on
th
 
In the case of Re MB (Medical Treatment)225, a 23-year-old woman, MB, was 
admitted to hospital whilst forty weeks pregnant with her baby in the breech position. 
Upon admission to hospital, MB signed a consent form allowing delivery of her baby 
by Caesarean section, but also refused consent to a number of procedures involving 
 
224 Gunn makes this point in (1994) The Meaning of Incapacity; Medical Law Review, Vol. 2, 8-29 at 
15. See also Malette v Schulman [1990] 67 D.L.R (4th) 321 (Ontario CA) and R v Blaue [1975] 1 
W.L.R 1411, both of which concerned Jehovah’s Witnesses and confirmed the right to refuse treatment 
on religious grounds.  
225 [1997] 38 B.M.L.R 175.  
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needles, due to an intense phobia that she had of them. Having eventually agreed to 
anaesthesia via mask, MB subsequently refused this as well as delivery by C-section 
following a discussion of the potential risks involved. Upon going into labour, MB 
once more agreed to a C-section provided that she would not be able to feel the needle 
used to administer the anaesthetic. Later, MB again refused anaesthesia via mask 
which resulted in the cancellation of the operation. The Health Authority then sought 
a declaration allowing the C-section to take place. This was immediately granted and 
MB appealed the decision. Of greatest relevance to the decision was the first ground 
of appeal. It was argued that Lord Justice Hollis was wrong to rule that MB lacked the 
requisite capacity to refuse the operation. During her judgement, Lady Justice Butler-
Slo
ent 
he likely consequences of having 
nformation 
presented to her, then that decision may not be a true one.”226 
mentary of the case in 
Me
capacity departs. Secondly, MB was not incapable of making a decision… 
                                                
ss provided the following guidance on capacity assessment: 
“A person lacks capacity if some impairment of disturbance of mental 
functioning renders the person unable to make a decision whether to cons
to or refuse treatment. That inability to make a decision will occur when; 
(a) the patient is unable to comprehend and retain the information which is 
material to the decision, especially as to t
or not having the treatment in question; 
(b) the patient is unable to use the information and weigh it in the balance as 
part of the process of arriving at the decision. If… a compulsive disorder 
or phobia from which the patient suffers stifles belief in the i
 
MB’s appeal was dismissed on the grounds that she had been rendered temporarily 
incompetent by her needle phobia. Although she had undoubtedly understood the 
need for the operation and had consented to it, in the final moments, “her fear 
dominated all.”227 As a result, MB was deemed to have failed the test laid down by 
Butler-Sloss L.J. The decision in Re MB has had its critics. Com
dical Law Review did not accept the decision, stating that  
“Fear, without more, is far too loose a term to constitute a mental 
impairment. It cannot be the law that the moment fear enters the mind, 
 
226 Ibid per Butler-Sloss L.J at 190.  
227 Ibid at 181.  
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She refused the proposed operation, albeit for reasons others would reject. 
But, she does not have to give, not even have, reasons.”228 
It is submitted that this criticism is ultimately without significant merit. The author 
criticises the notion that fear automatically results in a loss of capacity, and in a sense 
they are correct. However, MB’s fear of the operation was the instrumental factor in 
that case specifically. It does not necessarily follow from this that the presence of fear 
will always equate to a loss of capacity. Given the Law Commission’s endorsement of 
a functional approach to capacity assessment, the decision-making capacity of an 
individual in the light of factors such as fear and panic must be assessed in each 
individual case. Re MB highlights the fact that such factors can have a bearing on 
decision-making capacity at the material time. In addition, the commentator on the 
case states that MB need not have provided an acceptable reason for her refusal of the 
operation. Although not explicitly stated, it is clear that the commentator is referring 
to Lord Donaldson’s statement in Re T 229 that reasons for refusal of treatment can be 
rational, irrational or even non-existent. Be this as it may, Lord Donaldson’s 
statement was intended to apply only to those who have the requisite capacity to make 
a treatment decision. Provided this capacity exists, the individual can make whatever 
decision they wish for whatever reason. In MB’s case, her capacity had been eroded 
to the extent that she lacked the capacity to make a valid refusal of the operation, as 
evidenced by her reasons for refusing the treatment. It is also worth remembering 
Grisso and Appelbaum’s four standards of decision-making capacity, one of which is 
the ability to appreciate the information given and to apply it realistically to one’s 
particular situation.230 Since MB’s fear of needles in effect took control over her 
decision, it could be argued that she was ultimately unable to appreciate the fact that 
the health of her unborn child was at risk without the operation. If she were able to 
appreciate this, MB might have better been able to put her fears aside and go ahead 
with the C-section231.  
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Butler-Sloss L.J’s test of capacity was a development of an earlier test laid down by 
Thorpe L.J in the case of Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment)232. C was a 
sufferer of paranoid schizophrenia who developed a gangrenous foot whilst serving a 
term in Broadmoor. Without an amputation of the infected foot, C would have a mere 
15% chance of survival. C continually refused the operation, and the issue at the heart 
of the case was whether C had the requisite capacity to validly refuse the operation. 
Thorpe L.J laid down a tripartite test for determining whether capacity is present: 
“For the patient offered amputation to save life, there are three stages to the 
decision: 
1. To take in and retain the treatment information; 
2. To believe it, and 
3. To weigh that information, balancing risks and needs.”233 
His Lordship held that C’s capacity, whilst having been reduced due to his condition, 
had not diminished to such an extent so as to render his refusal of the treatment 
invalid. Evidence from C’s doctor had stated that C suffered under the delusion that 
he had been a famous doctor, and that the proposed treatment was in fact intended to 
harm him. In the light of this evidence, it could be argued that the court’s decision 
was wrong, since C appeared not have believed the information regarding the 
proposed amputation. In the light of this, C’s capacity could be construed as having 
been reduced to the extent that he did not sufficiently understand the nature, purpose 
and effects of the treatment234. Despite this, Thorpe L.J confirmed his satisfaction that 
C had understood and retained the relevant information, and that he believed it in his 
own way, thus arriving at a clear choice235. It is submitted that this decision was likely 
to have been at least partially based upon what C had said to the consultant vascular 
surgeon, namely that he would prefer to die with two legs than live with one236. This 
suggested that C had acknowledged and accepted that his life was probably at stake if 
                                                                                                                                            
case is not in any way representative of the legal position on treatment refusal as evidenced also in St 
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he refused the operation, despite this being in contrast to the statement made to his 
doctor earlier. The case confirmed the importance placed upon the principle of 
autonomy and the right of the competent patient to make any treatment decision they 
wish even if death will result237. The functional approach dictates that the competence 
of an individual must be tested for the particular situation and cannot be assumed 
simply because of the presence of a mental disorder or impairment238. This stance has 
remained constant throughout the common law and can be seen in its starkest form 
through cases involving the refusal of lifesaving treatment, such as Re B (Adult: 
Refusal of Medical Treatment)239 and Pretty v United Kingdom 240. 
 
It can be seen that Butler-Sloss L.J’s capacity test is in essence a reiteration of Thorpe 
L.J’s Re C test. However, it can also be seen that the former test contains no reference 
to stage two of the Re C test, i.e. belief in the information given. Does this then 
represent derogation from Thorpe L.J’s test? Kennedy and Grubb submit that this is 
not the case, since the court in Re MB did refer to the test on a number of occasions241 
Furthermore, her Ladyship stated that: 
“Irrationality is here used to connote a decision which is so outrageous in its 
defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who 
had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it… 
it might be otherwise if a decision is based on a misperception of reality. Such 
a misperception will be more readily accepted to be a disorder of the 
mind.”242 
In C’s case, the nature of his condition meant that he had made a number of 
statements which were clearly indicative of a misperception of reality, most notably 
that he had at one time in his life been a famous doctor. However, central to the issue 
of C’s capacity was the fact that he did ultimately believe that the proposed treatment 
                                                 
237 See also Re W (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2002] EWHC 901 (Fam) which illustrates 
this in specific relation to those suffering with psychiatric disorder and is thus comparable to the 
decision in Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment). 
238 See also Re JT (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1998] 1 F.L.R 48, in which the patient 
suffered from severe learning disabilities and was deemed to be capable of refusing life-saving 
treatment for renal failure by virtue of having satisfied the Re MB test.  
239 [2002] E.W.H.C 429. See also Journal of Medical Ethics (2002), Vol. 28, 232-243 for commentaries 
on this case.  
240 [2002] 35 E.H.R.R 1. See also  Boyd, K M (2002) Mrs Pretty and Ms B; Journal of Medical Ethics; 
Vol. 28, 211-212. 
241 Kennedy, I  and Grubb, A (2003) Medical Law; 3rd edition; Butterworth’s Press London at 626. 
242 Re MB (Medical Treatment) per Butler-Sloss LJ at 190. 
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would improve his condition. This was fully accepted by C, and his refusal of the 
treatment was not because he had any misperceptions about the nature treatment per 
se. The case of NHS Trust v Ms T243 illustrates further the issue of misperception of 
reality. Ms T was a sufferer of borderline personality disorder who self harmed on a 
regular basis. Eventually, this meant that Ms T would require a blood transfusion. Ms 
T had received a number of transfusions over the years which she had initially refused 
but had then accepted. On this occasion, Ms T refused the operation and provided an 
advance directive to that effect. The directive stated that Ms T was refusing further 
transfusions on the grounds that these would cause her greater stress in the long-term, 
and more importantly to the case, because she believed her blood to be a vessel of 
evil. Having a transfusion would not help as she believed that the blood would 
become corrupted once it entered her body. The court held that Ms T did not have the 
requisite capacity to refuse further treatment, and an interim declaration was made 
authorising a blood transfusion. The court interpreted Ms T’s claim that her blood was 
evil as a misperception of reality attributable to a disorder of the mind244.  
 
The case of Ms T further illustrates the justifiable reluctance of the courts to rule in 
favour of capacity when the reasons for refusing treatment are out of touch with 
reality. The court ultimately held that Ms T had failed to satisfy Butler-Sloss L.J’s Re 
MB test inasmuch as she was unable to use and weigh the relevant information and in 
the process of arriving at her decision to refuse a blood transfusion, and this was held 
to have been the situation when she signed the advance directive245. As a result, the 
fact that Ms T had also made an advance directive outlining her delusional beliefs 
ultimately had no bearing upon the final decision. Whilst the making of such a 
directive would normally signify a well-thought out and consistent thought process 
which would give great weight to an individual’s treatment refusal, this cannot apply 
when decisions are based upon a misperception of reality.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
243 [2004] E.W.H.C 1279.  
244 per Charles J at Para 62.  
245 Ibid at Para 63.  
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3.1.2: CAPACITY ASSESSMENT IN ENGLISH LAW UNDER THE MENTAL 
CAPACITY ACT 2005. 
 
As of October 2007, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 has been fully implemented in the 
law of England and Wales. The process which would eventually result in this is one 
that that began in earnest in 1991. In that year, the Law Commission of England and 
Wales published Consultation Paper 119, which was designed to provide a brief but 
concise overview of the then current legal position surrounding mental incapacity, as 
well as providing preliminary thoughts about which direction any proposed reforms 
should take. The Law Commission recognised that the law on capacity was in need of 
reform. As Parkin explains: “The law was fragmented as a result of ad hoc 
developments in disparate fields. There were divergences between the treatment 
of people and then property; the division of responsibility between relatives and 
professionals was unclear; there was no formal method of resolving disputes.”246 
 
The approach taken on the issue of capacity assessment has been largely consistent 
throughout the discussion and consultation stages of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, 
and much of the common law guidance has now been enshrined in some form within 
the legislation. Section 1 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 outlines the general 
principles of the Act, which show that there is a clear pro-autonomy ethos present 
throughout. Indeed, it should be noted that the emphasis upon empowerment and 
enablement of the individual resulted in a name change of the legislation from the 
originally proposed Mental Incapacity Act to the now used Mental Capacity Act 
2005247.  
 
From the outset, the Law Commission unequivocally stated that the individual must 
be presumed to have capacity unless this presumption can be accurately rebutted248. 
The presumption of capacity was accepted as being integral to the pro-autonomy 
ethos of the new legislation and was duly included in s. 1(2) of the Mental Capacity 
Act 2005: 
                                                 
246 Parkin, A (1996) Where now on Mental Incapacity? 2 Web J.C.L.I; accessed online on 19/04/2005; 
available at http://www.ncl.ac.uk/~nlawwww/1996/issue2/parkin2.html.  
247 House of Commons Hansard Debates (11/10/2004) per Mr. David Lammy at Col. 22.  
248 Ibid at Para 4.19.  
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“A person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established that he 
lacks capacity.” 
 
The remainder of section 1 of the Act similarly endorses the principle of autonomy, 
whilst also wholly rejecting a status approach to capacity in favour of a functional 
approach. The functional approach to capacity dictates that the decision-making 
capacity of an individual must be assessed for the particular decision, as opposed to 
the status approach to capacity which effectively allows for this to be assumed across 
the board based on the individual’s status as mentally disordered or impaired249. This 
approach is reflected in s.1(3) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which states that the 
individual must not be deemed as incapable of making a decision “unless all 
practicable steps to help him to do so have been taken without success.” The 
Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice 2007 confirms that this principle rejects the 
status approach in favour of the functional approach:  
“People with an illness or disability affecting their ability to make a decision 
should receive support to help them make as many decisions as they can. This 
principle aims to stop people being automatically labelled as lacking capacity 
to make particular decisions. Because it encourages individuals to play as big 
a role as possible in decision-making, it also helps prevent unnecessary 
interventions in their lives.”250 
In addition, the Code of Practice states that anyone who is supporting an incapable 
adult during the decision-making process should not use any coercion to unduly 
influence an individual’s decision. This is entirely consistent with the common law 
position on the issue of undue influence251.  
 
The third general principle which can be founding s.1(4) of the Act states that “a 
person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because he makes 
an unwise decision.”. Again, this principle is consistent with the common law 
approach, in particular Lord Donaldson’s statement in Re T (Adult: Refusal of 
Medical Treatment), in which His Lordship stated that it was irrelevant if the reasons 
                                                 
249 Law Commission Report No. 231 (1995) at Para 3.5. 
250 Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice 2007 at Para 2.6.  
251 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All E.R 649. 
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behind an individual’s decisions were rational, irrational or non-existent.252 As long 
as the individual has the capacity to make a decision, he/she may do so without 
having to gain the approval of others. This principle also confirms the rejection of an 
outcome approach to capacity, in which any decision deemed inconsistent with 
traditional values or with the opinions of the one making the capacity assessment, will 
be classified as invalid253. Such an approach cannot sit alongside the pro-autonomy 
ethos of the Mental Capacity Act because according to the Law Commission, the 
outcome approach looks upon the individuality of the person as a negative quality and 
penalises such individuality accordingly254. However, the Code of Practice states that 
care should be taken when the individual continually makes unwise decisions that put 
themselves at risk of harm, or makes decisions that are obviously irrational or out of 
character255. Decisions made on either of these grounds should not automatically 
equate to a lack of decision-making capacity, but further investigation may be needed 
to ascertain whether any developments have taken place which could impair the 
individual’s decision-making capacity. Gunn poses two questions which should be 
considered on this issue: “Is there a sufficient impact upon decision-making 
abilities to warrant determining that this person is incapable of making the 
decision? And, does the apparent decision-maker hold a patently false belief that 
demonstrates an inability to make the decision?”256 Gunn further states that the 
issue of a patently false belief is potentially complex because such beliefs must be 
distinguished from beliefs which are merely mistaken257. This point was originally 
raised by Saks who stated that it is often difficult to identify whether an individual’s 
opinion of truth is mistaken and therefore, “people should be free to pursue the 
truth as they see fit.” 258 If however a belief can be proven to be patently false as 
opposed to merely mistaken, it is then a matter of assessing whether these beliefs are a 
product of a mental disorder, and if they affect decision-making capacity to a 
                                                 
252 Ibid per Donaldson M.R at 663.  
253 Law Commission Report No. 231 (1995) at Para 3.3.  
254 Ibid.  
255 Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice 2007 at Para 2.11.  
256 Gunn, M J (2005) Decision-making Capacity and the Mental Capacity Act 2005: Some Difficult 
Issues and some Possible Means of Resolution; Unpublished. See also, Saks, E R (1993) Competency 
to Refuse Psychotropic Medication: Three Alternatives to the Law’s Cognitive Standard; University of 
Miami Law Review 47: 689-761 and Saks, E R (1991) Competency to Refuse Treatment; North 
Carolina Law Review; Vol. 69; 945-999 at 962 and Chapter 1.1 of this thesis.  
257 Ibid.  
258 Saks, E R (1991) Competency to Refuse Treatment; North Carolina Law Review; Vol. 69; 945-999 
at 964.  
  98   
sufficient degree. If this is the case, then the provisions of the Mental Capacity Act 
2005 become applicable, as will be explained below. In the context of s.1(4) of the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005, the Code of Practice alights on the fact that decisions 
made on the basis of values and beliefs cannot be deemed as invalid under this 
principle259. 
 
The fourth general principle which is set out in s.1(5) of the Act reads as follows: “An 
act done, or decision made, under this Act for or on behalf of a person who lacks 
capacity must be done, or made, in his best interests.” This is simply a restatement 
of the common law position which states that the best interests of the individual must 
form the basis for all actions done on behalf of the incapable adult.260 Although, as 
the common law confirmed, it is difficult to provide a single description of the best 
interests concept261, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 does provide a set of criteria to be 
followed in order to make this determination. These will be discussed in Chapter 4 of 
this thesis262, and as will be seen, it is through these criteria that derogation from the 
common law position on best interests can be seen.  
 
The fifth and final general principle as laid down in s.1(6) of the Act states that before 
an act is done or a decision is made, “regard must be had to whether the purpose 
for which it is needed can be as effectively achieved in a way that is less 
restrictive of the person’s rights and freedom of action.” This is an explicit 
endorsement of the principle of least restrictive alternative and requires anybody 
intervening on behalf of the incapable adult to “explore ways that would be less 
restrictive or allow the most freedom for a person who lacks capacity to make 
the decision in question.”263 The Code of Practice also emphasises the fact that the 
principle of least restrictive alternative must not supersede the best interests of the 
individual i.e. in order to ensure that the best interests of the individual are being met, 
it may be necessary to choose an option which is not the least restrictive of the 
available options. However, from a practical point of view, it will often be possible to 
combine the process of selecting the least restrictive option and the action which will 
                                                 
259 See also Ibid.  
260 Re A (Medical Treatment: Male Sterilisation) [2000] 53 B.M.L.R 66; Re SL (Adult Patient: Medical 
Treatment) [2000] 2 F.C.R 452; Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 A.C 1. 
261 Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice 2007 at Para 2.13.  
262 See Chapter 4.1.2 of this thesis at 142. 
263 Ibid at Para 2.16.  
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be in the best interests of the individual, making a conflict between the two possible 
but not likely264.  
 
Once the principles which underpin the Mental Capacity Act 2005 have been 
established, the next question to be answered is how the Act deals with the issue of 
capacity assessment. This is covered in sections 2 and 3 of the Act. Section 2(1) 
provides a statement of the diagnostic threshold: 
“For the purposes of this Act, a person lacks capacity in relation to a matter, 
if at the material time he is unable to make a decision for himself in relation 
to the matter because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the 
functioning of the mind or brain.” 
As can be seen, it is not simply that an individual must suffer with some form of 
incapacity, but rather, that this incapacity must be attributable to a mental disorder or 
impairment. Section 2(2) states that this diagnostic threshold has been satisfied, the 
incapacity need not be permanent. The Code of Practice confirms once again that a 
functional approach must be taken when assessing an individual’s capacity: “An 
assessment of a person’s capacity must be based on their ability to make a 
specific decision at the time it needs to be made, and not their ability to make 
decisions in general.”265 Following on from this, s.2(3) of the Act reiterates a 
rejection of the status approach by stating that a lack of capacity cannot be established 
merely by reference to “a person’s age or appearance, a condition of his, or an 
aspect of his behaviour, which might lead others to make unjustified 
assumptions about his capacity.” This statement also supports the principle of non-
discrimination, which requires anybody acting for on behalf of an incapable adult to 
do so without acting negatively towards the individual on the basis of some aspect of 
their condition. A doctor for example, may not simply assume that an 80-year-old 
patient with dementia will be incapable of making any decisions simply by virtue of 
their condition. This must be assessed thoroughly266.  
 
Section 3 arguably contains the most important provisions relating to assessment of 
capacity, and is worth quoting in full: 
                                                 
264 Ibid.  
265 Ibid at Para 4.4.  
266 see Mental Capacity Code of Practice 2007 at Paras 4.7-4.9 
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“3(1): For the purposes of section 2, a person is unable to make a decision for 
himself is he is unable –  
(a) to understand the information relevant to the decision, 
(b) to retain that information, 
(c) to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the 
decision, or 
(d) to communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign language or 
any other means) 
(2): A person is not to be regarded as unable to understand the information 
relevant to a decision if he is unable to understand an explanation of it given 
to him in a way that is appropriate to his circumstances (using simple 
language, visual aids or any other means). 
(3) The fact that a person is able to retain the information relevant to a 
decision for a short period only does not prevent him from being regarded as 
able to make the decision. 
(4) The information relevant to a decision includes information about the 
reasonably foreseeable consequences of – 
(a) deciding one way or another, or  
(b) failing to make a decision.” 
It can be seen that section 3(1) in particular is in essence a restatement of the common 
law test of capacity as laid down in Re MB (Medical Treatment)267. It will be recalled 
that Butler-Sloss L.J’s bipartite test states that an individual will be deemed incapable 
of making a treatment decision if he/she:  
“(a) …is unable to comprehend and retain the information which is material 
to the decision, especially as to the likely consequences of having or not 
having the treatment in question; 
 (b) the patient is unable to use the information and weigh it in the balance as 
part of the process of arriving at the decision.”268 
                                                 
267 [1997] 38 B.M.L.R 175. See also Local Authority X v MM and KM [2007] E.W.H.C 2003 (Fam) per 
Munby J at Para 74, where His Lordship confirmed that the test of capacity as laid down in s.3(1) of 
the Mental Capacity Act 2005 was essentially the same as that which was laid down in Re MB 
(Medical Treatment).  
268 Ibid per Butler-Sloss L.J at 190.  
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Butler-Sloss L.J’s test in essence restated Thorpe L.J’s tripartite test in Re C (Adult: 
Refusal of Medical Treatment)269, except that Her Ladyship’s test made no reference 
to belief in the information given. Similarly, the assessment criteria provided in s.3 of 
the Mental Capacity Act 2005 does not require the individual to believe the 
information given to them. This is unsurprising given that Re MB itself showed that 
belief is not necessarily a deciding factor in capacity assessment. In that case there 
was no issue as to whether MB believed that she needed the Caesarean operation to 
protect her unborn child. She believed this and fully accepted it. Nevertheless, she 
was deemed incapable of making a valid treatment decision on the basis that the fear 
and panic she experienced caused a temporary impairment of her mental functioning. 
However, Bellhouse et al make the point that although the issue of belief is not 
specifically tested through the Act’s assessment criteria, a strong lack of belief or 
disbelief in relevant information given should be noted as it may invalidate the 
decision270.  In the event of there being a strong lack of belief of disbelief in 
information given, the person making the capacity assessment should consider 
whether this sufficiently impinges upon an individual’s decision-making capacity. 
However, under s.3 of the Mental Capacity Act, belief has not been deemed to be a 
cornerstone criterion of the assessment process.  
 
That the individual must believe the information is not referred to specifically in the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005, nor was it referred to in the 1995 and 2003 versions of the 
Draft Bill. However, one could argue that belief in the information would be tied in to 
s.3(4) i.e. information which is relevant to a decision. While this could be argued to 
be a broad term, it is submitted that this might actually be advantageous. Different 
decisions involve difference circumstances, and the inclusion of s.3(4) would allow 
for individual circumstances to be taken into account. With regards to s. 3(1), the Law 
Commission had gained substantial support for its assertion that testing for 
understanding of the information was a more realistic prospect that testing for 
understanding of the nature of a decision271. The same applied to the express 
inclusion of ‘foreseeable consequences’, an issue which was of significant relevance 
in Re C. In addition, the inclusion of s.3(1)(c) was deemed to be important in order to 
                                                 
269 [1994] 1 All E.R 819.  
270 Bellhouse, J et al (2003) Capacity Based Mental Health Legislation and its Impact on Clinical 
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combat against the potential undue influence of third parties272. Furthermore, the 
provision covers cases where an individual, whilst able to take in and retain the 
information, might, on account of mental disorder or impairment, arrive at a treatment 
decision that is entirely unrelated to the information given. The Commission stated 
that the object of this was to “deflect the complications of asking whether a person 
needs to ‘appreciate’ the information as well as understand it.”273  It is 
appropriate at this time to recall Grisso and Appelbaum’s four standards of capacity 
assessment. As well as the ability to express a choice and understand and process 
information, Grisso and Appelbaum state that the individual should be able to 
appreciate information given to them and apply it to their own situation274. The Law 
Commission appear not to have given much weight to the appreciation requirement, 
as it was ultimately left out of their recommendations. This is perhaps surprising 
given that Grisso and Appelbaum’s appreciation standard is arguably a better 
exposition of the functional approach to capacity, as it requires not just the ability to 
understand the information abstractly, but also the ability to apply that information 
directly to one’s own situation. However, one could argue that s.3(1)(c), which refers 
to the ability to use or weigh up the information in the decision-making process, in 
effect requires the ability to apply information to one’s situation, and thus makes 
reference to the functional approach that way. The functional approach is again 
endorsed in s.3(3), which states that a person can be deemed capacitous even if he/she 
is only able to retain the information for a short while. The crucial issue is whether the 
individual can retain the information long enough to make the decision at the material 
time, thus allowing for those with fluctuating capacity to make treatment decisions275.  
                                                
 
Section 3(2) again signifies the pro-autonomy approach of the Act by stating that the 
individual must not be deemed incapable if they are able to understand an explanation 
of the treatment information given to him in a manner appropriate to their 
circumstances. According to the Code of Practice, section 3(2) “stresses the 
importance of explaining information using the most effective form of 
 
272 Law Commission Report No. 231 (1995) at Para 3.17.  
273 Ibid. 
274 Grisso, T and Appelbaum, P (1995) The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study I: Mental Illness 
and Competence to Consent to Treatment; Law and Human Behaviour; Vol. 19(2), 105-126 at 110.  
275 Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice 2007 at Para 4.20 
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communication for that person (such as simple language, sign language, visual 
representations, computer support or any other means).”276  
Section 3(2) promotes autonomy by virtue of the fact that it requires the capacity 
assessor to consider the circumstances of the patient on an individual basis. This 
means that the patient is given the best possible chance of understanding relevant 
information to the degree that is necessary to be deemed capable.  
 
3.2: CAPACITY ASSESSMENT IN SCOTTISH LAW UNDER THE ADULTS 
WITH INCAPACITY (SCOTLAND) ACT 2000 
 
At the heart of the Scottish approach is a clear and unambiguous endorsement of the 
principle of autonomy: individuals were to be encouraged to participate in the 
decision making process as much as was practicable. This was highlighted in the 
Scottish Law Commission’s discussion paper Mentally Disabled Adults: Legal 
Arrangements for Managing their Welfare and Finances277:  
“The philosophy that lies behind the new approach is one of minimum 
intervention in the lives of the mentally disabled consistent with providing 
proper care and protection and maximum help to enable individuals to 
realise their full potential and make the best use of the abilities they have.”278 
The intention of the reforms was essentially to take the concept of autonomy and 
develop it as far as was possible. To this end, individuals would not only be 
encouraged to make decisions about treatment at the time the treatment is needed, but 
would also be encouraged to make decisions in advance, in the event of a loss of 
capacity in the future. This was laid down in the Scottish Law Commission’s 1995 
Report on Incapable Adults: “Incapacitated adults and their carers should be 
enabled and encouraged to do as much as possible for themselves and to make 
their own arrangements for possible future incapacity.”279 
The Scottish Law Commission stated in 1991 that the pro-autonomy approach to 
capacity law was greatly influenced by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
                                                 
276 Ibid at Para 4.17.  
277 September 1991. 
278 Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No. 94 (1991) Mentally Disabled Adults: Legal 
Arrangements for Managing their Welfare and Finances at Para 1.7. 
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of Mentally Retarded Persons280, which fully endorsed a pro-autonomy approach in 
relation to potentially incapable individuals by stating that those suffering from 
mental retardation be given the same full rights as everybody else. Indeed, it is hard to 
disagree with the principle that those suffering with a mental disorder or impairment 
should be given the same rights as others281, or that all potentially incapable 
individuals should be given full rights to proper medical care and a decent standard of 
living282. However, although the Scottish Law Commission fully endorsed the 
approach outlined by the United Nations, it also highlighted the potential dichotomy 
between giving mentally retarded individuals full rights and full protection: 
“There is an inherent conflict or tension between the principles of maximum 
freedom for mentally disabled people and their protection. Giving mentally 
disabled people exactly the same rights as mentally normal people would 
often result in the disabled harming themselves and others and becoming 
victims of exploitation and abuse. Protection from these consequences 
necessarily involves some curtailment of the rights that normal people enjoy. 
Indeed, a certain level of protection may enhance the ability of mentally 
disabled to enjoy their other rights to a greater extent.”283 
The above statement by the Scottish Law Commission perhaps highlights the fact that 
the U.N Declaration is on occasion idealistic. The fact remains that giving incapable 
adults the same freedoms as capable adults may be counterproductive. It would be 
ignoring the fact that those suffering with a mental disorder or impairment are more 
vulnerable than healthy individuals; therefore, as the Scottish Law Commission 
stated, to bestow an identical set of rights upon a vulnerable group of people as a 
matter of principle may often result in harm coming to the individual or others. It is 
therefore not always possible to treat mentally disordered or impaired individuals the 
same as others across the board; the very fact that the U.N felt it necessary to state 
that mentally retarded persons had the right to full protection and due process 
confirms this. However, the fact that the U.N also used phrases such as ‘maximum 
degree of feasibility’ and ‘to the fullest possible extent of his capabilities’, suggests 
that it was aware of the fact that a mentally disabled individual’s ability to exercise 
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281 Ibid at Clause 1.  
282 Ibid at Clauses 2 and 3.  
283 Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No. 94 (1991) Mentally Disabled Adults: Legal 
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these rights may often be hampered to some extent. This is evidenced by clause 3 of 
the Declaration, which confers upon the individual the right to economic security and 
the right to take up an occupation. This could be argued to be an endorsement of the 
principle that capacity is not necessarily an ‘all or nothing’ concept, and that it must 
not be assumed that mentally disabled individuals will always be incapable of 
handling some of their own affairs. However, as stated previously, a fully pro-
autonomy approach may be unrealistic when dealing with mentally disabled 
individuals. That such individuals may often need some form of protection 
automatically necessitates at least a partially paternalistic approach. The fact that the 
Scottish Law Commission recognised the potential dichotomy between maximum 
freedom and maximum protection suggests that it was aware of this.  
 
The Scottish Law Commission eventually recommended a functional approach to 
capacity. In the 1995 Report, the Commission made the following recommendations 
as to when it would be permissible to intervene on behalf of the individual: 
“(1) an intervention should be capable of being made under our 
recommendation if the adult is: 
(a) mentally disordered; 
(b) unable to communicate due to physical or other disability and by reason 
of such mental disorder or inability to communicate, unable to take the 
decision or carry out the act in question; 
(c) Mental disorder should mean mental illness or mental handicap however 
caused or manifested, but a person should not be regarded as mentally 
disordered by reason solely of promiscuity of other immoral conduct, 
sexual deviancy, dependence on alcohol or drugs or acting as no prudent 
person would act.”284 
 
The above recommendations by the Scottish Law Commission first endorse a 
diagnostic threshold i.e. that a mental disorder must be present. In addition, the 
Commission clearly endorses a functional approach to capacity by referring to the 
inability to carry out the act in question. The individual’s incapacity must therefore be 
assessed in relation to a specific act, not generally. Finally, the Scottish Law 
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Commission reject the status approach by stating that mental disorder should not be 
assumed simply from the presence of unorthodox actions. It can be seen from this that 
there is little difference in this approach from that which was adopted in English law.  
The Scottish Law Commission clearly endorsed a functional, pro-autonomy approach 
to capacity. It is therefore necessary to discuss how this approach was eventually 
utilised in the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000. 
 
With regards to how one should assess an individual’s capacity to make decisions on 
medical treatment, the Scottish Law Commission emphasised at the outset that the 
2000 Act would not alter the common law position on this issue. The common law 
position was restated in the 1991 Discussion Paper:  
“The capacity of a patient to give an effective consent depends on his or her 
ability to comprehend, from information supplied by the doctor or others, the 
nature of the proposed treatment and its effects and risks, to come to a 
decision and to communicate that decision to the doctor. The ability of 
individuals to carry out these steps varies enormously, even among the 
general adult population. For consent to be effective the patient does not need 
to have been given an exhaustive evaluation of the treatment. In particular, 
minimal risks need not be mentioned. What is required is that the patient is 
informed in broad terms of the nature of the proposed treatment.”285 
The pro-autonomy approach is indirectly referred to in the above passage, by virtue of 
the fact that the individual need only be informed in broad terms of any proposed 
treatment. This illustrates the fact that the threshold of understanding for incapable 
adults should not be too high so as to enable a greater number of individuals to be 
ruled capable of making a treatment decision. This position remained unchanged and 
was restated in the 1995 Report on Incapable Adults286. 
Little more on this issue was added or changed in the 1997 Scottish Executive Paper 
Making the Right Moves, which concentrated more on procedural issues rather than 
fundamental definitions. It is therefore clear that the Scottish Law Commission did 
not intend to change the common law position in relation to how capacity should be 
assessed. This approach would eventually find its way into the 2000 Act itself. 
                                                 
285 Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No. 94 (1991) Mentally Disabled Adults: Legal 
Arrangements for Managing their Welfare and Finances at Para 3.5; see also Chatterton v Gerson 
[1981] QB 432. 
286 Scottish Law Commission Report No.151 (1995) Report on Incapable Adults at Para 5.2. 
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Section 1(2) of the Adults with Incapacity Act (Scotland) Act 2000 states that no 
intervention will be authorised on behalf of an individual unless the person 
authorising the intervention is satisfied that it will provide a benefit to the adult, and 
that the same benefit cannot reasonably be achieved without the proposed 
intervention. This confirms endorsement of the principle of autonomy. Following on 
from this, s.1(3) of the Act endorses the principle of least restrictive alternative in the 
event of an intervention being necessary. 
 
Section 1(6) of the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 provides the following 
guidance with respect to how incapacity should be defined: 
“For the purposes of the Act, and unless the context otherwise requires: 
‘adult’ means a person who has attained the age of 16 years; 
‘incapable’ means incapable of: 
a) acting; or 
b) making decisions; or 
c) communicating decisions; or 
d) understanding decisions; or 
e) retaining the memory of decisions, 
as mentioned in any provision of this Act, by reason of mental disorder or of 
inability to communicate because of physical disability; but a person shall not 
fall within this definition by reason only of a lack or deficiency in a faculty of 
communication if that lack or deficiency can be made good by human or 
mechanical aid (whether of an interpretive nature or otherwise); and 
‘incapacity’ shall be construed accordingly.” 
Whilst the given definition of ‘adult’ is straightforward enough, criticism can be 
levelled at the Act’s definition of ‘incapacity’. On the positive side, it is perhaps 
commendable that the Scottish Parliament elected to define incapacity using a 
checklist, as opposed to a shorter, more generalised definition. As incapacity is the 
cornerstone of the 2000 Act, one might argue that legislation should contain as much 
guidance as possible, in order to provide doctors with as much information as is 
necessary to prevent an erroneous diagnosis of incapacity. However, the checklist of 
incapacity which was incorporated into the 2000 Act can still be argued as being 
inadequate. Indeed, while section 1(6) appears at first glance to be exhaustive, closer 
study of the provision in fact reveals a number of vagaries and generalisations.  
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First, the Act states that an individual will be deemed to lack capacity if he/she is 
incapable of ‘acting’. It is submitted that this criterion is vague and ultimately 
unhelpful, since ‘acting’ in effect encompasses a number of aspects of the decision-
making process. Simply referring to an inability to act without further qualification of 
the term is failing to take this into consideration. Indeed, the Code of Practice for Part 
5 of the Act also fails to provide further guidance as to the provisions contained in 
s.1(6) of the legislation. Rather than issue guidance as to how doctors can assess 
accurately the failure of an individual to act, make, communicate, understand or retain 
the memory of decisions, the Code of Practice provides information on when an 
individual should not be deemed incapable of making decisions. Doctors and carers 
would perhaps benefit from more information in the legislation on when an individual 
is capable as opposed to incapable. Given that the emphasis of the 2000 legislation is 
upon presumption of capacity and empowerment of the individual wherever possible, 
this may explain the emphasis of the Code of Practice upon when an individual is 
capable, rather than the opposite. Nevertheless, it is submitted that failing to give 
adequate guidance on when a patient has satisfied the criteria of s.1(6) in effect 
defeats the purpose of the Act. What is also surprising about the generality of s.1(6) is 
that there appears to be no reference to the functional approach, despite it having been 
endorsed by the Law Commission during the discussion process. To illustrate this 
point, consider the wording of s.2(1) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which refers to 
the inability to make a decision “at the material time”. This phrase shows that one’s 
decision-making capacity must be assessed in the context of a particular decision 
made at that particular time, rather than assessed in general terms. By contrast, s.1(6) 
of the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 makes no such references, and 
although it would be inaccurate to suggest that a functional approach has not in fact 
been endorsed, this important point is not made remotely clear. Instead, the references 
to inability to act, making, communicating, understanding and retaining the memory 
of decisions are made as if a general assessment of these faculties will be acceptable. 
In 2002, the British Medical Association published suggested guidelines for capacity 
assessment in Scotland which included the following criteria to be considered when 
determining whether an individual is capable: 
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“Whether the adult: 
- is capable of making a choice; 
- understands why a choice is needed; 
- has memory abilities that allow the retention of information; 
- is aware of any alternatives; 
- has knowledge of the risks and benefits involved; 
- is aware of the decision’s personal relevance to him or herself; 
- is aware of his or her right to refuse, as well as the consequences of 
refusal; 
- is aware of how to refuse; 
- is capable of communicating his or her choice; 
- has ever expressed wishes relevant to the issues when greater capacity 
existed, and; 
- is expressing views consistent with previously preferred moral, cultural, 
family and experiential background.”287 
As can be seen, the B.M.A guidelines for assessing capacity are considerably more 
exhaustive than those which were included in the 2000 Act two years previously. In 
contrast to s.1(6), the B.M.A guidelines make no direct reference to ‘acting’, but 
instead focus upon one’s ability to make a choice, one’s awareness and 
communication of choices and opinions. It could be argued that these are ‘acts’ of 
sorts, although the 2000 Act appears not to consider them as such, since making, 
communicating and understanding decisions are considered separately to one’s 
inability to act. Another important difference between the Act’s provisions and the 
B.M.A guidelines is that the British Medical Association recognised the important 
difference between actually making a choice, and being capable of making a choice. 
Put another way, an individual may choose to somehow abdicate their decision-
making rights, or make a decision in an entirely random or unorthodox manner (such 
as flipping a coin for example). This is of secondary importance provided the doctor 
is satisfied that the individual is at least capable of making a decision in the first place 
should they wish to. This is also in line with Grisso and Appelbaum’s exposition of 
capacity assessment, which states that an individual must display an ability to 
understand information, rather than actually be required to utilise this understanding 
                                                 
287 British Medical Association (June 2002) Adults with Incapacity: Medical Treatment for Scotland at 
6. 
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directly288. Section 1(6) of the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 and its 
Code of Practice do not include any such elaboration, referring only to acting, 
memory of decisions and making, communicating and understanding decisions.  
 
The British Medical Association also suggested that as well as simply evidencing a 
choice, the patient should also demonstrate, or at least be capable of demonstrating, 
that they understand why a choice is necessary, that they are capable of retaining the 
information, and are aware of their right to refuse the treatment should they wish. One 
might argue these criteria to be essential aspects of informed decision-making, yet the 
2000 Act has effectively ignored these aspects, electing instead to use all-
encompassing terms such as ‘acting’ and ‘understanding’. As the B.M.A has shown, a 
term such as ‘understanding’ in reality encompasses a number of factors, such as 
retention of information and being able to balance up the risks and benefits. It is 
submitted that the guidelines laid down in s.1(6) of the Adults with Incapacity 
(Scotland) Act 2000 have failed to consider the possibility that many patients whose 
capacity is called into question are ‘borderline’ cases. In such cases, it is essential that 
healthcare professionals are given as much guidance as possible in how best to 
accurately determine a patient’s capacity. However, proponents of the set-up of the 
2000 Act may equally argue that the provisions of the Act cannot realistically be too 
narrow, since the Act applies potentially to a variety of situations relating to personal 
welfare, finance and property. Capacity to consent to or refuse medical treatment may 
involve a different set of criteria to one’s testamentary capacity for instance, and it is 
therefore arguable that Parliament was simply attempting to take this into 
consideration. Adrian Ward explains thus: 
“…the Act’s definitions of ‘incapable’ and ‘incapacity’, as with its other 
definitions, are only ‘for the purposes of this Act’. They will not necessarily 
be interpreted as coinciding with the tests of capacity for other purposes, 
such as determining whether a purported act or transaction is void. For 
example, the courts are unlikely to depart from their policy of reluctance to 
declare a person incapable of testamentary capacity, and might decline to 
apply – for that purpose – the element of ‘retaining the memory of decisions’ 
in the case of someone who is incapable of retaining memory of the decision 
                                                 
288 Appelbaum, P.S and Grisso, T (1995) MacArthur Treatment Competence Study I: Mental Illness 
and Competence to Consent to Treatment; Law and Human Behaviour; Vol. 19(2); 105-126 at 109.  
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as to appropriate testamentary provision, yet who consistently and 
repeatedly reaches the same decision in a manner otherwise satisfying all 
relevant tests of capacity.”289 
Ward also highlights the fact that the Act does not in fact create a generalised 
category of incapable individuals290. Instead, the Act is designed to be applied to each 
individual case as the circumstances require.  This would explain the fact that each of 
the criteria specified in s.1(6) of the 2000 Act are followed by ‘or’ as opposed to 
‘and’. This effectively enables the decision–maker to choose which of the criteria they 
consider to be relevant to the particular decision they are required to make at the time. 
Furthermore, by phrasing s.1(6) in this manner, Parliament has arguably attempted to 
promote the concept of presumption of capacity –an individual will be presumed to 
have capacity unless proven otherwise. This is suggested by the fact that an individual 
whose capacity has been called into question is not required to satisfy all five of the 
criteria specified in s.1(6). To be required to do so would set the burden of proof at 
too high a level. By requiring the individual to satisfy at least one of the five criteria, 
they are given a better chance of being deemed capable of making decisions for him 
or herself. Despite this advantage, it is submitted that s.1(6) of the Scottish legislation 
ultimately fails to provide an adequate definition of incapacity. As stated above, this 
is largely due to the fact that the inability to act has been deemed to be a separate 
criterion to the remainder of the section, which refers to the inability to make, 
communicate, understand or retain the memory of decisions. It is submitted that the 
reference made to ‘incapacity to act’ in s.1(6)(a) is surplus to requirements, since the 
criteria provided in s.1(6)(b) – (e) could be interpreted as being ‘actions’ in the 
context of treatment decision-making. Possible exposition of what it means to be 
incapable of ‘acting’ may be found through reference to Gillon’s definition of 
autonomy291. Gillon states that there are in essence three facets to autonomy: 
autonomy of thought i.e. the ability to think for oneself, make decisions and believe 
information that is conveyed; autonomy of will i.e. the freedom to make a particular 
decision on the basis of one’s deliberations; and autonomy of action, which correlates 
                                                 
289 Ward, A.D (2003) Adult Incapacity; W. Green/Sweet and Maxwell Edinburgh at Para 4.27. 
290 Ibid at Para 4.28. 
291 Gillon, R (1986) Philosophical Medical Ethics; Wiley Medical Publications Chichester. 
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to the notion that specific actions can be autonomous even if they are not the result of 
a thought process292.  
 
Another issue highlighted by the British Medical Association was the issue of 
awareness. The B.M.A stated that the individual should be “aware of any 
alternatives [to the proposed treatment]… aware of the decision’s personal 
relevance to him or herself… aware of his or her right to refuse, as well as the 
consequence of refusal…[and] aware of how to refuse.”293 The issue of awareness 
ties in with Grisso and Appelbaum’s four standards of capacity assessment, in 
particular their recommendation that the individual be able to appreciate the 
information. Grisso and Appelbaum state that for this criterion to be satisfied, the 
individual must show an ability to apply the information to one’s own situation294, 
which equates in essence to the B.M.A’s reference to the individual being aware of a 
decision’s relevance to themselves.  
 
Section 1(6) of the Scottish legislation states that there are two gateways by which the 
provision of the Act may be invoked. First, the individual in question must be 
suffering from a mental disorder. Alternatively, the individual must be deemed 
incapable of communicating by virtue of a physical disability. Ward highlights the 
fact that Parliament elected to adopt the same definition of mental disorder as that 
which is contained in s.1(2) of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984: 
“…mental illness (including personality disorder) or mental handicap 
however caused or manifested; but an adult shall not be treated as suffering 
from mental disorder by reason only of promiscuity or other immoral 
conduct, sexual deviancy, dependence on alcohol or drugs.”295 
With respect to the second gateway definition, Ward states that this is the narrower of 
the two definitions296. Furthermore: 
“It admits only those whose inability to communicate is a complete bar to 
exercise of capacity in a matter in which a decision cannot reasonably be 
                                                 
292 Ibid at 61. 
293 Ibid. 
294 Appelbaum, P.S and Grisso, T (1995) MacArthur Treatment Competence Study I: Mental Illness 
and Competence to Consent to Treatment; Law and Human Behaviour; Vol. 19(2), 105-126 at 110.  
295 Ibid at Para 4.27. See also Scottish Law Commission Report No. 151 (1995) Report on Incapable 
Adults at Para 2.15, which also recommended this definition. 
296 Ward, A.D (2003) Adult Incapacity; W. Green/Sweet and Maxwell Edinburgh at Para 4.26. 
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deferred, and whose inability to communicate results from physical 
disability. If the inability to communicate is the result of a mental rather than 
a physical disability, the first rather than the second gateway applies.”297 
Once could infer form this that inability to communicate would only be deemed to be 
a barrier to exercising capacity if the physical disability is extremely severe i.e. a 
complete bar to exercise of capacity. Once again, Parliament’s intention to empower 
the patient as much as possible and thus promote the principle of autonomy is evident. 
However, the second gateway can only be invoked when the incapacity in question is 
physical rather than mental. Added to this, the Act’s provisions cannot be relied upon 
where the incapacity is due to the effects of alcohol or drug consumption. Intoxication 
has not been classed as a mental disorder. With this in mind, the second gateway 
definition in s,1(6) is potentially ambiguous. If an individual is incapacitated as a 
result of intoxication, could that be classified as a physical disability, and 
subsequently fall within the scope of s.1(6)? Ward suggests that if one were 
intoxicated to such an extent as to completely affect one’s capacity, the second 
gateway could then be relied upon298. 
 
It is understandable that Parliament elected to approach the criteria of capacity 
assessment in the manner prescribed in s.1(6) of the 2000 Act. It is submitted that 
s.1(6) represents an attempt to be as inclusive as possible of all potential issues that 
may arise in relation to adult incapacity. This view was voiced during Stage 1 of the 
Parliamentary debates on the 2000 Act, where Mr Jim Wallace stated that the bill was 
based on “strong and overarching principles” and that there would be:  
“…no labelling based on preconceived notions of what a person can or 
cannot do, nor will anyone be considered incapable just because they have a 
learning disability or a mental illness 299. Doctors will make most assessments 
of incapacity, but we expect them to get advice from others who know the 
adult and who are aware of the nature of the decisions to be made on the 
adult’s behalf.”300 
According to Mr. Wallace, the important aspect of assessing capacity is not from 
consultation of the legislation, but rather, from consultation with those who would be 
                                                 
297 Ibid. 
298 Ibid. 
299 A rejection of the status approach to capacity. 
300 Ibid. 
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able to provide information as to how best to make decisions. If this was indeed 
intended to be the case, then this provides an explanation for the non-specific nature 
of the assessment criteria in s.1(6) of the Act. However, it is submitted that the criteria 
in s.1(6) are still too broad to be able to provide significant guidance on the issue. If 
legislation has been implemented to deal specifically with the issue of adult 
incapacity, it is obvious that an adequate explanation of how to assess this is essential 
to the correct working of that legislation. As seen earlier, the British Medical 
Association provided useful further guidance as to what factors are important when 
assessing an individual’s capacity. The assessment criteria in the Mental Capacity Act 
2005 far better encapsulate the important issues relating to capacity. The functional 
approach is clearly mentioned301 and the assessment criteria reflect this approach302. 
Despite the Scottish Law Commission having supported a functional approach to 
capacity, there is, as stated earlier, little to suggest this in the 2000 Act. While some of 
the criteria such as communicating, understanding and retaining the memory of 
decisions are well established and mirror the criteria specified by both Grisso and 
Appelbaum303 and the Mental Capacity Act 2005, the usefulness of these are 
countered by the presence of disconcertingly vague references to the ability to act and 
to make decisions. It is also perhaps telling that these issues were not discussed in any 
significant manner during the Parliamentary debates stage. As highlighted above, Jim 
Wallace makes the point that consultation with those close to the individual would aid 
the decision-maker when assessing capacity. This is a salient point. However, any 
consultation which takes place should be informed by the provisions of the Adults 
with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000. The vagaries of the assessment criteria make 
this more difficult than is necessary.  
 
3.3: CAPACITY ASSESSMENT IN INDIAN LAW 
 
There is currently no legal provision for capacity issues relating to medical treatment 
in Indian law. However, the law does cover the issue in relation to other areas, albeit 
briefly. The most notable of these is the law in relation to capacity to marry. Through 
an analysis of statutory and common law provisions in this area, it will then be 
                                                 
301 Mental Capacity Act 2005 s.2(1).  
302 Ibid at s.3(1).  
303 Appelbaum, P.S and Grisso, T (1995) MacArthur Treatment Competence Study I: Mental Illness 
and Competence to Consent to Treatment; Law and Human Behaviour; Vol. 19(2), 105-126. 
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possible to discuss how the central provisions might extend to include matters of 
medical treatment.   
 
Marriage is governed in Indian law primarily by the Hindu Marriage Act 1955. 
Section 5(2) is of particular relevance in relation to capacity: 
“A marriage may be solemnised between any two Hindus, if… at the time of 
marriage, neither party  
a) is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in consequence of unsoundness 
of mind; or  
b) though capable of giving a valid consent, has been suffering from mental 
disorder of such a kind or to such an extent as to be unfit for marriage and 
the procreation of children; or  
c) has been subject to recurrent attacks of insanity.” 
 
The above provisions were introduced into the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 via an 
amendment to the Act made in 1976.  Although the provisions of s.5(2) are broad, a 
rudimentary functional approach can be identified. Subsections (b) and (c) relate more 
to an individual’s suitability as a marriage partner rather than one’s ability to enter 
into the contract of marriage per se, and are therefore not wholly representative of a 
traditional functional approach. However, section 5(2)(a) refers more directly to a 
functional approach, as capacity is mentioned specifically. The terms of the section do 
not render a marriage voidable simply by virtue of the presence of a mental disorder 
or unsoundness of mind, but rather, requires an assessment of whether the mental 
disorder impacts sufficiently upon one’s ability to cope with the responsibilities of 
marriage and parenting. However, one might argue that the provisions of s.5(2) give 
cause for concern due to the presence of the term ‘unsoundness of mind’. This term 
has not been given further explanation, and it is submitted that its presence in 
legislation is unhelpful in the context of a pragmatic functional approach to capacity. 
Dhanda explains further: 
“It is claimed that all persons with psychosocial disability are not viewed as 
incompetent by the law, and the legal provisions are meant to be only 
applicable to those who have been rendered incapable by their condition. 
However, studies of the litigation patterns show those efforts to obtain a legal 
determination of incompetence are made for all manners of persons from the 
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eccentric to the non-conforming to the deviant. These efforts (whether 
successful of not) are continually made because ‘unsoundness of mind’ is 
equated with incompetence in law and a legally incompetent person is 
required to live his or her life in accordance with the dictates of others, be it 
family, professional or state. The person’s own perceptions, wishes and 
aspirations are legislated out of existence.”304 
As well as the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, other marriage laws in India make 
unsoundness of mind a potential factor in voiding marriage305. It is clear from 
Dhanda’s exposition of unsoundness of mind that without a more precise explanation 
of the term, there is a significant possibility that incapacity will be assumed across the 
board for anybody suffering from mental disorder or impairment. Put another way, a 
test for incapacity using the criterion of unsoundness of mind serves only to promote a 
status rather than a functional approach. It should be noted however that the 
provisions in s.5(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 pertaining to capacity to marry 
are markedly similar to the equivalent provisions in English law. Consider the 
relevant terms of s.12 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973: 
“A marriage celebrated after 31st July 1971 shall be voidable on the following 
grounds only, that is to say –  
(c) that either party to the marriage did not validly consent to it, whether in 
consequence of duress, mistake, unsoundness of mind or otherwise; 
(d) that at the time of the marriage either party, though capable of giving a 
valid consent, was suffering (whether continuously or intermittently) from 
mental disorder within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1983 of such a 
kind or to such an extent as to be unfit for marriage…” 
 
As can be seen, there is little difference between the relevant provisions of both the 
Hindu Marriage Act 1955 and the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, with the latter also 
referring to unsoundness of mind as a potential barrier to valid consent. In addition, 
the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 stipulates that a marriage will be voidable if either 
                                                 
304 Dhanda, A [2002] A Participative Evaluation of the Rights of Persons with Psychosocial Disability; 
unpublished.  
305 See Special Marriage Act 1954 s.4(b)(1-2). This legislation in essence permits any Indian national 
living either in India or abroad to marry irrespective of religion or faith. The specified provisions 
outline the conditions necessary for a valid marriage. The terms of s.5(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act 
1955 are replicated in this legislation. In addition, it should be noted that under Islamic law, a person of 
unsound mind is deemed incapable of entering into a marriage unless consent of a guardian is given.  
  117   
party was, at the time of the marriage, suffering with a mental disorder of such a kind 
so as to make that party unfit for maintaining a marriage. Both these provisions mirror 
the position in Indian law, and the fact that the terms of s.5(2) of the Hindu Marriage 
Act 1955 were the result of an amendment made in 1976 suggests that the provisions 
of the English law were of direct influence. The only difference between the terms of 
the two statutes is that the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 refers to either party being unfit 
for the procreation of children in addition to being unfit for marriage itself. This could 
be attributable to a cultural difference between the United Kingdom and India, in 
which the latter places equal emphasis upon procreation within marriage as well as 
the actual marriage itself.  
 
The commonality between the relevant provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 of 
India and the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 of England and Wales has been 
highlighted in order to illustrate the argument that any difference in approach between 
the jurisdictions on the issue of capacity is attributable to developmental issues. This 
is illustrated further by the common law guidance relating to capacity to marry in 
India. 
 
The case of Usha v Abraham306 concerned two Christians who were parties in an 
arranged marriage. The respondent, a Mr. Abraham Jacob, sought dissolution of the 
marriage under s.19 of the Indian Divorce Act 1869307. He contended that, from as 
early as the marriage day itself, he had found what he believed to be symptoms of 
mental retardation in his wife the appellant. These symptoms allegedly included the 
appellant’s inability to spell her own name. As time went on the appellant alleged that 
his wife was “not merely dull intellectually, but deficient in intellect so as to be 
incapable of rational conduct expected of an adult woman”. Therefore, “the 
appellant’s condition was such that she was incapable of any improvement and 
the normal married life was quite impossible”308. The appellant denied that she 
suffered from any kind of mental retardation and stated that  
                                                 
306 [1988] A.I.R Ker 96.  
307 Since the parties in the marriage were Christians rather than Hindus, the relevant provision for 
seeking a dissolution of the marriage is s.19 of the Indian Divorce Act 1869, which allows divorce on 
the grounds that either party was “a lunatic or idiot at the time of marriage.” 
308 Ibid per Balakrishnan J at Para 2. 
  118   
“the marriage was preceded by the usual house visits, and after the marriage 
the respondent and the appellant were living as husband and wife… By 1976 
the petitioner went for a job to Gulf Country. The petitioner had been 
sending letters and gifts to the appellant and he also filed a declaration before 
the Indian Embassy at Sharjah to obtain a passport for the appellant. 
However, by 1980 the respondent showed some estrangement which 
culminated in the ultimate filing of the petition for declaration of nullity of 
marriage”309 
At first instance, the court held that the appellant was in fact a lunatic or idiot at the 
time of marriage, and that subsequently she was incapable of consenting to marriage 
as she did not understand its objects and purpose. However, Balakrishnan J did not 
agree with this ruling. His Lordship first stated that the Indian Divorce Act 1869 did 
not contain any definition for the term ‘lunatic’. Therefore, it was deemed necessary 
to use the definition contained in section 3(5) of the Indian Lunacy Act 1912310, as 
had been done previously in Daniel v Sarla311. Section 3(5) of the Indian Lunacy Act 
defines a lunatic as “an idiot or person of unsound mind”. In order to ascertain 
lunacy, the appellant had undergone a medical examination by a board consisting of 
three senior doctors working in Trivandrum Medical College. After a follow up 
appointment, the board stated that “she [the appellant] is not a congenital idiot 
and… she does not suffer from lunacy… the intelligence quotient is 68. She is not 
congenitally impotent and there is no gynaecological anatomical defect”312. The 
crux of the issue was not simply that the appellant was suffering from any form of 
retardation or mental disorder, but rather, whether the presence of such a condition 
resulted in incapacity to enter into a marriage313. On this point, Balakrishnan J said 
the following: 
                                                
“The marriage is a civil contract as well as a religious sacrament. The 
voluntary consent of both parties is necessary for a valid marriage. The 
contract of marriage is simple and it does not require a high degree of 
intelligence to comprehend. The test is whether a person in question is 
capable of understanding the nature of the contract, or whether his mental 
 
309 Ibid at Para 3. 
310 This was the applicable mental health legislation at the time of the case, prior to the implementation 
of the Mental Health Act 1987.  
311 [1976] ILR 2 Ker 357. 
312 Supra note 88 at Para 7. 
313 Ibid at Para 10. 
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condition was such that he was incapable of understanding it. In order to 
ascertain the nature of the contract of marriage, a man must be mentally 
capable of appreciating that it involves responsibilities normally attaching to 
marriage. The parties to the marriage must be able to comprehend the 
significance of the promise and vows that flow from such a transaction. There 
is a strong presumption that such consent has been given. The burden of 
proof on the party attempting to impeach a marriage on the ground of want 
of consent is heavier than in the case of impeaching a commercial contract. 
The petitioner must show that because of the mental disorder, the other 
spouse was unable to know the nature and consequences of his/her act. A 
mere weakness of intellect, mild mental retardation or physical inability will 
not justify an annulment of marriage.”314  
 
The above statement by Balakrishnan J is important, in as much as it is arguably a 
clear endorsement of a functional approach towards capacity within the context of 
marriage. In stating that a mere presence of weak intellect, mental retardation or 
physical inability is not enough to justify nullity of a marriage, his Lordship appears 
to be explicitly rejecting a status approach in favour of a functional approach. It is 
submitted that his Lordship was correct to highlight the fact that different areas of 
one’s life will involve different thresholds that would need satisfying; marriage is one 
sphere that ultimately requires less understanding than others, and subsequently, the 
party that is seeking to end the marriage due to inability to consent and to understand, 
will need to produce significant evidence in support of his/her claim. Another 
important aspect of the case, in the context of the comparative study being undertaken 
in this thesis, was the clear influence of English law upon the decision. As can be seen 
in the above statement, Balakrishnan J stated that a contract of marriage was 
ultimately a simple one which did not require a high degree of intelligence to 
understand. This is an exact restatement of the law in England given by Sir Hannen J 
in the English case of Durham v Durham315 in which His Lordship stated that the 
contract of marriage was “a very simple one which did not require a high degree 
of intelligence to comprehend.”316 The case of Durham v Durham was cited in the 
                                                 
314 Ibid at Para 11. 
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judgment in Usha v Abraham which, as with the statutory provisions relating to 
capacity to enter into a marriage, shows the influence of English law in Indian law.  
In the judgment in Usha v Abraham, the court held that although the appellant did 
suffer from some form of arrested development, the evidence did not show that this 
affected her ability to manage her household duties. Furthermore,  
“She was able to recall the date of her marriage and other details of personal 
importance. In the petition it has been alleged that she is an idiot and lunatic 
and that she did not know how to read or write… [However]… this is clearly 
belied by her evidence. During her examination she was asked to read a 
portion of the Bible and it has been recorded in the deposition that she had 
read the Bible”317 
Similarly, the appellant revealed during cross examination that she did not know who 
Christ was, and that cows would deliver calves once they were fed with straw. 
However, the court rejected this as sufficient evidence of her inability to appreciate 
the nature and consequences of her acts318. Eventually, the court allowed the appeal 
and held that the appellant was quite capable of “managing herself and all her 
affairs in her own simple way, and she would be able to cope with the obligation 
of marital life”.319 
 
However, in Pravati Mishra v Jagananda Mishra320, it was held that the respondent, 
by virtue of having an I.Q below 50% of the normal level for a 21-year-old, would not 
be cured of her impairment and was thus incapable of marrying. The medical 
professional who conducted the I.Q test stated that “a person, more particularly one 
belonging to the middle class, cannot manage with such a wife, as such a wife is 
not capable of rearing children”321. It is interesting that class would be mentioned 
as a relevant factor in determining capacity. This appears to be an endorsement of a 
status approach to capacity. It would be inaccurate to suggest that the legislation and 
the courts intended the status approach to be a determining factor in assessing 
capacity, however the court in Pravati Mishra v Jagananda Mishra appear to have 
supported just such a scenario. An inconsistency in approach is evident. Whilst the 
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court in Usha v Abraham were in essence endorsing a functional approach to capacity 
by requiring the capacity of Usha Abraham to be ascertained specifically in relation to 
the marriage contract rather than in general, the court in Pravati Mishra ultimately 
accepted the view of the medical professional who stated that the Pravati Mishra 
could not enter into a marriage contract because her condition was incurable and that 
she would thus not be capable of raising children or discharging her duties as the wife 
in a middle-class family. The fact that class was referred to raises the possibility that 
the result of disputes over capacity to marry may vary according to the class of the 
individual, thus in essence furthering a status approach to capacity. Such an approach 
would also contravene the substantive principle of non-discrimination, by virtue of 
emphasising the condition of the individual rather than the impact of the condition 
upon capacity322. The inconsistency in approach towards the issue of capacity to 
marry is further illustrated by the decision in Gurnam Singh v Chand Kaur323, in 
which the Punjab High Court held that mere evidence of schizophrenia was not 
enough – it would be necessary to prove that the sufferer would not be able to marry 
or raise children as a consequence of the illness before a marriage would be 
considered voidable. This is yet another example of the preference of the functional 
approach to capacity over the status approach.  
 
A theme that runs through a number of cases on marriage is the issue of capacity to 
bear children. As stated previously, in Gurnam Singh the court held that nullity would 
be granted if the respondent’s mental disorder suffering rendered her incapable of 
both marriage and procreation. However, as Dhanda points out, “the court held that 
‘unfit for procreation of children’ did not connote the ability to bear children but 
the capacity to rear them”324. One inference that could be drawn from this decision 
is that again, the effect of the respondent’s illness on the other party is being 
prioritised. If an individual is unable to look after children as a consequence of their 
illness, and the marriage is voidable because of this, then by implication, the 
respondent is being potentially deprived of the right to a partner as well as the right to 
a family. The other party at least has the option of marrying again, whereas the 
respondent with the mental disorder will most likely not be able to get married until 
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they are cured (if indeed this is possible), because each subsequent marriage would be 
voidable on the same grounds. When one also considers the fact that the majority of 
child-rearing duties are considered to rest upon the wife, the court’s decision again 
has the secondary effect of being more detrimental to women than to men. 
Consequently, the law has the effect of furthering a status approach to capacity. 
However, it must again be stressed that a blanket status approach has not been 
adopted by the courts in India. A functional approach is also present, As Dhanda 
explains: 
“One set of decisions stress the fact of social recovery and hold that if a 
person can resume normal married life and management of herself and her 
affairs, she cannot be described as incurably of unsound mind merely 
because she has to take a drug once a week or once a day. However, if a 
person cannot manage herself or her affairs, lives an artificial existence 
protected from the normal incidents and problems of life, she will be termed 
incurable… In the other interpretative pattern, inability to predict for the 
period of recovery is viewed as determinative of the issue”325 
Dhanda further highlights the fact that the standards of legal and medical incapacity 
are different. As stated previously, an individual could be ill but nevertheless maintain 
capacity to make decisions. Dhanda submits that of the two court approaches, the 
former standard of social recovery is the more appropriate. Simply because a person 
who has basically recovered but nevertheless needs maintenance therapy does not 
mean that a marriage need to be dissolved. What is integral to the issue of capacity 
here is not just the presence of mental disorder, but rather, the effect of the disorder 
upon the individual’s capacity.  
 
Further guidance on capacity in Indian law can be found in the law of contract. 
According to s.12 of the Indian Contract Act 1872, an individual will be deemed to be 
capable of making a contract, “if at the time when he makes it, he is capable of 
understanding it and forming a rational judgment as to its effect upon its 
interests”. This capacity has to be present at the time the contract is drawn up. In the 
case of a person with fluctuating capacity, the Act permits a contract to be made 
whilst the person is of sound mind, but not otherwise:  
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“A person is said to be of sound mind for the purpose of making a contract, 
if, at the time when he makes it, he is capable of understanding it and of 
forming a rational judgment as to its effect upon his interest. A person, who 
is usually of unsound mind, but occasionally of sound mind, may not make a 
contract when he is of unsound mind.” 
Dhanda explains:  
“Section 12 requires that the cognitive faculties of understanding memory 
and judgment should be intact for the exercise of contractual capacity. These 
faculties are necessary for parties to comprehend an agreement, to remember 
their assets and liabilities and then to judge the effect of the contract on their 
interests. This standard encompasses both absolute and functional 
incapacity. Absolute incapacity would mean that the cognitive faculties of an 
individual are totally deranged or undeveloped. In functional incapacity 
however, the faculties, though present, are incapable of performing the 
specific functions of remembering, understanding and judging”326 
 
Cases such as Ram Sunder Saha v Kali Narain Choudhary327 illustrate that symptoms 
ordinarily associated with old age such as forgetfulness, are not in themselves an 
indicator of lack of capacity. Ultimately, “lack of capacity is inferred only if, due to 
old age, the mind has become vacuous and delusory”328. In Govindswami Naicker 
v K N Srinivasa Rao329, an elderly gentleman gave a gift of some property to his 
daughter. The gentleman was under the delusion that he was in possession of 
thousands of acres of land. In reality, he owned approximately 120 acres in Myanmar 
and India. The court held that he did not have the requisite capacity to make the gift, 
because he could not have realised the impact of the gift on his own interests.  
 
Upon analysis of the Indian law relating to capacity to contract, parallels with English 
law can be drawn. A functional approach can be identified which requires assessment 
of whether capacity existed at the time of entering into the contract, rather than simply 
require a generalised assessment of an individual’s capacity. In addition, the 
provisions of the legislation provide a potential starting point for development of the 
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law in India in relation to medical treatment. Section 12 provides embryonic 
information to begin a criteria specific test for medical treatment, which, if s.12 is 
used as a guide, would include the need to form a rational judgment as to the effect of 
accepting or refusing medical treatment upon the interests of the individual. There is 
thus some theoretical scope for adopting the same provisions to apply to medical 
treatment issues330.  
 
The existing law that relates to capacity in India illustrates the fact that the central 
issues are recognised, albeit at a basic level. The statutory provisions in both the 
Hindu Marriage Act 1955 and the Indian Contract Act 1872 refer to a functional 
approach to capacity and recognise that capacity is necessary in order to enter into a 
marriage or a contract although guidance as to how this assessment is to be made is 
still extremely basic. However, this is in essence no different to the English position, 
with s.12 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 specifying the same criteria as s.5 of 
the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 for example. In addition, common law guidance, 
particularly the judgment given in Usha v Abraham, has been clearly influenced by 
English law331. However the use of the functional approach in some cases is 
counterbalanced by the use of the status approach in other cases. It is submitted that 
this inconsistency in approach is attributable to the fact that the law of capacity in 
India has simply yet to develop to the extent that a uniform approach can be 
recognised and adopted. The relevance of capacity in relation to medical treatment 
has not yet received any recognition in the law, but the fact that capacity is recognised 
in a nascent form suggests that this there is potential for this to happen. The position 
of capacity law in India currently is in essence the same as capacity law in England 
twenty years ago.  
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CHAPTER 4: DECISION-MAKING FOR THE INCAPABLE 
PATIENT IN ENGLISH, SCOTTISH AND INDIAN LAW 
 
 
4.1: DECISION-MAKING FOR THE INCAPABLE PATIENT IN ENGLISH 
LAW 
 
The concept of best interests is another cornerstone issue in the law of capacity. It 
becomes relevant only when the assessment of an individual’s capacity has revealed 
conclusively that the individual is incapable of making treatment decisions without 
assistance. In such a case, the relevant healthcare professional must make a decision 
based on what they consider to be in the best interests of the individual. This concept 
has undergone significant development over the last two decades, more in terms of 
content than definition. 
 
4.1.1: DECISION-MAKING FOR THE INCAPABLE PATIENT IN ENGLAND 
AND WALES PRIOR TO THE MENTAL CAPACITY ACT 2005 – THE 
CONCEPT OF BEST INTERESTS 
 
As stated in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the concept of best interests becomes relevant in 
the law of capacity only once the assessment of an individual’s capacity confirms that 
he/she lacks the capacity to make treatment decisions without assistance. As has been 
discussed, the common law position has provided actual criteria to assist with the 
assessment of decision-making capacity that has now been utilised in the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005. The common law position on the best interests concept has 
arguably harder to ascertain.  
 
The case of Re A (Mental Patient: Male Sterilisation)332 is an appropriate starting 
point for this discussion. A was a 28-year-old man who had Down’s syndrome and 
whose intelligence levels had been assessed as being on the borderline between 
significant and severely impaired. A lived with his mother, who applied to the High 
Court for a declaration authorising a sterilisation operation. A’s mother believed that 
his condition left him vulnerable to potential advances from women, which in turn 
might lead to A having casual sexual relations which might result in pregnancy for 
somebody. The declaration was refused at first instance and A’s mother appealed. The 
judge at first instance had held that there was little chance of A entering into casual 
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relationships whilst under the supervision of his mother. However A’s mother stated 
that her health was deteriorating and that she would shortly be requiring hospital 
treatment. In her absence, the chances of A having sexual relations and making 
somebody pregnant increased. This would be particularly serious given that A would 
be unlikely to understand the implications of making somebody pregnant and would 
thus be unable to take proper responsibility. In the light of this, A’s mother argued 
that a vasectomy would be in A’s best interests. Contraception was not practical and 
A’s application had been supported at first instance by a consultant psychiatrist who 
agreed with the mother’s concerns. The appeal was also eventually dismissed. The 
President stated that carrying out the operation would not decrease the chances of A 
being exploited, nor would it help cope with any emotional fallout from any close 
relationship.  
 
The court in Re A stated that the central issue relevant to any discussion on 
sterilisation operations must be whether the proposed operation would be in the best 
interests of the individual. This issue was first raised in the case of Re F (Mental 
Patient: Sterilisation)333, which concerned a 36-year-old mentally impaired woman 
who was a voluntary in-patient in hospital. F had formed a sexual relationship with a 
fellow patient, which had caused concern amongst the hospital staff. Since F had the 
mental capacity of a child and would never recover from her condition, both the 
hospital staff and both the hospital staff and F’s mother believed that were F to 
become pregnant, she would be unable to cope with the responsibility of looking after 
a child as well as the stress of pregnancy in general. In the light of this, the hospital 
staff believed that a sterilisation operation would be in F’s long term best interests. 
Since other less invasive forms of contraception had been ruled out as being 
unsuitable, F’s mother sought a court declaration authorising a non-therapeutic 
sterilisation for F, which was duly granted. Re F was an important case inasmuch as it 
was the first case to examine the best interests concept334. The case has nevertheless 
been criticised on the grounds that the court declined to give an actual definition of 
the term, but instead provided guidelines designed to aid proxy decision-makers in 
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deciding whether a particular course of action would be in the best interests of the 
individual. Lord Justice Brandon gave his thoughts on the issue: 
“In my opinion… a doctor can lawfully operate on, or give other treatment 
to, adult patients who are incapable, for one reason or another, or consenting 
to his doing so, provided that the operation or other treatment concerned is 
in the best interests of such patients. The operation or other treatment will be 
in their best interests if, but only if, it is carried out in order either to save 
their lives or to ensure improvement or prevent deterioration in their 
physical or mental health.”335 
 
His Lordship’s exposition of best interests is useful as a starting point, but is still 
limited as a fully-rounded explanation of the concept. This is unsurprising given that 
Re F did not require broader considerations of the concept336. In Re A, the court 
sought to broaden the scope of best interests beyond what was stated in Re F. Butler- 
Sloss L.J referred back to the judgment in Re MB (Medical Treatment) in which she 
stated that best interests were not limited to best medical interests337. Her Ladyship 
expanded upon this point in Re A by stating that “best interests encompasses 
medical, emotional and all other welfare issues.”338 In A’s case however, the 
proposed sterilisation operation was deemed not to be sufficiently in A’s best 
interests. The central argument provided in favour of the operation was that A had 
clearly become sexually active but had no understanding of the link between sexual 
intercourse and pregnancy339. A sterilisation operation would therefore eliminate the 
possibility of pregnancy whilst allowing A to have an active sexual relationship 
should he wish to at any time. However, this evidence was countered on the grounds 
that A’s sexual activity had not as yet included sexual intercourse, and that in reality, 
the chances of A engaging in sexual intercourse was minimal340. In addition, Mr 
Francis QC submitted that there was a presumption against the non-therapeutic 
sterilisation of incapable adults, and that this can only be rebutted by sound evidence 
that the operation would be in the individual’s best interests341. The case was also 
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distinguishable from Re F on the grounds that A was a man and F was a woman. The 
issue of pregnancy would affect F far more directly than if A made another woman 
pregnant. On this basis, Butler-Sloss L.J stated that an application for the sterilisation 
of a man was not the direct equivalent of an application made on behalf of a woman. 
In addition, her Ladyship stated that “In the case of a man who is mentally 
incapacitated, neither the fact of the birth of a child not disapproval of his 
conduct is likely to impinge on him to a significant degree other than in 
exceptional circumstances.”342 The proposed operation was less about the best 
interests of A and more about the best interests of any woman that may become 
pregnant by him. Since the only issue of relevance was the best interests of A himself, 
the proposed operation was not justifiable.  
 
Although the application for the sterilisation operation was dismissed, Thorpe L.J 
stated that the arguments in favour of the operation were entirely cogent and that a 
further application may be made on the basis of fresh evidence at a later time343. His 
Lordship accepted the view that A’s fertility was disadvantageous and that it was the 
duty of society to “minimise the consequence of disability by vouchsafing for the 
disabled wherever possible the rights and freedoms vouchsafed to the majority 
who have been spared disability.”344 On the issue of how to approach best interests, 
His Lordship stated that it was in essence a balancing exercise, with the factors that 
would provide benefit to the individual on one hand and any counterbalancing factors 
on the other345. Despite Thorpe L.J’s acceptance of the central arguments in favour of 
sterilisation, His Lordship too dismissed the appeal based on the evidence of A’s 
mother, who had stated that there would be no relaxation in the level of supervision 
even after the operation. In addition to this, there had been no evidence given by A’s 
carers that post-operation, A would be given the opportunity to develop his sexual 
experiences. Since this was one of the main arguments in favour of the operation, 
those arguing on behalf of A’s mother had failed to establish sufficiently that the 
operation would be in A’s best interests. This statement provided further guidance on 
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how to approach the issue of best interests, by highlighting the fact that the onus 
would be on the claimant to establish this346.  
 
Re A is an important case in the context of best interests inasmuch as is develops the 
concept beyond the explanation of it given in Re F, in which it was stated that any 
proposed treatment will only be in the best interests of the individual if it is designed 
to preserve life or prevent a deterioration in the physical or mental well-being of the 
individual. Re A elaborates on this by confirming that best interests must encompass 
interests beyond mere medical ones to include emotional and other welfare issues. 
This central issue was further confirmed in the case of Re SL (Adult Patient: Medical 
Treatment)347. 
 
The case concerned the proposed sterilisation of a 29-year-old woman, SL, for the 
purposes of eliminating her menstrual periods. SL had been born with severe learning 
difficulties and was unable to live without assistance from her mother. Her mother 
was concerned that as SL grew older and moved into separate accommodation, she 
would either form sexual relations of her own volition or be sexually assaulted, both 
of which may lead to pregnancy. Since SL would not be able to understand the 
implications or concept of pregnancy, SL’s mother applied for a declaration 
authorising a sterilisation or partial hysterectomy to be performed on her daughter in 
order to avoid the risks of pregnancy. In addition, SL’s mother stated that the 
operation would be therapeutic, since SL suffered from heavy menstrual bleeding 
which caused her considerable distress. Wall J oversaw the originating summons and 
authorised the operation for the latter reason. Leave to appeal was eventually granted 
and the appeal subsequently allowed on the grounds that major invasive treatment at 
the material time was on balance premature. There had been a failure to take the 
medical advice evidence into consideration, which had stated that SL’s levels of 
menstrual bleeding were no higher than normal, and also the progress being made in 
medical research in that particular field, which may in the future provide more 
acceptable and less invasive methods of regulating menstrual periods348. In addition, 
the court also stated that best interests was wider in concept than medical 
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consideration, and quoted Re A in support of this. Wall J was deemed at first instance 
to have insufficient note of these factors. He had dismissed the idea of SL having a 
Mirena coil inserted in lieu of surgery on the grounds that she would have to undergo 
a series of anaesthetics throughout her life349. This statement notwithstanding, the 
Court of Appeal overturned Wall J’s judgment on the basis that he had misdirected 
himself in law. At first instance, Wall J stated that an appropriate standard for 
determining whether a particular course of action was in the best interests of the 
individual was the test laid down in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management 
Committee350. This test states that a doctor has a duty to act in accordance with a 
practice accepted at the time by a responsible body of medical opinion. Thorpe L.J 
highlighted the fact that the test had been developed so that the courts may determine 
appropriate boundaries of medical responsibility for treatment which had gone 
wrong351. Consequently, its relevance to best interests existed “only at the outset to 
ensure that the treatment proposed is recognised as proper by a responsible 
body of medical opinion skilled in delivering that particular treatment.”352 
Therefore, this test merely provides the courts with a range of viable treatment options 
to choose from. Determining best interests however, is not about providing a variety 
of options, but about the courts declaring which single course of treatment is in the 
best interests of the patient353. Thorpe L.J stated that for this purpose, Bolam had no 
meaningful contribution to make354. However, Wall J’s decision at first instance 
would ultimately have to be reversed on the grounds that he had provided possible 
alternatives to the proposed sterilisation, rather than decide whether the proposed 
treatment itself was in the best interests of SL.  
 
It can be seen from the above discussion that the concept of best interests has 
undergone significant development in the common law. Re F provides a starting 
point, but it was through Re A and Re SL that the concept was given more detailed 
exposition. The facts of Re F and Re SL can be more readily compared with each 
other. Both cases concerned the proposed sterilisation of an incapable adult, both of 
whom were considered at risk of pregnancy which both F and SL would be unable to 
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cope with. However, the cases are also distinguishable in as much as both produced 
different judgments. The proposed sterilisation operation in Re F was wholly for non-
therapeutic purposes355. It was held in the Australian case of Secretary, Dept. of 
Health and Community Services v. JWB and SMB (also referred to as Marion’s 
case)356 that any treatment would be deemed to be therapeutic if it was 
“administered for the chief purpose of preventing, removing or ameliorating 
a cosmetic deformity, a pathological condition or a psychological disorder, 
provided that the treatment is appropriate for and proportionate to the 
purpose for which it is administered.”357 
Put another way, treatment will be considered therapeutic if carried out to treat an 
underlying medical condition; a hysterectomy carried out to treat ovarian cancer is an 
example of this. Logically then, non-therapeutic medical treatment is that which is 
carried out for purposes other than for the treatment of an existing medical condition, 
such as the emotional well-being of the patient.  
In F’s case, the reasons for the proposed sterilisation fall clearly in to the non-
therapeutic category i.e. there was no issue before the court of the operation being 
necessary to prevent excessive menstrual bleeding as was the case in Re SL, nor was 
there any other medical problem which could only be remedied through a sterilisation 
operation. The central issue was that F was at risk of becoming pregnant, which, due 
to the nature of her condition, she would be unable to appreciate or cope with.  While 
this was also an issue brought before the court in Re SL, there was also a therapeutic 
element to the proposed treatment which makes it distinguishable from Re F. Phil 
Fennell, writing in 1990 just after the case had been heard, submits also that following 
Re F, the existing information on how to ascertain best interests was too broad to be 
able to resolve any “ethical differences which may occur within care teams 
concerned with the treatment of incapable patients.”358 In addition, Fennell 
suggests two possible ways in which the best interests test could be defined. First, the 
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test could be defined so as to allow treatment to be given to incapable patients if it is 
in their best medical interests. Secondly, Fennell suggests that the test could be given 
a wider interpretation to take account of “the welfare (in the broader sense) of the 
non-volitional patient.”359 It is submitted that the second interpretation carries the 
most weight, and indeed, it was this approach which was subsequently adopted in 
cases such as Re A and Re SL. Without a more holistic approach to the issue of 
welfare and best interests, it is possible that Re F might have been decided differently. 
Although the procedure proposed was entirely medical, it could be argued that the 
reasons for authorising the operation were not related to best medical interests in the 
sense that there was no therapeutic benefit to be gained. However, despite the fact that 
this was not mentioned in great detail in the case, the courts did in effect give a wide 
interpretation of the best interests test to consider the impact on F’s welfare were she 
to become pregnant. Pregnancy would not have a detrimental impact on her health as 
such, but would more than likely be contrary to her emotional welfare, something 
which might not have been taken into consideration were the best interests given a 
narrower interpretation360.  
 
The concept of best interests as developed through the common law has been held to 
encompass medical, emotional and other welfare interests in general. However, this is 
further complicated when the individual in question has been deemed by the law to 
have no interests of any kind. It was this precise issue which was at the heart of 
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland361.  
The case concerned Anthony Bland, who was severely injured in the Hillsborough 
disaster in 1989. As a result, Bland suffered irreversible brain damage and had 
subsequently lain in a Persistent Vegetative State (PVS) for three years. The doctors 
in charge unanimously stated that Anthony Bland would never recover and would 
never gain any form of awareness. With the approval of his parents, the Healthcare 
Trust applied for a declaration which would authorise the withdrawal of further life-
prolonging treatment, which would result in Anthony Bland’s death. The declaration 
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was duly granted and the Official Solicitor appealed, although this appeal was 
subsequently dismissed. Lord Mustill’s speech addressed the question as to whether 
treatment would provide any tangible benefit to Anthony Bland: 
“He [Anthony Bland] feels no pain and suffers no mental anguish. Stress was 
laid in argument on the damage to his personal dignity by the continuation of 
the present medical regime, and on the progressive erosion of the family’s 
happy recollections month by month of distressing and hopeless care. 
Considerations of this kind will no doubt carry great weight when parliament 
comes to consider the whole question in the round. But it seems to me to be 
stretching the concept of personal rights beyond breaking point to say that 
Anthony Bland has an interest in ending these sources of other’s distress. 
Unlike the conscious patient he does not know what is happening to his body, 
and cannot be affronted by it; he does no know of his family’s continuing 
sorrow. By ending his life the doctors will not relieve him of a burden become 
intolerable, for others carry the burden and he has none. What other 
considerations could make it better for him to die now rather than later? The 
distressing truth which must not be shirked is that the proposed conduct is 
not in the best interests of Anthony Bland, for he has no best interests of any 
kind.”362 
 
Lord Mustill’s speech is central to the issue of best interests in relation to PVS 
patients363. Of particular relevance is the final statement made by His Lordship in 
which he states that keeping Anthony Bland alive would not be in his best interests, 
because the nature of his condition meant that he effectively had no best interests. 
There is a certain logic to this statement, particularly given that in the case of Anthony 
Bland, continuing with life-prolonging treatment would do nothing to serve his well-
being, but would only serve to delay the sad inevitability of his death.  Lord Mustill 
further commented on the issue of best interests by stating that although ending 
Anthony Bland’s life was not directly in his best interests, any potential interests in 
keeping him alive had long since evaporated. It would therefore not be a criminal 
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offence to stop the treatment, since the nature of the patient’s condition meant that the 
doctors no longer had a duty to continue the treatment. It is also worth mentioning at 
this stage the European Convention on Human Rights, specifically Article 2 which 
guarantees the individual’s right to life. It could be argued that doctors would be 
infringing Article 2 of the Convention because in ceasing all life prolonging 
treatment, they would effectively be bringing about Anthony Bland’s death. However, 
this argument is ultimately untenable, As discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis364, 
whilst Article 2 does not permit individuals to actively aid in the death of another, this 
is to be differentiated from a scenario such as that of Anthony Bland, whereby 
continuation of his treatment would have been, on balance, disproportionate to the 
benefit that it would have been achieved. Article 2 does not require life prolonging 
treatment to be continued indefinitely and to cease it would therefore not be a breach 
of Article 2.  
 
Nevertheless, is it true to say that Anthony Bland no longer had any interests of any 
kind? In the Court of Appeal, Lord Hoffmann stressed the difficulty of cases such as 
that of Anthony Bland, stating that a conflict existed between the sanctity of life and 
the principle of self-determination. Speaking about the sanctity of life, His Lordship 
said the following: 
“Our belief in the sanctity of life explains why we think it is almost always 
wrong to cause the death of another human being, even one who is terminally 
ill or so disabled that we think that if we were in his position we would rather 
be dead. Still less do we tolerate laws such as existed in Nazi Germany, by 
which handicapped people or inferior races could be put to death because 
someone else thought that their lives were useless.”365 
However, his Lordship continued by stating that the sanctity of life principle is only 
one of the relevant principles that must be considered. Anthony Bland, despite being 
in a vegetative state, was nonetheless still alive. Hoffmann L.J validly reminds us that 
human life has an intrinsic value to it which is given great importance by many 
individuals, both from a religious and a secular viewpoint366. In the case of those such 
as Anthony Bland who are incapable of expressing their wishes on medical treatment, 
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the intrinsic value placed on human life nonetheless requires the individual to be 
treated with dignity. If for example the patient was a member of a religion such as 
Islam or Judaism that adhered to strict dietary codes. Respecting the patient’s dignity 
would preclude the patient being fed with bacon, despite the fact that he/she would 
more than likely have no recollection of the hospital staff having done so. Certainly 
there is considerable validity in the statement that every human being has the right to 
be treated with dignity without fear of humiliation and indeed, this right is protected 
under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which protects the 
individual against inhuman or degrading treatment. The fact remains however that to 
consider cases such as that of Anthony Bland exclusively in such terms is to do so in 
too idealistic a manner. Indeed, Butler-Sloss L.J stated that adhering unequivocally to 
the sanctity of life principle was failing to consider the reality of Mr. Bland’s 
situation367. Her Ladyship referred to the fact that quality of life was an integral factor 
in determining whether a life should be preserved at all costs368. In the case of 
Anthony Bland, the Court of Appeal was entirely satisfied that he had been 
appropriately examined and that there was absolutely no possibility of him regaining 
consciousness having been in a permanent vegetative state for over one year369. It is 
here that the issue of dignity again becomes relevant. Hoffmann L.J rejected the idea 
that one retains interests only when conscious, and stated that this did not correspond 
to the intuitive feelings of many people on the issue of life and death370. In Anthony 
Bland’s case, his dignity would be best respected by ensuring that he died in an 
appropriate manner: 
“Most people would like an honourable and dignified death and we think it 
wrong to dishonour their deaths, even when they are unconscious that this is 
happening. We pay respect to their dead bodies and to their memory because 
we think it an offence against the dead themselves if we do not.”371 
His Lordship also rejected the notion that the principles of sanctity of life and self-
determination were in conflict. Given the nature of Mr. Bland’s condition, it was not 
possible for him to voice his opinions about whether he would wish to be kept alive or 
not. Therefore, the only realistic option for the Court of Appeal was to gather 
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information about him from loved ones and decide accordingly; particularly given 
that the patient had made no advance statements outlining what he would wish to have 
done372. Hoffmann L.J stated that in the circumstances surrounding Anthony Bland’s 
situation, the Court of Appeal had felt that it was on balance more likely that he 
would have chosen to die, and that is was therefore entirely lawful for any life-
prolonging treatment to be withdrawn373. It should be noted however, that the ruling 
of the Court of Appeal in Bland was relevant to that particular case, and should not be 
taken as applying in all cases involving patients in a vegetative state. There was no 
chance of Anthony Bland regaining consciousness, but in other similar cases, the 
chances of recovery might be higher and so this must be taken into consideration 
when deciding whether life-prolonging treatment should be continued.  
 
It could also be argued that individuals in a PVS retain interests because of the 
possibility that they may recover some degree of awareness –therefore, the argument 
that they have no interests cannot always be assumed. Lord Hoffman stated in his 
judgment in Bland that no individual had ever recovered consciousness after being in 
a persistent vegetative state for over one year374.  
Existing literature has provided differing views as to whether PVS patients actually 
feel pain and whether this can be accurately determined. McCullagh refers to the 
testimonies of the American Medical Association, who stated that “pain cannot be 
experienced by brains that no longer retain neural apparatus for suffering.”375 
Similarly, Cranford states that  
“No conscious experience of pain and suffering is possible without the 
integrated functioning of the brainstem and cerebral cortex. Pain and 
suffering are attributes of consciousness, and PVS patients… do not 
experience them.”376 
Certainly this was the conclusion reached by the U.K courts in Airedale NHS Trust v 
Bland. The medical staff were certain that Tony Bland was incapable of displaying 
any sentient response and that there was no hope of recovery. True though this may be 
however, the conclusion reached in Bland does not automatically apply to all PVS 
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cases. The American Neurological Association stated in 1993 that the question as to 
whether PVS patients can feel pain “may not be resolved scientifically to 
everyone’s complete satisfaction.”377 This is illustrated in the U.K case of Frenchay 
Healthcare NHS Trust v S378, which also concerned an application by a health 
authority for a declaration allowing them to lawfully refrain from any further attempts 
to reinsert a gastrostomy tube into a PVS patient. Since this was the same position that 
Tony Bland was in, Frenchay NHS Trust argued that the same approach was 
justifiable in this case. The declaration was duly granted and the subsequent appeal 
dismissed. During the appeal, the Official Solicitor raised the question of whether the 
diagnosis of PVS was accurate, and whether S’s circumstances did in fact mirror 
those of Tony Bland. In particular, Sir Thomas Bingham M.R highlighted the 
following: 
“More significantly, attention is drawn to suggestions in the medical reports 
of what might be interpreted as volitional behaviour: that is, not mere spasm 
or reflex reaction, but voluntary behaviour on the part of the patient. There 
is reference at one point to pulling out the nasogastric tube and indeed to the 
pulling out of the gastrostomy tube… There are references to the possibility 
that S may feel distress and may be suffering. Indeed, it is pointed out that 
one of the reasons why the nurses are so gravely distressed by S’s condition is 
that they are convinced that at times he seems to suffer.”379 
Ultimately, the court was satisfied with the evidence of the consultant who had 
diagnosed S as a PVS patient who had no chance of recovery, particularly as this had 
been further confirmed by another consultant neuro-psychiatrist380. However the court 
also acknowledged that the circumstances of the Bland case could not be assumed as 
applying automatically to all PVS patients. In S’s case, the court stated that his 
condition was not as clear-cut as Tony Bland’s, and that it was still necessary for 
doctors to exhaust all treatment avenues before concluding that there is no hope of 
recovery for a patient in a persistent vegetative state381.  
Although not an example of a misdiagnosed PVS as such, the case of Frenchay 
Healthcare NHS Trust v S is useful as an illustration of the inherent difficulty in 
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accurately determining awareness levels in PVS patients. Clearly, each case will be 
different and in the light of this, providing specific criteria for determining awareness 
is perhaps not practical. McCullagh has highlighted the fact that although much of the 
existing commentary confirms that PVS patients by definition are not capable of 
experiencing pain or any form of sentience, commentary also exists that would appear 
to challenge this.  
 
The case of Anthony Bland illustrates the various complexities involved when dealing 
with patients in a persistent vegetative state. Lord Hoffman’s assertion that patients in 
a persistent vegetative state still maintain critical interests, if not experiential ones, is 
entirely valid, but is also perhaps too idealistic to be of any real use when considering 
what to do regarding the continuation of treatment for patients such as Anthony Bland 
who have no chance of recovery. The question which must therefore be asked is 
whether continuation of life-prolonging treatment would benefit the patient in any 
way. However, would the same rules apply when the patient is not in a persistent 
vegetative state, but nonetheless finds their interests evaporating as a result of a 
serious illness? This was the central issue in W Healthcare NHS Trust v KH and 
others382.  
 
The case concerned a 59-year-old woman suffering with multiple sclerosis, who had 
been incapable of taking informed decisions for herself for at least 20 years. She lived 
in a nursing home and required round the clock care. Although the woman, KH, was 
conscious, her bodily functions had ceased and she could not speak more than one 
word at a time. KH had been fed through a tube for five years. On one occasion, the 
tube fell out and KH was admitted to hospital as a result. Although the hospital staff 
felt that it was in KH’s best interests to have the tube reinserted, her family did not 
wish this to take place as they felt that under the circumstances, KH would prefer to 
die. However, the court held that there was insufficient evidence of KH’s wishes prior 
to the loss of her capacity. Therefore, to permit the feeding tube to remain out would 
be tantamount to allowing the patient to die of starvation. This was deemed 
unacceptable for a patient who was not in a persistent vegetative state unless the 
patient’s condition was so intolerable that death would unquestionably be in her best 
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interests. The subsequent appeal by KH’s brother and daughter was dismissed for the 
same reasons.  
 
W Healthcare NHS Trust v KH and others illustrates how complicated a best interests 
determination can be. At appeal, Brooke L.J referred to a statement made by the trial 
judge, stating how borderline the decision was, and how the family’s case about KH’s 
suffering was as strong as the arguments made to the contrary383. KH’s condition was 
such that she did not recognise any of her family and received no visitors as a result. 
Why then, did the court rule against their wishes and order the feeding tube to be 
reinserted? The answer may lie in the nature of the treatment, namely artificial 
nutrition and hydration. As stated earlier, ceasing this was deemed tantamount to 
starving KH to death, which would have been extremely painful and undignified. 
Furthermore, Brooke L.J stated that there was no evidence to suggest that KH knew of 
the pain of starving to death, and that there was also no evidence to suggest that KH 
would explicitly prefer to die in this manner. The issue was therefore not whether it 
was in KH’s best interests to die, but that it was not in her interests to die in such a 
painful undignified manner. This may not have been as important an issue were KH in 
a persistent vegetative state, but since she was mildly sentient, acceding to the 
family’s wishes would have resulted in a painful death, which the courts were entirely 
correct not to authorise. In short, the issue of best interests must be considered not 
simply in terms of outcome, but in how that outcome is achieved.  
 
4.1.2: DECISION MAKING FOR THE INCAPABLE PATIENT UNDER THE 
MENTAL CAPACITY ACT 2005: DEVELOPMENT OF THE BEST 
INTERESTS CONCEPT 
 
Section 4(1) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 states that when making a 
determination as to what is in an individual’s best interests, the decision-maker must 
not do so based on the individual’s age or appearance (4(1)(a)), or any condition 
which might lead others to make unjustified assumptions about what may be in the 
individual’s best interests (4(1)(b)). This is an explicit endorsement of the principle of 
non-discrimination and the rejection of the status approach in favour of a functional 
approach to capacity, which is consistent with the Law Commission’s earlier 
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recommendations. Despite the fact that best interests has been interpreted in the 
common law as a predominantly paternalistic concept, the Law Commission’s 
attempts to introduce a more autonomous aspect to it are also significantly represented 
in s.4 of the Mental Capacity Act. First, s.4(4) states that the decision-maker must 
permit and encourage the individual to participate in the decision-making process as 
far as is reasonably practicable. This is in contrast to a more traditional model of best 
interests, which places greater emphasis upon the decision-maker and what he/she 
deems to be the correct course of action to be taken on the individuals’ behalf.  
Following on from this, s.4(6) states the following: 
“He [the decision-maker] must consider, so far as is reasonably 
ascertainable- 
(a) the person’s past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular any 
relevant written statements made by him when he had capacity), 
(b) the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he 
had capacity, and 
(c) the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do 
so.” 
This section has deviated very little from the Law Commission’s proposals for the 
Draft Mental Incapacity Bill 1995384, which had originally included virtually identical 
provisions to the above. It is wholly in keeping with the Commission’s main theme of 
empowerment of the individual, and illustrates further just how the best interests test 
as included in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 differs from the test as applied in the 
common law.  
The issue of whether a particular course of treatment is in the best interests of the 
individual will be predominantly decided upon clinical factors. However, as can be 
seen above, Section 4(6) states that in addition to clinical factors, decision-makers 
must consider the past and present wishes and feelings of the individual as far as these 
can be ascertained385. This confirms the English common law position on the subject, 
which confirms that ‘best interests’ encompasses factors beyond mere medical 
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ones386. If an indication of the individual’s preferences can be evidenced, this must 
take priority over the decision-maker’s own opinions. The 2007 Code of Practice 
reiterates the importance of the individual’s past and present wishes and feelings, in 
particular when an individual has made an advanced statement specifying a particular 
treatment decision387. Beyond this, the Code of Practice says little more on this issue 
which cannot be found in the Act itself. Section 4(6) also requires the decision-maker 
to consider any deeply held belief or value systems which may have an influence on a 
how an individual might make a particular decision. The Code of Practice states that 
these could include matters such as cultural background, religious beliefs, political 
convictions or past behaviour or habits388. If for instance, a Jehovah’s Witness 
becomes incapable of making a decision following an accident and requires a blood 
transfusion, the doctor cannot simply rule that it is in the patient’s best interests to 
have the treatment. Instead, the doctor must now consider the beliefs of the individual 
and decide accordingly. In this case, the treatment should not go ahead based upon the 
beliefs of Jehovah’s Witnesses regarding blood products.  
 
It is also worth noting that the presence of s.4(6)(c) provides further indication that 
certain elements of the substituted judgment test have been included within the best 
interests provisions in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. As well as the past and present 
wishes and feelings of the individual, s.4(7) of the Act requires the decision-maker to 
consider, as far as is practicable:  
“(a) anyone named by the person as someone to be consulted on the matter in 
question or on matters of that kind, 
(b) anyone engaged in caring for the person or interested in his welfare, 
(c) any donee of a lasting power of attorney granted by the person, and  
(d) any deputy appointed for the person by the court.” 
Though not explicitly mentioned, the fact that the above provisions have been 
included directly below the references to the past and present wishes and feelings of 
the individual, suggests that consultation with others close to the individual should not 
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take precedence over consulting with the individual themselves. In addition, s.7(a) 
refers to anybody who has been named by the person as somebody to be consulted. 
This is again emphasising the importance of the individual’s involvement in the 
decision-making process; even when he/she may not be capable of contributing 
directly.  
 
4.2: DECISION-MAKING FOR THE INCAPABLE PATIENT UNDER THE 
ADULTS WITH INCAPACITY (SCOTLAND) ACT 2000 – THE CONCEPT 
OF ‘BENEFIT’ 
 
The general principles of the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 permits 
intervention in the affairs of the incapable adult provided that the person responsible 
for authorising or putting into effect the intervention is satisfied that the intervention 
will benefit the individual, and that this benefit cannot reasonably be achieved without 
the proposed intervention389. Where an intervention is necessary, the principle of least 
restrictive alternative must be applied in relation to the freedom of the adult390. It was 
further stated in M, Applicant391 that the test for benefit should not include issues of 
primary or secondary benefit. The valid test was only that which adhered to the 
general principles of the 2000 Act392. 
 
The equivalent test to benefit in English law, namely the best interests test, is notable 
by its complete absence from the 2000 Act. The reason for this was explained in the 
1995 Scottish Law Commission Report: 
“We consider that ‘best interests’ by itself is too vague and would require to 
be supplemented by further factors which would have to be taken into 
account. We also consider that ‘best interests’ does not give due weight to the 
views of the adult, particularly to wishes and feelings which he or she had 
expressed while capable of doing so. The concept of best interests was 
developed in the context of child law where a child’s level of understanding 
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may not be high and will usually have been lower in the past. Incapable 
adults such as those who are mentally ill, head injured or suffering from 
dementia at the time when a decision has to be made in connection with them, 
will have possessed full mental powers before their present incapacity. We 
think it is wrong to equate such adults with children and for that reason 
would avoid extending child law concepts to them. Accordingly, the general 
principles… are framed without express reference to best interests.”393 
 
Although a definition of ‘benefit’ was not provided in the 2000 Act, s.1(4) of the 2000 
Act provides further guidance: 
“In determining if an intervention is to be made, and if so, what intervention 
is to be made, account shall be taken of –  
a) the past and present wishes and feelings of the adult so far as they can be 
ascertained by any means of communication, whether human or by 
mechanical aid (whether of an interpretive nature or otherwise) 
appropriate to the adult; 
b) The views of the nearest relative and the primary carer of the adult, in so 
far as it is reasonable and practicable to do so; 
c) The views of – any guardian, continuing attorney or welfare attorney of 
the adult who has powers relating to the proposed intervention; and any 
person whom the Sheriff has directed to be consulted; in so far as it is 
reasonable and practicable to do so; and 
d) The views of any other person appearing to the person responsible for 
authorising or effecting the intervention to have an interest in the welfare 
of the adult or in the proposed intervention, where these views have been 
made known to the person responsible, in so far as it is reasonable and 
practicable to do so.” 
As can be seen, the past and present wishes and feelings of the individual have been 
placed at the top of the list of criteria. It has not been specifically stated that the above 
criteria have been listed in a hierarchical manner, but this notwithstanding, the 
emphasis placed upon patient autonomy suggests strongly that the ascertainable past 
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and present wishes of the patient will be prioritised ahead of the views of relatives and 
carers.  
 
It is unclear as to whether Parliament intended s.1(4) to be used specifically as criteria 
for determining whether a particular course of action benefits the individual. The fact 
that s.1(4) exists as a separate sub-clause from the ‘benefit’ clause (s.1(2)) suggests 
that s.1(4) is to be taken as a separate general principle. Nevertheless, the fact that 
‘benefit’ was not defined also suggests that there is nothing to stop s.1(4) being used 
as guidance for determining what would constitute a benefit in a particular case. Ward 
suggests that the requirements to ascertain the individual’s own present or past wishes 
and feelings, and to consult the nearest relative and primary carer, would be 
particularly helpful in assessing benefit394. This is a valid submission worthy of 
consideration. The concept of benefit must be given construction beyond mere 
medical interpretation of the term. To explain this further, consider the example given 
above of the Jehovah’s Witness who has refused a much needed blood transfusion. If 
one were to give ‘benefit’ a strict medical interpretation, then one would arguably 
have to administer the blood transfusion in order that the patient might regain full 
health. However, an alternative interpretation might be that respecting the patient’s 
wishes and allowing them to refuse the blood transfusion is providing greater benefit 
to the patient. Also, the fact that such a great emphasis has placed upon autonomy in 
the 2000 legislation arguably gives greater weight to this interpretation. Following on 
from this, if the Act requires the ‘intervener’ to consider the present and past wishes 
of the individual, one could then link this to the ‘benefit’ requirement by prioritising 
the wishes of the individual, either from the present or the past. Ward provides 
extremely useful exposition on the issue of constructing decisions on behalf of an 
incapable individual. He states that there is in essence a hierarchy of twelve factors to 
be considered when making a decision, number one being the most important, and 
number twelve being the least important: 
“The possible elements of the construct can be stated hierarchically as 
follows: 
1) The adult’s present competent decision; 
2) The adult’s past competent decision; 
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3) The adult’s decisive present choice; 
4) The adult’s significant present choice; 
5) The adult’s present wishes and feelings; 
6) The adult’s past wishes and feelings; 
7) Information about the adult from, and the views of, the persons closest to 
the adult; 
8) Input of others with significant personal or professional knowledge of the 
adult, or specific appointments or roles in relation to the adult; 
9) The shared views and ethos of the adult’s family; 
10) The shared views and ethos of any other grouping with which the adult is 
immediately and substantially associated. 
11) The shared views and ethos of any religious, ethnic or other group of 
which the adult, or the adult’s family, is a member; 
12) The norms of the society of which the adult is a member.”395 
 
In keeping with the pro-autonomy approach of the 2000 Act, Ward rightly considers 
the present competent decision of the adult to be the most significant factor in 
decision-making process. Put simply, if the individual is fully capable and makes a 
decision, then that decision must be respected by the doctor. Of secondary importance 
is any past decision the individual has made; if the individual has since become 
incapable, but has evidenced a decision made at a time when capacity had been 
retained i.e. through an advance statement, this must be followed. Elements three and 
four represent choices made by the individual who, though having some degree of 
incapacity, is nonetheless able to evidence some choice which may be decisive or 
significant in the final treatment decision. Elements three and four are very much in 
keeping with the Scottish Law Commission’s earlier statement that capacity is not an 
‘all-or-nothing concept’, and that incapacity in one aspect of life does not necessarily 
mean incapacity across the board. Elements five and six do not refer to actual choices 
made by the individual, but instead refer to any wishes and feelings expressed by the 
individual, either in the present or the past. These could be differentiated from 
actually making a choice in as much as the wishes and feelings expressed may not 
refer directly to the treatment decision in question, but rather to general opinions 
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about issues such as the type of treatment offered, or about end-of-life issues in 
general for example. After consideration of the elements which are aimed at involving 
the individual in the decision-making process, the ‘intervener’, according to Ward, 
may then consider the opinions, wishes and feelings, be they past or present, of any 
persons who may be considered close to the adult. While this could ostensibly include 
nearest relatives, note also that Ward includes the ‘shared views of the adult’s family’ 
as a separate element. One might argue from this that information relating directly to 
the feelings and opinions of the individual are more to be considered ahead of the 
more general wishes and feelings of the individual’s family as a whole. Of lesser 
importance still are the opinions and feelings of any religious, ethnic or community 
group which may be connected to the individual. In this way, Ward appears to be 
giving only nominal importance to the principle of communitarianism, which in the 
context of treatment decision-making, places the needs and wishes of any community 
of which the individual is a member above the wishes and feelings of the individual 
themselves. The fact that the views of any religious, ethic or any other group have 
been placed at the bottom of Ward’s list along with the norms of society shows that 
Ward considers these factors to be insignificant when compared to the wishes and 
feelings of the individual.  
 
The concept of benefit bears strong similarity to the best interests test contained in the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005. Both concepts prioritise what is best for the individual, 
and both concepts emphasise the need to consider past and present wishes and 
feelings of the individual and persons close to the individual. Given these apparent 
similarities, it is perhaps useful to examine whether the concepts of ‘benefit’ and ‘best 
interests’ are in reality all that different. 
 
First, consider the definition of benefit as espoused by Adrian Ward. Ward states that 
the concept of benefit could, with due caution, be used to describe anything which 
attempts to overcome the limitations that incapacity may create for an individual. This 
would in turn permit a course of action to be taken which the individual could 
reasonably be expected to have chosen to do if they had capacity. It appears from this 
definition that the concept of ‘benefit’ contains elements of another test used during 
cases of incapacity, namely, the substituted judgment test. According to Ward, the 
substituted judgment test means “ascertaining and applying the choice or decision 
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which, it is believed, the adult would have arrived at if able to make and 
communicate a choice or decision in the matter in question.”396 There is a great 
similarity between Ward’s definition of substituted judgment and his definition of 
‘benefit’. As stated earlier, the lack of statutory definition for the concept of ‘benefit’ 
means that one could theoretically use the provisions of s.1(4) of the 2000 Act; in 
particular, the need for the decision-maker to take account of the past and present 
wishes and feelings of the individual so far as they can be ascertained. It is submitted 
that the inclusion of this requirement within statute suggests government endorsement 
of some form of substituted judgment. Endorsement of a pure best interests model 
would arguably not require consideration of the past and present wishes and feelings 
of the individual, as the deciding factor in a treatment decision would be what the 
decision-maker considers to be in the individual’s best interests, irrespective of what 
the individual might have decided had he/she had the requisite capacity. It is 
unsurprising that the 2000 legislation makes it necessary for decision-makers to 
consider the past and present wishes and feelings of the individual; it is after all in 
keeping with the pro-autonomy approach of the legislation. What is particularly 
interesting however, is the fact that the best interests test as laid down in the English 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 also states that decision makers must have regard to the 
past and present wishes and feelings of the individual. One might conclude from this 
that the test for proxy decision-making in both U.K jurisdictions is undergoing an 
evolution of sorts and that this evolution is represented by the inclusion of a hybrid 
test which consists of elements from both the best interests test and the substituted 
judgment test. Indeed, it is perhaps too obtuse to proponents of both tests to insist 
upon a pure model of either test. Adrian Ward highlights some potential deficiencies 
in a pure best interests model, whilst endorsing the approach eventually favoured by 
the Scottish Law Commission: 
“The approach of the Scottish Law Commission is to be preferred both on its 
merits and because Scots law in this regard now implements the 
Commission’s recommendations. [The best interests test] is an inherently 
subjective and paternalistic approach. Except where the choice of decision is 
beyond doubt, it entails a choice by someone other than the adult. If that 
choice is in any way reflective of the personal views and background of 
                                                 
396 Ibid at Para 15.27. See also D’s Curator Bonis, Noter, [1998] S.L.T 2. 
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whoever makes it, it is to that extent flawed; but even if the person making 
the choice is rigorously objective, that choice will inevitably be a reflection of 
level 12 of the list.397 In other words it will be a contribution from the lowest 
level of the list, and should be accorded no higher status than that. If 
inconsistent even with level 11398 or with the preponderant view to be derived 
from higher levels, then usually it should not prevail. It is worthy of 
repetition that the requirement of modern Scots law is that any judge, 
safeguarder, curator ad litem… or appointee, or any other authority or 
person exercising functions under the Incapacity Act, should proceed in all 
respects in accordance with the general principles of the Incapacity Act, and 
not by simply interjecting their personal views as to the adult’s ‘best 
interests’.”399 
Ward makes a number of points which are central to the issue of decision-making for 
incapable adults. In the light of Ward’s twelve point checklist, it is submitted that the 
application of the ‘benefit’ requirement necessitates prioritisation of the substituted 
judgment approach i.e. acting on the basis of the past and present wishes of the 
individual. If the past and present wishes, feelings or choices of the individual are 
unascertainable, it would then be acceptable for the decision-maker to adopt a more 
paternalistic approach i.e. act on the basis of what he/she feels would be beneficial to 
the individual. The fact that the best interests test as laid down in the English Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 also contains the requirement that decision-makers consider the 
past and present wishes, feelings and beliefs of the individual400, shows that even the 
English approach to best interests has evolved so as to now include a degree of 
substituted judgment. One could therefore infer that the concept of benefit is not 
particularly far removed from best interests as laid down in the 2005 English Act. 
Furthermore, the fact that the Scottish Act was passed five years before the English 
legislation suggests that England might in fact have been influenced by the Scottish 
approach.  
 
                                                 
397 “The norms of the society of which the adult is a member” see earlier in this chapter at 144-145 
for Ward’s complete list. 
398 “The shared views and ethos of any religious, ethnic or other group of which the adult or the 
adult’s family, is a member”. 
399 Ward, A.D (2003) Adult Incapacity; W. Green/Sweet and Maxwell Edinburgh at Para 15.27. 
400 Mental Capacity Act 2005 s.4(6). 
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It is submitted that despite the rejection of the best interests concept by the Scottish 
Law Commission in 1995, there is ultimately little substantive difference between this 
concept and the concept of benefit as laid down in the Adults with Incapacity 
(Scotland) Act 2000. The Scottish Law Commission stated that the best interests test 
was unsuitable in the context of incapable adults because it was developed in the 
context of childcare law and it was this inappropriate to equate incapable adults with 
children401. It is submitted however, that this distinction is wholly unconvincing, 
given the way that both concepts have been laid down in both English and Scottish 
legislation. Both concepts require the person making the determination to prioritise 
the past and present wishes and feelings of the individual and take account of the 
wishes and feelings of those closely connected to the individual. Therefore, the 
Scottish Law Commission’s assertion in 1995 that the best interests test does not give 
adequate weight to the wishes and feelings of the adult402 no longer has any validity. 
Furthermore, English common law application of best interests has highlighted the 
fact that for some incapable adults, incapacity will have existed from birth and it 
would therefore not be possible in such cases to ascertain what the past wishes of an 
individual would be with regard to a particular situation403. However, this has been 
taken into account by both the English and Scottish legislations by allowing for the 
view of relatives and carers to be considered by the person making an intervention on 
behalf of an incapable adult.  
 
4.3: DECISION-MAKING FOR THE INCAPABLE PATIENT IN INDIAN 
LAW 
 
Indian law currently does not recognise the concepts of best interests or benefit and 
their relevance in determining how to act on behalf of an incapable adult. However, a 
review of the literature has revealed that recognition of the underlying issues is slowly 
developing, in particular to the important issues of sterilisation for the incapable adult 
and issues relating to end-of-life care. Thus far, one case relating to sterilisation of the 
incapable adult has been reported in India, and is worthy of discussion here.  
                                                 
401 Scottish Law Commission Report No. 151 (1995) Report on Incapable Adults at Para 2.50. 
402 Ibid.  
403 See Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 A.C 1; Re A (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [2000] 
53 B.M.L.R 66; Re SL (Adult Patient: Medical Treatment) [2000] 2 F.C.R 452. In each case, the 
condition present in the individual which resulted in incapacity had been present since birth.  
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On February 5th 1994, The Indian Express Newspaper published an article concerning 
the proposed removal of the uterus from several mentally impaired women by a 
doctor working at Sassoon General Hospital in Pune. There were two reasons given to 
justify the operation: 
“a) these women, whose mental age was between two and three years, were 
unable to attend to their personal hygiene and often smeared themselves and 
their surroundings with menstrual fluid. 
b) They were subject to rape and unwanted pregnancy. Removal of the 
uterus would stop menstruation and prevent pregnancy. Ms. Vandana 
Khullar, Director in charge of the welfare of women, children and the 
handicapped in Maharashtra pointed out that the guardians of such women 
were often unwilling to attend them or children born to them. She claimed 
that removal of the uterus did not eliminate femininity”404 
PARYAY, a group promoting alternatives to hysterectomy operations for the 
mentally impaired, published an article denouncing the proposed operations for the 
following reasons: 
“Menstruation, even in the mentally handicapped, is not a disease to be 
eliminated. Hysterectomy has been carried out for the convenience of the 
caretaker institutions and not for the health of the mentally handicapped 
women. Would a ‘normal’ woman undergo this operation just to get rid of 
the ‘trouble of menstruation’ even after the completion of childbearing? 
… Hysterectomy is major surgery with a mortality rate of 1-2 per 1000 
operations and an even higher complication rate. 
… Such hysterectomy is not recommended by any standard textbook of 
gynaecology or psychiatry. An extensive search… shows that it is not an 
accepted practice in developed countries. 
…The human rights of persons in State custody need to be strengthened, not 
weakened. Removal of a healthy organ without even providing basic care and 
facilities erodes their human rights”405 
 
                                                 
404 Author unspecified (1994) Removing the Uterus from Mentally Handicapped Women: Some Ethical 
Considerations; Indian Journal of Medical Ethics; Feb-Apr  1994(3); accessed on 18/01/2006; 
available online at http://www.issuesinmedicalethics.org/013mi010.html. 
405 PARYAY (1994) Hysterectomy in the Mentally Handicapped; Indian Journal of Medical Ethics; 
Aug-Oct Vol.2(1); accessed online at http://www.issuesinmedicalethics.org/021mi006.html. 
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Following outrage amongst women’s rights groups, the Chief Minister of Maharashtra 
ordered an immediate ban on the proposed operations. The protesters felt that removal 
of the uterus for the sake of menstrual hygiene was too extreme a measure, since 
“…keeping these women clean during the three of four days when they were 
menstruating each month was not an insurmountable problem.”406. Furthermore, 
it was not accepted that removing the uterus would not affect the patient’s femininity: 
“The statement that removal of the womb does not deprive a woman of her 
femininity smacks of insensitivity. There is ample documentation of the deep 
sense of despair experienced by women who have been deprived of this 
organ”407. However, the ban on the proposed operation was subsequently lifted, thus 
permitting hysterectomy operations on handicapped women to continue, provided that 
such procedures were not carried out in surgical ‘camps’, which presumably invoked 
images of the Third Reich.  
The Pune hysterectomies scandal further raises questions about the status of women in 
certain sections of Indian society. Rajan comments on this through reference to the 
practice of female infanticide that has been reported in certain areas of India: 
“Son-preference is a widespread attitude in India, but its degree, and the 
consequential degree of discrimination against girl children, varies in 
different regions. Neither the preference nor the discrimination is much 
camouflaged. The abhorrence of female children is intense enough to affect 
their chances and rates of survival.”408 
Bandewar comments further on this issue: 
“…it is argued that if women do not produce sons, they will be victimised by 
their families and communities. This, women should have the right to sex-
selective abortion, exercising their right to autonomy and preventing 
victimisation. However, while individual women might escape abuse this way, 
it actually reinforces gender inequities and accepts social injustice. Women’s 
right to abortion should emancipate them from sex-based subordination. Sex-
                                                 
406 Ibid. 
407 Ibid. 
408 Rajan, R S (2003) The Scandal of the State: Women, Law and Citizenship in Postcolonial India; 
Duke University Press, Durham and London at 177-178.  
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selectives practices perpetuate the oppressive and sexist society which 
promotes this practice.”409 
One of the central reasons for female infanticide is the existence of the dowry system, 
whereby the families of women, when they reach marriageable age, are required to 
provide money, goods or property to the family of their daughter’s would-be groom. 
For families who live near to or below the poverty line, this will be impractical yet 
compulsory if they wish their daughter to be married. Therefore, the birth of a 
daughter could be seen by some as a burdensome prospect from the outset, where 
infanticide is the preferred option. If women are vulnerable by virtue of their gender, 
this vulnerability is arguably increased for women who are affected with some form 
of disability.   
Rajan suggests that women, who are destitute or suffering from some form of 
disability, are extremely vulnerable because the State welfare system effectively fails 
to distinguish between those who need to be placed in correctional institutions and 
those who require protection or rehabilitation: 
“Formally, a distinction exists between ‘protective homes’ and ‘corrective 
institutions’, but actually they are put to use interchangeably. Destitute or 
sick women for whom the first is intended are placed along with women 
accused of ‘victimless crimes’ like vagrancy or solicitation identified for the 
occupation of the latter, and all of them are indistinguishable from 
criminals.”410 
Rajan highlights the fact that the stigma of mental illness still prevalent in India, often 
results in individuals being committed to institutions by family members who are 
unable to cope with this stigma. In addition to this, women are arguably more prone to 
being taken into custody under charges of prostitution, vagrancy or begging; 
according to a 1995 Report by the Joint Women’s Program, the status of being “a 
single and especially poor woman, without any male support, must either be 
already be working in prostitution or will soon be corrupted into joining it.”411 It 
would therefore appear that the notion still exists in India of women being incapable 
by virtue of their gender, essentially rendered incapable without the support of a 
                                                 
409 Bandewar, S (2005) Exploring the Ethics of Induced Abortion; Indian Journal of Medical Ethics; 
Vol. 13(1), accessed online on 23/01/09, available online at 
http://www.issuesinmedicalethics.org/131di018.html.  
410 Ibid at 88.  
411 Ibid.  
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male412. Women who are placed in institutions will therefore often not be released 
unless they have families to be released to413, an unlikely scenario if the individual 
has been admitted by family members in the first place. Rajan explains further: 
“It is the ‘ideology of the family’ – the conviction that women’s sexuality 
must be both protected and controlled – that underpins the ideology of 
institutional confinement, making a vicious circle of the passage of women 
from family of community to the institution and back. The processes of 
discharge/exit are highly bureaucratic. Women are released only if they have 
a family to receive them, but families… are either reluctant or unfit to receive 
them.”414 
Rajan links the above analysis back to the Pune hysterectomies scandal by 
highlighting both the ideological conflict that was at the heart of the dispute, coupled 
with the unofficial but definite endorsement of the status approach: 
“It will be clear that in the debate over the hysterectomies, the government’s 
most elevated defence of the practice was based on the ‘alleviation of 
suffering’ argument, while the activist’s opposition to it drew from the 
human rights defence of the women’s autonomy, liberty, integrity and 
privacy… In a single stroke, the sterilisation procedure wholly and 
comprehensively defined the identity of the inmates of the welfare home as 
‘mentally retarded women’: as women, in terms of the ‘problems’ of female 
sexuality; and as mentally retarded in terms of their incapacity to make 
rational choices. The individual’s spaces of selfhood, subjectivity and 
citizenship are thus entirely usurped by the state and the exigencies of 
institutional care.”415 
The Pune hysterectomies scandal effectively brings together a number of key ethical 
concepts and thus is essential for any discussion of capacity issues in India. On a more 
general level, state intervention, it would seem, has yet to recognise the possibility 
that women who are mentally disordered or impaired can be encouraged and 
empowered to live at least partly independently; they must either be released into the 
care of the family or remain institutionalised, without any middle ground available to 
                                                 
412 See also Ramanathan, U (1996) Women, Law and Institutionalisation: A Manifestation of State 
Power; Indian Journal of Gender Studies; Vol. 3(2); 199-224 at 200.  
413 Rajan, R S (2003) The Scandal of the State: Women, Law and Citizenship in Postcolonial India; 
Duke University Press, Durham and London at 89.  
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the individual that takes into account the varying degrees of incapacity that exist. 
Such an analysis also means that the ability of women to exercise their right to 
autonomy is effectively being disputed by the state, thus giving way to the principle 
of paternalism. With specific reference to the Pune case, Rajan suggests that the 
issues surrounding the sexuality of women are particularly contentious in the context 
of Indian society: 
“The anxieties produced by women’s sexuality – real and imagined fears 
about promiscuity, commercial sex, sexually transmitted diseases, 
unregulated fertility, infertility, deviant sexuality – are widely recognised as 
coexisting with the exploitation and regulation of aspects of women’s 
sexuality by social, religious, legal, communal and state sanctions.”416 
The above statement suggests a meeting of both cultural and developmental issues. 
From a developmental perspective, state handling of mentally disordered and 
impaired women arguably illustrates a lack of awareness of fundamental capacity 
issues. However, given that it was only after Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) in 
1990 that U.K capacity law developed significantly, the present situation in India is 
arguably comparable to the U.K situation twenty years previously. Cultural 
differences however can be identified, particularly in the degree to which the status 
approach is applied to women in both jurisdictions. If would be inaccurate to suggest 
that women are not, or never have been perceived as being somehow ‘lesser’ than 
men in the United Kingdom. They were not granted the vote until 1928, and martial 
rape was not criminalised until 1991417. However, the manner and degree that male 
preference is shown in India, e.g. through female infanticide and the reasoning behind 
it, arguably sets it apart from the United Kingdom.  
 
Pursuant to this, the Forum for Medical Ethics drew up draft guidelines for dealing 
with hysterectomy cases in mentally impaired women.  
“Rationale for hysterectomy:  
1) Inability to maintain personal hygiene during menstruation a) this must be 
documented on the case sheets. The effects of such documented lack of 
hygiene on the mentally handicapped woman must be clearly stated. 
Reference must be made in writing to the state of personal hygiene on other 
                                                 
416 Ibid at 89. 
417 See R v R (1992) 1 A.C 599. 
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days when she is not menstruating, especially with regard to excretion of 
urine and faeces. It must be evident to an objective observer scrutinising the 
case sheets and inspecting the woman’s surroundings that despite all 
available care and assistance, there is breach of hygiene from menstruation 
hazardous to the woman’s health and well-being. 
b) Where available care and assistance are less than what can be reasonably 
expected, the shortcomings must be corrected before a decision is made on 
hazard to the woman from breach of hygiene. 
c) Hysterectomy in the absence of a conscientious effort at helping the woman 
to maintain personal hygiene cannot be justified. 
…Whilst improvement in facilities for maintenance of personal hygiene to the 
state where it would be unnecessary to consider such options as hysterectomy 
would be ideal, given the circumstances in most institutions for the mentally 
handicapped in India, this is likely to remain infeasible for quite some time. 
Whilst every effort should be made to reach this ideal, in the interim the 
above guidelines appear practical. 
It must be emphasised that all concerned… should ensure that recourse to 
hysterectomy does not become the refuge of the inefficient, corrupt or 
unconcerned. Public institutions running on subsidies from society cannot 
evade their responsibilities towards these women or consider the promotion 
of personal hygiene amongst them as ‘extraordinary care’. 
2) …Hysterectomy is not permitted solely to prevent unwanted pregnancy. 
Laparoscopic tubal ligation is the procedure of choice for this purpose.  
 3) For medical indications such as menorrhagia… the decision by a qualified 
gynaecologist to perform hysterectomy as therapy for such indications 
documented on the patient’s case sheets cannot be challenged. 
4) To avoid the consequences of rape: This is an untenable reason for 
hysterectomy. Prevention of rape is the responsibility of the legal guardian of 
the mentally handicapped woman. When such a woman is in a state 
institution, the onus for preventing such assault lies squarely on the 
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administrators of the institution. The very nature of the handicap necessitates 
special protection.”418 
 
It can be seen that there is, to at least some extent, a convergence of approach between 
India and the U.K. It was held in the English case of Re SL (Adult: Medical 
Treatment)419 that hysterectomy of mentally impaired women for the purpose of 
stopping menstrual periods can only be done where the lack of menstrual hygiene is 
of such a level as to be potentially or actually hazardous to the health and well-being 
of the patient. Although a hysterectomy operation was not authorised in SL’s case, 
this was because the court were not satisfied that less invasive alternatives were not 
available. Had a hysterectomy operation been the only viable method of treatment 
available to SL, it would have been authorised if in her best interests, and indeed, it 
was only at appeal that the operation was rejected. Similarly, the Forum for Medical 
Ethics in India expressly stated that such operations were unjustifiable unless all 
measures had been taken to maintain menstrual hygiene via less invasive measures; in 
other words, a hysterectomy cannot be performed simply for the convenience of the 
carers. However, the Forum also correctly emphasised that the state of India’s health 
service may mean that maintenance of acceptable standards in this area may not 
always be possible. Though it is commendable that this was recognised, it remains to 
be seen whether this will translate into actual improvements in healthcare provision.  
 
The Forum for Medical Ethics further stated that a hysterectomy for the purposes of 
preventing unwanted pregnancy was not justifiable. The Forum for Medical Ethics 
recommended a laparoscopic tubal ligation as an alternative which is a considerably 
less invasive sterilisation procedure. The Forum for Medical Ethics was rightly 
adamant that an already vulnerable group of individuals should not be subjected to 
potentially distressing and invasive procedures when the same effect could be 
achieved via simpler means. This is an endorsement of the principle of least restrictive 
alternative and mirrors the U.K position. Cases such as Re A (Medical Treatment: 
Male Sterilisation)420, Re SL (Adult Patient: Medical Treatment)421 and Re F (Mental 
                                                 
418 Author unspecified (1994) Suggested Guidelines for Hysterectomy in Mentally Handicapped 
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Patient: Sterilisation)422 have in the past confirmed that sterilisation operations will 
not be authorised unless they in the best interests of the individual and provided that 
no less restrictive means of achieving the same result are feasible.  
 
A further incident which is worthy of discussion was reported in the Indian Journal of 
Medical Ethics in 1993. The incident in question took place in Mumbai and involved 
a group of individuals who went on hunger strike in order to protest the construction 
of a new dam. On the second day of the fasting, two protesters, Medha Patkar and 
Devram Kanera were arrested and taken to hospital. Despite continuous refusal, both 
Patkar and Kanera were fed intravenously and released two days later. However, both 
were subsequently rearrested nine days later when again, attempts were made to force 
feed both of them. Jesani and Pilgaokar highlighted in the article the fact that the 
medical profession remained completely silent about the treatment of the two 
protesters. This suggests that the medical profession saw very little that was wrong 
with the actions of the hospital staff in force feeding the two protesters. Jesani and 
Pilgaokar suggested the following reasons why there was little reaction: 
“1) Some of us may be ignorant of the ethical requirement that we must 
respect the autonomy of such patients as regards choice of therapy, especially 
when they are competent to exercise such a choice. 
2) Some may feel that once a person is legally ‘arrested’, her/his rights as a 
patient are restricted. 
3) Many might be unwilling to allow a person’s health to deteriorate when 
‘simple therapy’ such as an infusion will restore fluid and electrolyte balance. 
4) There may be a feeling that when superiors ‘order’ subordinates to carry 
out actions that might contravene ethics, the onus shifts to the superiors”423 
Jesani and Pilgaokar regard the above reasons as being insufficient justification for 
force-feeding. They highlight the fact that the Tokyo Declaration (1975) of the World 
Medical Association states that: 
“Where a prisoner refuses nourishment and is considered by the physician as 
capable of forming an unimpaired and rational judgment concerning the 
                                                                                                                                            
421 [2000] 2 F.C.R 452.  
422 [1990] 2 A.C 1.  
423 Jesani A & Pilgaokar A (1993) Patient’s Autonomy: Throwing it to the Winds? ; Indian Journal of 
Medical Ethics; Aug-Oct Vol.1(1). Accessed on 18/01/2006; available online at 
http://www.issuesinmedicalethics.org/011mi006.html . 
  158   
consequences of such a voluntary refusal of nourishment, he or she shall not 
be fed artificially. The decision as to the capacity of the prisoner to form such 
a judgment should be confirmed by at least one other independent physician. 
The consequences of the refusal of nourishment shall be explained by the 
physician to the prisoner.”424 
Jesani and Pilgaokar also state that if the doctors in charge of the two protesters felt an 
ethical dilemma about force-feeding, the appropriate measure would have been to 
hand the case over to another doctor425. 
 
The treatment of the two protesters in Mumbai can be compared with the manner in 
which force-feeding cases are dealt with in England. In Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v Robb426, an adult prisoner began refusing all forms of nutrition. 
Upon medical examination, it was confirmed that Robb was of sound mind and 
understood entirely that the refusal of nutrition and hydration would result in his 
death. The Home Office subsequently sought a declaration stating that all relevant 
prison and medical staff should abide by Robb’s decision to fast, provided that he 
retained the capacity to continue it. The declaration was duly granted, with the court 
stating that an adult with capacity had the right to refuse food and water and that this 
right should not be eroded simply by virtue of the fact that the individual was a 
prisoner. His Lordship rejected the judgement in the case of Leigh v Gladstone427, 
which provided authority for the premise that it was the duty of the prison to 
safeguard the welfare of prisoners, even if this included force-feeding. Lord Thorpe 
stated that the judgement of Lord Keith of Kinkel in Airedale N.H.S Trust v Bland 
was more relevant for modern times. In the Bland case, Lord Keith stated that the 
principle of the sanctity of life did not compel a doctor to treat a patient contrary to 
his/her wishes, irrespective of whether refusal would lead to death. It was ultimately 
this authority which prevailed in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Robb. 
 
It is evident that the approach taken by the Mumbai police and the medical staff was 
in stark contrast to the approach taken in the English common law. Despite a 
complete lack of evidence to suggest that Medha Patkar and Devram Kanera were 
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425 Supra note 110.  
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incapable of refusing food, this decision was not respected in any way. Indeed, the 
fact that the refusal of food was in protest to what Patkar and Kanera perceived to be a 
social injustice, suggest strongly that the attempts to force-feed them were made not 
in order to safeguard the welfare of the protesters, but rather as a form of social 
control in order to avoid a difficult political situation. Jesani and Pilgaokar submitted 
that one of the reasons why the medical profession were silent on the protester’s 
treatment was that it was perhaps deemed acceptable for a patient’s rights to be 
restricted once they had been arrested428. If this is true, then it is stark contrast to the 
approach now followed in England, as evidenced by the judgement in Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v Robb. However, it may be premature to suggest that 
this difference could be attributed to cultural difference between England and India. 
As stated above, Lord Thorpe in Robb highlighted the fact that Lord Alverstone in 
Leigh v Gladstone held that the duty of prison officials to preserve the health of 
prisoners could extend to force-feeding. Leigh v Gladstone provides an interesting 
comparison to the case of the Mumbai protesters, in as much as the former case also 
concerned a protester, a suffragette, who had been force-fed in prison. It was held that 
force-feeding was acceptable, since fasting technically constituted  a suicide attempt 
which was illegal at that time. In India, attempts to commit suicide are still illegal 
under s.309 of the Indian Penal Code 1860. It is therefore apparent that the facts of 
Leigh v Gladstone bear some similarity with the Mumbai protesters case, albeit the 
former took place almost 100 years earlier, suggesting that the difference between 
England and India in this case are due to developmental, rather than cultural or 
ideological differences.  
 
Commentary has also been given in a number of articles regarding end-of-life issues. 
Adhikary and Raviraj comment on the status of the Do Not Resuscitate order in India, 
and highlight the fact that such issues are not recognised in the law as yet: 
“The Do Not Resuscitate order is still not documented legal practice in India. 
It is a verbal communication between the clinician and the patient’s relative 
or caregiver. The autonomy of the patient also remains a weak concept. Even 
the right to live a dignified life or die a dignified death has not been 
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extensively discussed. The law is silent or ambiguous on most issues related to 
end-of-life care.”429 
Adhikary and Raviraj also highlight one important aspect of proxy decision-making 
which provides a useful contrast to the U.K position: 
“When the patient is not in a position to give consent, the consent given or 
obtained in such circumstances is called proxy consent. Ideally the patient’s 
relative or caregiver gives proxy consent… Ideally, a person with the most 
accurate and intimate knowledge of the patient’s recent wishes and lifestyle 
should give proxy consent. He/she should have a maximum stake in the 
decision and should be responsible for the consequences… In developed 
countries people’s daily needs and medical care at the end of life are usually 
looked after by government agencies or insurance companies. This is not the 
case in India. Caregivers here may feel that the death of the person they care 
for will relieve them of a burden. This can lead to a conflict of interests 
arising from the treatment decision.”430 
 
Adhikary and Raviraj’s commentary highlights the fact that there are no mechanisms 
in place to govern the issue of decision-making on behalf of the incapable adult. The 
authors state that a family member or carer may fulfil this role; this contrasts sharply 
with the position in U.K capacity law, in which it is the doctor who makes healthcare 
decisions for the incapable adult, with the views of family members and carers being 
only providing information for the doctor when making a best interests or benefit 
determination431. The fact that the authors state that the proxy should “ideally” be one 
who has intimate knowledge of the individual shows further that there is no concrete 
guidance on the issue in either statute or common law. If such guidance did exist, 
Adhikary and Raviraj would have been able to definitively state what the position was 
as opposed to what an ideal scenario would be. In addition to this, commentary on 
end-of-life issues in India suggests that it will be sometime before the right of the 
individual to have life-sustaining treatment terminated is fully acknowledged: 
“There are several impediments to end-of-life practices in India: the 
approach of the physician is generally paternalistic, as the concept of patient 
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autonomy is weak in the prevailing cultural ethos… Self-determination of 
patients relating to medical decisions is not well articulated in our 
Constitution…”432 
The above statement by Mani et al suggests that culture is of relevance in the context 
of end-of-life issues. Reference is made to the paternalistic attitude of the physician. 
This attitude would ostensibly manifest itself via the physician’s refusal to terminate 
life-prolonging treatment. Rastogi highlights this in the context of how his dying 
mother was treated in an Indian hospital: “The attending physician said that he was 
obliged to keep her alive with machines even if this was against the family’s 
wishes…”433 Rastogi’s comment identifies a strongly paternalistic approach to 
medical treatment, which manifests itself through a desire to preserve life as far as is 
practicable. Although cultural attitudes may play a part in this approach, Jindal opines 
that the central problem is the lack of clear protocol for doctors to act upon, and that 
until such protocol is introduced, doctors are in essence bound to follow local cultural 
medical practices434. Furthermore, Indian law currently makes no provision for ways 
in which the individual can take control of what happens in the event of incapacity, 
such as advance statements or welfare powers of attorney. This means that there is 
realistically little that the patient can do to have their wishes and feelings heard, and 
thus have their autonomy respected. However, it is not beyond possibility that this 
situation may change. Although the law has yet to recognise the issues relating to 
treatment for incapable adults, journal articles have been published highlighting the 
practices of western medicine and how these should influence Indian guidance on the 
issue. Jagannadha Rao highlights the importance of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland upon 
end-of-life issues. Mamdani for example discusses the possible implications of the 
American cases of Karen Quinlan, Nancy Cruzan and Terry Schiavo, all of which 
concerned the termination of life-support for patients in a persistent vegetative state. 
Mamdani concludes by emphasising the importance of designating a health-care 
proxy and the need to respect the wishes of the patient: “When called upon to act as 
proxies, we must remember that it is the patient’s likely choice that we have to 
                                                 
432 Mani, R K et al (2005) Limiting Life-Prolonging Interventions and Providing Palliative Care 
Towards the End-of-life in Indian Intensive Care Units; Indian Journal of Critical Care Medicine; Vol. 
9(2), 96-107 at 97.  
433 Rastogi, A K (2005) End-of-life- Issues Neglected in India; Indian Journal of Medical Ethics; July-
Sept 2005(3), accessed on 9/01/2008; available online at http://www.ijme.in/133di03.html.  
434 Jindal, S K (2005) Issues in the Care of the Dying; Indian Journal of Medical Ethics; July-
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express, not our own wishes.”435 One could argue that advance decision-making on 
end-of-life issues may not be utilised even if provided for in Indian law. Deshpande, 
writing about the attitude of Hindus living in the United States of America towards 
end-of-life care, writes the following: 
“…there have been no published reports concerning the use of specific life-
sustaining or life-prolonging procedures in Hindu patients, and these issues 
are not covered in the scriptures. However, there have been a few small 
population-based studies examining the beliefs and use of advance directives 
and hospice are in Asian-Indian Hindu immigrants. These studies found that 
only approximately 9% of Hindus have advance directives, well below the 
national average of 15% to 20%. A familial decision-making tradition or 
strong beliefs in the importance of religion and rituals were negatively 
correlated with having an advance directive.”436 
Deshpande’s commentary highlights the potential importance of the principle of 
communitarianism in relation to advance decision-making, and suggests that the 
importance placed upon communal decision-making within Hindu families may 
negate the need for an advance directive; after all, the individual has a family to make 
decisions. It cannot of course be assumed that a strong belief in communal decision-
making and religious ritual will always equate to a lesser emphasis on advance 
directives; it is possible for example that an individual may not have strong ties to 
their families and in such a case, collaborative decision-making with family may not 
be of such importance. However, the individual may nevertheless place great 
importance upon religion and ritual, and may therefore want to express these wishes 
through advance directives. India currently has no legal recognition of advance 
directives, and it is submitted that whether they are used or not, mechanisms must be 
in place to allow the individual the option of taking control over medical decisions for 
a time when they may no longer have the capacity to do so. If it is necessary for 
decisions to be made on behalf of an incapable adult, India’s healthcare system has no 
protocol in place to govern who is permitted to make such decisions and who is not; 
all that has been ascertained from literature on the subject is that there is nothing to 
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stop family members from taking decisions on behalf of an incapable adult. However, 
even this has not been specified in law, which ultimately means that there is no 
consistency in approach. Whereas Adhikary and Raviraj refer to the family as 
decision-makers, Rastogi’s experience involving his mother suggested that the wishes 
of the family were subordinate to the doctor’s duty to keep patients alive whatever the 
cost. It is difficult to tell which the correct approach is. What this means, in the 
context of the best interests of the individual, is that there are no real safeguards in 
place to ensure that those who are making decisions on behalf of the incapable adult 
are considering the best interests of the patient, and also whether they are acting in 
accordance with their wishes and feelings.  
 
Ultimately no system is perfect, but it is submitted that the best way to safeguard the 
best interests of the individual whilst considering their wishes, feelings, beliefs and 
values is to follow the route taken by the English and Scottish legislations, where the 
wishes and feelings of the individual must be considered by the healthcare 
professional wherever practicable, followed by the views of anybody named by the 
individual or those closely connected to them. However, the views of others must 
merely be considered by the healthcare professional making the decision; this is 
distinguishable from a scenario where others named or connected to the individual, 
such as family members, actually make the final decision as to what is in an 
individual’s best interests, which is not permitted under U.K capacity law. In 
specifying the healthcare professional as the one who is permitted to make 
determinations on what is in the best interests or to the benefit of the individual, there 
is less chance of a decision being made for less than genuine motives. It should also 
be noted however, that in the context of a communitarian approach to decision-
making, an individual choosing specifically to defer future treatment decisions to 
family members is no less of an autonomous decision than if the individual made the 
decision entirely by themselves. If evidence can be ascertained that part of an 
individual’s value system includes deferring to or collaborating with family members 
for important decisions, this could be used as evidence of the past wishes, feelings, 
beliefs or values of the individual437. Therefore, if Indian capacity develops to the 
extent that the individual’s right to take control of treatment decisions is recognised to 
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a greater extent, there is no reason why a communitarian approach to decision-making 
should not continue to be viable. The crux of the matter, it is submitted, is to increase 
awareness amongst health professionals that the wishes, feelings, beliefs and values of 
the individual need to be ascertained wherever practicable, and not simply assumed 
on the basis of local cultural practice or the word of others. The fact that articles have 
been published highlighting these issues using Western practices as a guide, suggests 
that there is a possibility of this awareness increasing in future.  
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CHAPTER 5: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN ENGLISH, SCOTTISH 
AND INDIAN CAPACITY LAW 
 
5.1: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE UNDER THE MENTAL CAPACITY ACT 2005 
 
As stated in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the primary purpose of procedural justice is to 
ensure, as far as is practicable, that the substantive principles which underpin the law 
are adhered to and protected. To this end, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 contains a set 
of procedural mechanisms which are designed to safeguard the interests of the 
incapable adult.  
 
The starting point for any discussion on procedural justice begins with section 5 of the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005, which provides for a general authority to treat. The section 
relates to acts which are carried out in connection with care or treatment and reads as 
follows: 
“(1) If a person (D) does an act in connection with the care or treatment of 
another person (P), the act is done to which this section applies if –  
(a) before doing the act, D takes reasonable steps to establish whether P lacks 
capacity in relation to the matter in question, and 
(b) when doing the act, D reasonable believes –  
(i) that P lacks capacity in relation to the matter, and  
(ii) that it will be in P’s best interests for the act to be done.  
(2) D does not incur any liability in relation to the act that he would not 
have incurred if P – 
(a) had had the capacity to consent in relation to the matter, and 
(b) had consented to D’s doing the act.” 
 
The Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice 2007 states that the purpose of section 5 is 
to protect family and carers from liability for actions which may otherwise be classed 
as civil wrongs or crimes. In allowing this, “the Act allows necessary caring acts or 
treatment to take place as if a person who lacks capacity to consent had 
consented to them.”438 Peter Bartlett commends the decision to include a general 
authority to treat within the legislation, stating that it has considerable advantages: “It 
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is designed to apply to all and only those decisions the client is unable to make 
himself or herself, thus addressing the issue of least restrictive alternative and 
the consequent variations in difficulty and category of decision.”439 However, Phil 
Fennell highlights the fact that under the pro-autonomy ethos of the legislation, the 
general authority to treat can be overridden when the proposed treatment is contrary 
to a valid anticipatory refusal, a refusal of consent by a person with the authority to do 
so, or prohibition via judicial forum440. Consequently there are a number of 
mechanisms in place to allow the individual to control what may happen to them in 
the event of the onset of incapacity. This is integral to the pro-autonomy ethos of the 
legislation inasmuch as the mechanisms which are in place allow the wishes and 
choices of the individual to be prioritised and carried out even when he/she is no 
longer capable of making decisions. 
 
Under sections 24 to 26, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 allows an individual to refuse 
in advance specified medical treatment for a time in the future when they may no 
longer have the capacity to make a treatment decision441. The terms of the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 only permits treatment to be refused in advance; the Act cannot be 
used to insist upon a specific form of treatment that the individual feels is in their best 
interests442. If the advance refusal of treatment is valid, it will have the same effect as 
a decision made by a person with capacity443. Under the terms of the Act, an advance 
decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment will be applicable only if it is in writing 
and is signed by the individual or by someone else in the presence of the individual at 
his/her behest444. In keeping with the pro-autonomy ethos of the Act, an advance 
refusal can be withdrawn or altered at any time by the individual provided that he/she 
has the capacity to do so, and this need not be in writing.445 It will no longer be valid 
under the following circumstances: If the individual has withdrawn the decision when 
he/she was capable; if the individual has created a lasting power of attorney 
subsequent to making the advance refusal and conferred authority upon the donee to 
                                                 
439Bartlett, P (1997) The Consequences of Incapacity; 4 Web JCLI; accessed online on 19/03/2005; 
available at http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1997/issue4/bartle4.html.  
440 Fennell, P (1994) Statutory Authority to Treat, Relatives and Treatment Proxies; Medical Law 
Review; Vol. 2, 30-56 at 45.  
441 Mental Capacity Act 2005 s. 24(1). 
442 See R (On the Application of Burke) v General Medical Council [2005] E.W.C.A Civ 1003. 
443 Ibid at s.26(1).   
444 Ibid at s.25(6).  
445 Ibid at s.24(4-5).  
  167   
give or refuse consent to the treatment specified in the advance statement; or if the 
individual has done anything else which is clearly inconsistent with the advance 
decision remaining his fixed decision.446 An advance refusal will not be applicable if: 
the treatment in question is not the treatment which is specified in the refusal; the 
circumstances specified in the advance decision are absent; or if there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that circumstances exist which the individual had not 
anticipated at the time of making the advance decision and which would have affected 
the decision had they been anticipated447. 
 
In terms of the essential principles which underpin the procedural mechanisms 
contained in the Act, advance decisions to refuse treatment are entirely in keeping 
with the principle of participation. It will be recalled that this principle requires that 
the individual should be able to participate in any proceedings relating to them as far 
as is practicable. In this case, advance decisions in essence enable the individual to 
participate in all areas relating to specific medical treatment even when the individual 
no longer has the capacity to make such decisions directly. In this way, the procedural 
principle of participation is being utilised to promote the substantive principle of 
autonomy, by ensuring that even when capacity is no longer present, the wishes of the 
individual are paramount above those of the family or carer. The need to specify the 
details of any treatment to be refused also helps to satisfy the procedural principle of 
accuracy. If the exact terms of the individual’s refusal of treatment is specified 
precisely, there is no chance of the wishes and feelings of the individual being 
misunderstood and not being adhered to accurately.  
 
As an alternative to making an advance decision to refuse treatment, the individual 
may also ensure control over future events by making a Lasting Power of Attorney 
(L.P.A). L.P.As may be set up in order to oversee issues relating to health and 
personal welfare or property and affairs448. All L.P.As must be registered with the 
Public Guardian who is responsible for making sure that they comply fully with the 
provisions of the Mental Capacity Act 2005449.  The attorney must carry out their 
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duties whilst always following the statutory principles contained in s.1 of the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005. In keeping with the pro-autonomy ethos, the individual may select 
anybody they wish to act as a donee for the L.P.A, but must name a specific 
individual rather than a job title450. Under s.10(4) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, 
two or more attorneys may be appointed and the donor may decide whether they 
should act jointly or independently of each other. The scope of the attorney’s powers 
is ultimately at the discretion of the donor. As the Code of Practice explains, “the 
standard form for personal welfare L.P.As allows attorneys to make decisions 
about anything that relates to the donor’s personal welfare. But donors can add 
restrictions or conditions to areas where they would not wish the attorney to 
have power to act.”451 The attorney must be sure that the donor does in fact lack the 
capacity to make relevant decisions, and only then will the L.P.A be valid and the 
attorney permitted to discharge his/her duties452. In addition, an L.P.A will never 
override an advance decision unless the L.P.A has been made last453, nor can the 
attorney make any decision relating to life-saving treatment unless the donor has 
specifically authorised this in the L.P.A document454.  
 
The provisions relating to Lasting Powers of Attorney are entirely in keeping with the 
theme of empowerment and autonomy which is prevalent throughout the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005. The ultimate objective of the attorney is to act as an agent for the 
donor, and as a result, the donor is entitled to specify precisely which areas the 
attorney is and is not permitted to make decisions upon. Whilst providing the donor 
with full autonomy, the provisions contained in the Act also take into account fully 
the need to safeguard the best interests of the individual against any potentially 
conflicting interests, which is why the attorney is not permitted to make any decisions 
on life-saving treatment without express permission from the donor. As with the 
provisions relating to advance refusal of treatment, the provisions relating to L.P.As 
also endorse the principle of participation by virtue of the fact that the individual is 
provided with the opportunity to have all his/her wishes and feelings adhered to 
through the construction of the L.P.A document. In addition, the principle of accuracy 
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would also be satisfied because, as with advance refusals of treatment, the individual 
must specify in great detail precisely what the attorney is entitled to do or not do on 
behalf of the individual. If this is done correctly, there is little chance of the wishes of 
the individual being incorrectly carried out.  
 
Despite the existence of provisions to create an advance refusal of treatment and a 
Lasting Power of Attorney, disputes may still arise concerning issues dealt with by the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005. In such cases, it may be necessary to apply to the Court of 
Protection.  
The Court of Protection in its pre-2005 Act form was established under s.94(2) of the 
Mental Health Act 1983. This incarnation was not a court as such, but an 
administrative body which dealt with matters of property and finance on behalf of 
incapable adults. This incarnation of the Court of Protection has now been abolished 
under the Mental Capacity Act 2005455. In accordance with s.47(1) of the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005, the new Court of Protection has the same powers, right, privileges 
and authority as the High Court, which retains its inherent jurisdiction to make 
declarations on issues of medical treatment when there is a serious justiciable issue456. 
The Court of Protection thus also has the power to make declarations on specific 
issues including the capacity of an individual and the lawfulness of any act done in 
furtherance of the individual’s best interests457. Gunn makes the point that the power 
of the Court of Protection to make declarations on an individual’s capacity achieves 
compliance with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights458.  In 
addition, issues involving serious healthcare and treatment decisions must be brought 
before the Court of Protection without exception. Such decisions will predominantly 
relate to: the proposed withholding of artificial nutrition and hydration from patients 
in a permanent vegetative state459; organ or bone marrow donation460; non-therapeutic 
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sterilisation of an incapable adult461 and any other cases where there is dispute about 
whether a particular course of treatment is in the individual’s best interests462. This 
mirrors the position on declarations prior to the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The 2006 
Practice Note by the Official Solicitor on declaratory proceedings states that court 
applications must be made wherever the proposed treatment relates to: withdrawal of 
artificial nutrition and hydration for patients in permanent vegetative state; the 
sterilisation for contraceptive purposes of a person who cannot consent; and certain 
termination of pregnancy cases463.  
 
Whenever the central issue before the court is serious medical treatment, the body 
responsible for the treatment i.e. the N.H.S, must instruct an Independent Mental 
Capacity Advocate (I.M.C.A) to support and represent the individual provided that 
there is no-one else available to fulfil this role. According to rule 4 of the I.M.C.A 
Rules 2006, an I.M.C.A must be appointed where the treatment in question: involves 
a fine balance between benefits and risks to the patient; a fine balance as to which 
from an available choice is to be used or where the proposed treatment would be 
likely to have serious consequences for the patient. Section 36 of the 2005 Act details 
the functions of an I.M.C.A, who will be expected to fulfil the following duties:  
- provide support to the incapable adult in order that he/she may be able to fully 
participate in the decision-making process as much as is practicable; 
- obtain and evaluate all relevant information; 
- ascertain what the individual’s wishes, beliefs and values would be likely to 
be, and how these might influence a decision; 
- ascertain any alternative courses of action available to the individual; 
- obtain further medical opinion where treatment is proposed and the advocate 
believes that one should be obtained.  
As the name suggests, Independent Mental Capacity Advocates are entirely 
independent, and are available for appointment when there is no other representative 
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available for consultation464. Their presence in theory satisfies a number of important 
principles both substantive and procedural. First, the fact that I.M.C.As are an 
available option to help the individual participate in the decision-making process in 
the absence of any other representative is essential to upholding the principle of 
autonomy. In addition, the principle of non-discrimination would be satisfied as 
I.M.C.As would ensure that the individual would be able to have his/her interests 
taken care of in the same way that a capable adult would. In terms of procedural 
principles, I.M.C.As would help to satisfy the principles of participation in as much as 
the individual would be provided with impartial help in communicating their needs, 
and would thus be able to directly participate in any dispute resolution.  
 
Whenever possible, the Court of Protection is expected to resolve disputes on its own. 
In the event that this is difficult however, further safeguards have been put in place to 
ensure that the best interests of the individual are safeguarded at all times. Under s.16 
of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, a deputy may be appointed to help the incapable 
adult make decisions on personal welfare or property matters. Section 17 details the 
powers of the deputy in relation to personal welfare; these powers include giving or 
refusing consent to the carrying out or continuation of treatment by a healthcare 
provider and giving directions that a particular person responsible for the individual’s 
healthcare should be replaced465. The Court of Protection has the power to appoint a 
deputy if there is the need for an ongoing process of decision-making powers and a 
Lasting Power of Attorney has not been set up. An additional safeguard for the 
supervision of deputies comes in the form of the Public Guardian, which derives the 
power to supervise deputies from s.57 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Given that it 
is the Court of Protection, rather than the incapable adult who selects the deputy, the 
presence of the Public Guardian is extremely important to ensure that the deputy 
appointed is appropriate and that they do not misuse their position466. Dhanda 
criticises the manner in which deputies are subject to supervision, stating that rather 
than foster an ethos of trust, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 “legislates for conflict 
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and suspicion.”467 It is submitted however, that this is not the case. The fact remains 
that incapable adults are potentially vulnerable and need to be safeguarded as well as 
empowered. As stated above, deputies, when necessary, are appointed by the Court of 
Protection and the incapable adult has no say in who is appointed to this position. It is 
therefore essential that court-appointed deputies are adequately supervised as they 
lack the endorsement of the incapable adult themselves. According to the Code of 
Practice, deputies will only be necessary in extremely difficult cases where the court’s 
authority is essential and there is no other way of resolving a particular issue in 
relation to the individual’s best interests468. Section 20 of the Act highlights some 
restrictions on the powers of a deputy.  The most important of these is to be found in 
s.20(1): “A deputy does not have power to make a decision on behalf of P [the 
incapable adult] in relation to a matter if he knows or has reasonable grounds 
for believing that P has capacity in relation to the matter.” This is perhaps an 
obvious inclusion given the continuous emphasis that has been placed upon the 
autonomy of the individual being paramount, but it is nevertheless important that it 
has been mentioned in relation to the powers of a deputy. It must be made clear that 
the appointment of a deputy does not mean that the capacity of an individual should 
not be assessed regularly in order to ascertain whether his/her capacity has returned, 
since in the event of this, the individual would no longer require any formal help in 
making decisions. In essence, s.20(1) is a restatement of the functional approach to 
capacity which had been endorsed and applied from the early stages of the Act’s 
consultation process.  
 
In order to apply to the Court of Protection, permission must first be sought. 
However, s.50(1) of the Mental Capacity Act and rule 51 of the Court of Protection 
Rules 2007 provide a list of persons who do not require permission to apply to the 
Court. These are: the person who lacks or is alleged to lack capacity; anybody with 
parental responsibility for the individual should he/she be under the age of 18; the 
donor or donee of a Lasting Power of Attorney to which the application relates; a 
person named in an existing order of the court, if the application relates to the order; 
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the Official Solicitor and the Public Guardian469. This means that any other persons 
who have an interest in the individual will require permission to apply, i.e. family 
members who are not attorneys or named in an existing order of the court, but who 
still have an active interest in the welfare of the individual. The purpose of the 
permission requirement is ultimately to safeguard the welfare and best interests of the 
individual. According to the Code of Practice, the Court of Protection must consider 
the following criteria when deciding whether to give permission for an application: 
“The applicant’s connection to the person the application is about; the reasons 
for the application; whether a proposed order or direction of the court will 
benefit the person the application is about, and whether it is possible to get that 
benefit another way.”470 This protects the individual against any other party who 
may wish to promote their own interests rather than the best interests of the 
individual.  
 
Section 50 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 plays an important role in upholding the 
ethos of the Mental Capacity Act. It is essential to a pro-autonomy, non-
discriminatory approach that the incapable adult does not require permission to apply 
to the court, because having in place a complicated applications process is likely to 
discourage individuals from seeking help from the Court of Protection, which would 
entirely defeat the purpose of the Court. In addition, encouraging the incapable adult 
to apply to the Court by making the process easier is likely to better satisfy the 
principle of participation, which stipulates that the individual must have the 
opportunity to be present and participate in any proceedings relating to them. This is 
less likely to happen if the individual is required to jump through a number of 
procedural hoops. Furthermore, allowing the incapable individual to apply to the 
Court of Protection without permission will help to satisfy the provisions of Principle 
13 of the Council of Europe’s Recommendation (99)4, which highlights the right of 
the individual to be heard in person. If it is not practical for the incapable adult to 
make an application to the Court of Protection, s.50(1) allows for persons representing 
the individual, such as parents or guardians and Lasting Powers of Attorney. This is 
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also important as it represents a pragmatic approach; the incapable adult may be 
entirely unable to make applications to the Court of Protection, in which case it is 
correct that their interests should be represented by a third party for whom the 
applications process should be as straight-forward as it would have been for the 
incapable adult themselves. The provisions of s.50 should also ensure compliance 
with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which states that 
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable amount of time. 
The chances of this happening increase if the individual is able to apply to the Court 
of Protection without first having to ask permission.  
 
The new Court of Protection is a superior court of record and is able to establish 
judicial precedent471. However, it is intended to be accessed as an option of last resort.  
The Department of Constitutional Affairs stated that any application made to the 
Court of Protection should be resolved as smoothly and as expeditiously as 
possible472. In order to achieve this, the Draft Court of Protection Rules 2006 made 
extensive reference to pre-action protocols, which were designed to specify the action 
that must be taken prior to the making of an application to the Court of Protection. In 
addition, it had been envisaged that the presence of pre-action protocols would 
encourage co-operation between the parties and promote an early exchange of 
information that would ideally resolve any disputes without having to apply to the 
Court of Protection473. Despite a positive response during the consultation process474, 
the final Court of Protection Rules 2007 contain no reference to pre-action protocols. 
This is a surprising omission. It is submitted that the presence of pre-action protocols 
would have greatly helped the provisions relating to the Court of Protection to satisfy 
the principle of conciliation, which requires any proceedings to be less adversarial 
when the parties involved do not necessarily have competing interests475. Including 
pre-action protocols in the final Court of Protection Rules would have helped to 
emphasise dispute resolution through compromise and ensuring that all parties, 
including the incapable adult, were given opportunity to have opinions and feelings 
                                                 
471 Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice 2007 at Para 8.1.  
472 Department of Constitutional Affairs (17/07/2006) Draft Court Rules: Mental Capacity Act 2005 
Court of Protection Rules Consultation Paper at Para 4.2.  
473 Draft Court of Protection Rules 2006, Draft Rule 12.  
474 Department of Constitutional Affairs (17/07/2006) Draft Court Rules: Mental Capacity Act 2005 
Court of Protection Rules – Response to Consultation at 8.  
475 See Chapter 2.2.3 of this thesis.  
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heard. It is submitted that encouraging individuals to deal with issues in such a 
manner would also help to uphold the substantive principle of non-discrimination, 
inasmuch as the individuals who may find it difficult to go through the process of 
applying to the Court of Protection would not be made to feel uncomfortable or 
stigmatised because of the difficulties that may be faced in making an application to 
the Court of Protection. The Court of Protection emphasises that it is best for those in 
dispute to utilise less formal methods of dispute resolution, such as mediations, before 
applying to the Court of Protection476. Discouraging individuals from applying 
directly to the Court of Protection is a salient suggestion, since otherwise, there is a 
risk of the Court being over-burdened with applications. As well as the potential for 
increased costs, such a scenario carries with it the risk of challenge under Article 6 of 
the E.C.H.R on the grounds of the court being inaccessible within a reasonable time. 
Whether this happens currently remains to be seen given that the Mental Capacity Act 
has been in force for only fifteen months at the time of writing, but it is submitted that 
the decision to drop pre-action protocols from the Court of Protection Rules is 
confusing given the awareness shown during the consultation process of their 
potential benefits.  
 
5.2: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE UNDER THE ADULTS WITH INCAPACITY 
(SCOTLAND) ACT 2000 
 
As with the Mental Capacity Act 2005, the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 
2000 has in place a number of procedural mechanisms which are designed to 
safeguard the welfare of the incapable adult. In addition, mechanisms are in place 
which allow the incapable adult to control what may happen in relation to medical 
treatment once he/she is no longer capable of making such decision directly.  
 
Section 47 of the 2000 Act provides a general authority to treat patients who are 
incapable of making a decision on the proposed treatment. It provides details on the 
procedure which must be followed by those responsible for the administration of 
medical treatment upon an incapable adult. Section 47(2) outlines this authority: 
                                                 
476 Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice 2007 at Para 15.7.  
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“Without prejudice to any authority conferred by any other enactment or 
rule of law, and subject to sections 49 and 50 and to the following provisions 
of this section, the medical practitioner primarily responsible for the medical 
treatment of the adult shall have, during the period specified in the 
certificate, authority to do what is reasonable in the circumstances, in 
relation to the medical treatment, to safeguard or promote the physical or 
mental health of the adult.” 
Certain forms of treatment have been excluded from this general authority to treat. 
These are specified in Schedule 1 of the Specified Medical Treatment Regulations 
2002 as being: neurosurgery for mental disorder; sterilisation where there is no 
serious malfunction or disease of the reproductive organs and surgical implantation of 
hormones for reducing sex drive. In order for these treatments to be carried out, 
permission will always be required from the Court of Session, a stipulation which is 
comparable to the position under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 where permission will 
be required from the Court of Protection for issues regarding any serious medical 
treatment477.  
 
In order to ensure further that a finding of incapacity is genuine, a certificate of 
incapacity must be completed by the responsible medical practitioner. This duty is 
laid down in s.47(5) of the 2000 Act: 
“A certificate for the purposes of subsection (1) shall be in the prescribed 
form and shall specify the period during which the authority conferred by 
subsection (2) shall subsist, being a period which –  
(a) the medical practitioner primarily responsible for the medical treatment 
of the adult considers appropriate to the condition or circumstances of the 
adult; but 
(b) does not exceed one year from the date of the examination on which the 
certificate is based.478” 
 
                                                 
477 Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice 2007 at Para 8.18. 
478 With respect to this provision, the Adults with Incapacity (Conditions and Circumstances 
Applicable to Three Year Medical Treatment Certificates) (Scotland) Regulations 2007 allow for a 
certificate to be made out for three years if the incapable adult suffers with severe or profound learning 
disability, but only if the condition is unlikely to improve.  
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When completing the certificate, any proposed treatment must adhere to the general 
principles of the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000. In addition, the relevant 
medical practitioner must be satisfied that the individual lacks capacity in relation to a 
decision regarding the treatment in question.479 This is clear endorsement of a 
functional approach to capacity, as evidenced by reference to the treatment in 
question, rather than ability to make treatment decisions in general. This mirrors the 
approach taken in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Section 47 certificates are useful for 
ensuring that an assessment of capacity is made thoroughly. It also potentially 
removes any possible ambiguity over a decision made by a particular doctor. In 
addition, the presence of a specific time limit allows for the individual’s capacity to 
be reassessed after a time, ensuring that their autonomy is not interfered with for any 
longer than is absolutely necessary. This also helps to uphold the procedural principle 
of accuracy by ensuring that an individual is not erroneously deprived of their 
fundamental right to decision-making when they have since regained the capacity to 
make treatment decisions themselves.  
 
In the context of procedural justice, certificates issued under s.47(5) are important as 
they serve as concrete evidence that the doctors in charge are permitted to make 
treatment decisions on behalf of the individual. Formal proxy decision-making should 
only be triggered in the event of the individual’s incapacity. Therefore, s.47(5) 
certificates are in keeping with Principle 12 of Recommendation (99)4 by the Council 
of Europe, which states that appropriate procedures must be in place to facilitate the 
investigation and assessment of the individual’s personal faculties. This has been 
accounted for in s.47(5) via the stipulation that any certificate issued must be of a 
limited duration. This is order to ensure that an individual suffering from temporary 
incapacity is not subject to proxy decision-making any longer than is necessary. This 
is also in line with Principle 14 of Recommendation (99)4, which stipulates that all 
measures of protection must be of a limited duration and reviewed to take account of 
any change in circumstances.  
 
Although incapacity certificates clearly have their advantages, they could also be 
considered impractical if overused. It is submitted that incapacity certificates are more 
                                                 
479 Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 Code of Practice for Part 5 at Para 2.17. 
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useful when dealing with borderline or fluctuating capacity cases. An individual may 
for instance lack capacity in a specific area of life which may be pertinent to a 
particular requirement for treatment. In such cases, a certificate detailing the exact 
nature of incapacity could be considered necessary. However, one could argue that a 
certificate would be surplus to requirements when an individual’s incapacity is so 
pronounced as to be beyond doubt. The Code of Practice suggests that certificates 
may not be necessary when treatment is required for multiple ailments, but would 
almost certainly be needed when just a single course of treatment is required: 
“It would be unreasonable and impractical to issue a certificate of incapacity 
for every healthcare intervention in some people… On the other hand, a 
single certificate of incapacity is entirely appropriate when a person requires 
a single procedure e.g. an operation. The Act specifies, under s.47(2), that 
‘the medical practitioner primarily responsible for the medical treatment of 
the adult shall have… authority to do what is reasonable in the 
circumstances, in relation to the medical treatment, to safeguard or promote 
the physical or mental health of the adult’. This could cover not only the 
operation but also post-operative medical care and pain relief. It is therefore 
clear that the certificate of incapacity, as designed, will provide an effective 
and workable means for managing single healthcare interventions, but 
requires careful completion for a person who needs multiple 
interventions.”480 
The Code of Practice makes a salient point regarding the practicalities of issuing 
certificates for multiple ailments. In such a case, it is possible that the certificate will 
become more complicated to fill in, which in turn could lead to mistakes being made, 
effectively voiding the certificate because of a failure to follow procedure correctly. 
One possible solution might be to allow the completion of one certificate for a 
condition such as dementia, which then permits the doctors to make interventions for 
any subsequent ailments relating to the main condition which the individual is not 
capable of making decisions over. In the case of dementia for example, the certificate 
could be made to cover healthcare decisions relating to feeding if the individual is no 
longer able to do this themselves. This in itself is not an ideal solution, since in the 
case of an individual who has a large number of problems, complications may still 
                                                 
480 Ibid at Para 2.18. 
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arise over whether a particular issue is directly attributable to the main condition. 
However, if one wishes to formalise the need for proxy-decision making in such a 
manner, there may be no other solution that does not contain disadvantages. 
Completing a s.47 certificate is the way in which the general authority to treat may be 
accessed. However, under s.47(7), the general authority does not authorise the use of 
any force or detention unless absolutely necessary, nor does it authorise the admission 
to hospital for mental disorder against the will of the individual. In this way, s.47(7) 
upholds the principles of least restrictive alternative and autonomy.  In keeping with 
the pro-autonomy ethos, the general authority to treat may be disapplied if the 
individual has a proxy-decision maker in place to aid in the decision-making 
process481. In order that the individual may exercise control over welfare issues, 
including medical treatment, following the onset of incapacity, the 2000 Act allows 
for the creation of a Welfare Power of Attorney (W.P.A). The creation of a Welfare 
Power of Attorney is authorised under s.16 of the 2000 Act and may only be exercised 
once the granter has become incapable in relations to matters specified in the 
document482. To ensure complete clarity, the Welfare Power of Attorney document 
must be in writing, signed by the granter and include a certificate by a solicitor or 
another member of a prescribed class which confirms that the granter has been 
interviewed prior to the document being signed and that he/she understands the nature 
and extent of it without having been unduly influenced483. As a further safeguard, the 
document must be registered with the Public Guardian under s.19 of the 2000 Act. 
The Code of Practice states that the attorney, once appointed, must apply the general 
principles contained in the 2000 Act i.e. ensure that all interventions benefit the 
individual utilising the least restrictive alternative whilst taking account of the wishes 
and feelings of the individual and relevant others. In addition to this, s.1(5) of the 
Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 states that any Welfare Power of Attorney 
must encourage the individual to exercise whatever skills might be present relating to 
relevant issues. This is a clear endorsement of the substantive principle of autonomy 
and the procedural principle of participation, which states that the individual must be 
able to participate in proceedings relating to him/herself as much as is practicable.  
                                                 
481 Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, s.50(2).  
482 Ibid at s.16(5)(b). See also Code of Practice for Continuing and Welfare Powers of Attorney 2002 at 
Para 3.1.  
483 Ibid at s.16(3)(b). See also Code of Practice for Continuing and Welfare Powers of Attorney 2002 at 
Para 3.4.  
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It is clear that the ability to create a welfare power of attorney is important in the 
context of the pro-autonomy ethos of the Act. The ability to create a Lasting Power of 
Attorney under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 is comparable to this mechanism. In the 
light of this, it worth mentioning briefly the position of the Act with regards to 
advance statements. The Draft Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Bill 1995 had 
originally made provision for the inclusion of advance statements which would allow 
either consent or refusal of treatment in advance484 (this is in contrast to the position 
of advance statements in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which relate only to advance 
refusals of treatment). Advance statements were deemed to be in keeping with respect 
for patient autonomy inasmuch as they would allow an incapable adult to have their 
wishes on treatment carried out in the same way as that of a capable patient.485 In the 
light of this, advance statements were ultimately excluded from the Adults with 
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000. No significant reason given for this at any time 
during the Parliamentary debate stages, although Patrick suggests that there was 
dispute over whether advance statements should be persuasive or legally binding486. 
Given that the 2000 Act makes clear an absolute obligation to consider the past and 
present wishes and feelings of the individual, this exclusion is baffling. What renders 
the scenario regarding advance statements yet more confusing is the fact that they 
would eventually gain statutory recognition in the Mental Health (Care and 
Treatment) Scotland Act 2003487. This suggests that the advance statements were 
excluded from the 2000 Act either by design or by mistake, although the former 
reason can effectively be discounted on the grounds that an intention to introduce 
advance statements into legislation at a later stage would more than likely have been 
expressed during the Parliamentary debates stage for the Mental Health (Care and 
Treatment) Scotland Act488. As a result, one can only conclude that the failure to 
include advance statements in the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 
represents a missed opportunity for legislators to further respect the wishes and 
                                                 
484 See Draft Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Bill 1995 at Clause 40.  
485 Scottish Law Commission Report No. 151 (1995) Report on Incapable Adults at Para 5.41.  
486 Patrick, H (2000) Reviewing Scottish Mental Health Law: Any Lessons for England and Wales? 
Journal of Mental Health Law; December 2000; 147-156 at 155.  
487 Mental Health (Care and Treatment) Scotland Act 2003, s.275-276. 
488 Indeed, Scott Barrie stated during Stage 1 of the debates that an opportunity had been missed with 
regards to advance statements being included within the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000.  
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feelings of the individual. Given that this is one of the cornerstone criteria of the 2000 
Act, the exclusion of advance statements from the legislation is hard to defend.  
 
The powers of the Sheriff and the Sheriff court were set up via s.3 of the Adults with 
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000. The purpose of the Sheriff court is to hear 
applications relating to guardianship and intervention orders. The court also retains a 
supervisory role with regards to certain issues relating to adult incapacity. Sections 
3(1) – (3) outline the powers of the Sheriff and read as follows: 
“(1) In an application or any other proceedings under this Act, the Sheriff 
may make such consequential or ancillary order, provision or direction as he 
considers appropriate. 
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) or to any other 
powers conferred by this Act, the Sheriff may –  
a) make any order granted by him subject to such conditions and restrictions 
as appear to him to be appropriate; 
b) order that any reports relating to the person who is the subject of the 
application or proceedings be lodged with the court or that the person be 
assessed or interviewed and that a report of such assessment or interview be 
lodged; 
c) make such further inquiry or call for such further information as appears 
to him to be appropriate; 
d) make such interim order as appears to him to be appropriate pending the 
disposal of the application or proceedings. 
(3) On an application by any person (including the adult himself) claiming an 
interest in the property, financial affairs or personal welfare of an adult, the 
Sheriff may give such directions to any person exercising –  
a) functions conferred by this Act; or 
b) functions of a like nature conferred by the law of any country.” 
 
As can be seen, the powers of the Sheriff are relatively exhaustive. He/she has the 
authority to “make any order or direction he/she considers necessary when 
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considering an application or hearing other proceedings under the Adults with 
Incapacity Act.”489 
 
In their 1991 Discussion Paper, the Scottish Law Commission discussed the issue of 
which decision-making body would be most appropriate for making decisions relating 
to mental incapacity. Part of the discussions involved the issue of whether a tribunal 
system should be utilised for this purpose. The Scottish Law Commission stated that a 
tribunal system had its advantages, in as much as tribunals themselves were informal 
and less adversarial than the more traditional court system. Furthermore: 
“Informality in conducting proceedings and in the atmosphere and layout of 
the places where hearings take place is very important if people other than 
lawyers are to participate in the proceedings. Party litigants feel more at ease 
with tribunals and hearings than with courts. The surroundings and 
procedures ought not to be unwelcoming and unintelligible.”490 
However, the Scottish Law Commission ultimately decided that the most appropriate 
body to handle issues of incapacity would be the Sheriff Court. The Commission 
stated that despite the undoubted advantages of the tribunal system, there were also 
flaws which could not be ignored: 
“Tribunals however, have disadvantages. Using professionals as tribunal 
members could blur the distinction between professional assessments or 
opinions and judicial or quasi-judicial decision making. Moreover, members 
of one profession may dominate the others who lack the expertise to question 
their opinions or assessments. The volume of mental disability cases would 
make the job a part-time one. It may prove difficult to get and train suitable 
members.”491  
The Commission’s rejection of the tribunal system was interesting inasmuch as the 
system might be better suited characteristically to dealing with issues of capacity. 
First, a tribunal system, as stated above, is less adversarial and more informal in 
nature. This would theoretically be a more effective system for promoting the 
principle of conciliation, which requires proceedings to be conducted in a manner 
which promotes and emphasises compromise. This is better for the incapable 
                                                 
489 Patrick, H (2006) Mental Health, Incapacity and the Law in Scotland; Tottel Publishing West 
Sussex and Edinburgh at Para 24.19. 
490 Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No. 94 (1991) at Para 6.5. 
491 Ibid at Para 6.6. 
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individual at the centre of proceedings, who may feel unduly pressured by formal 
proceedings in which the individual’s condition will be focused on heavily. A tribunal 
system can be classified as being more inquisitorial and conciliatory, rather than 
adversarial. Rather than have each side arguing its case and then being cross-
examined by the opposition, a tribunal system allows for the tribunal itself to question 
both parties in order to establish the relevant facts of the proceedings. This is 
considerably more appropriate for cases relating to capacity, as the notion of there 
being two opposing sides does not apply as such. Both sides are likely to be arguing 
for the same thing; the welfare of the incapable adult. The conflict more than likely 
will arise from disagreement as to how to promote the welfare of the individual.  
 
Hilary Patrick highlights the fact that although a tribunal system places greater 
emphasis upon an inquisitorial process, the nature of procedural justice dictates the 
need for some elements of an adversarial system to be present492. This is in order to 
ensure that a fair hearing takes place. A mental health tribunal system is utilised in 
Scotland under s.18 of the Mental Health (Care and Treatment)(Scotland) Act 2003, 
which does not deal with any issues of capacity, but is nonetheless useful as a point of 
comparison here. The rules for the Tribunal are provided for in the Mental Health 
Tribunal for Scotland (Practice and Procedure) Rules 2005. Rule 63(3) highlights the 
fact that the system still retains an adversarial flavour: 
“The relevant persons shall be entitled to give evidence, to call witnesses, to 
question any witness and to address the Tribunal both on the evidence and 
generally on the subject matter of the case.” 
As can be seen, this procedure is very much in keeping with a traditional adversarial 
system, where evidence is given and witnesses called. However, the Tribunal Rules 
also provide for more inquisitorial procedure in rule 63(5), so as to achieve an 
appropriate balance: 
“Having considered the circumstances of the relevant persons and whether 
(and to what extent) they are represented, the Convener– 
(a) may, in order to assist resolution of any disputed fact, put questions to the 
relevant persons and to witnesses or may allow another member of the   
Tribunal to put such questions; and 
                                                 
492 Patrick, H (2006) Mental Health, Incapacity and the Law in Scotland; Tottel Publishing West 
Sussex and Edinburgh at Para 23.31. 
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(b) shall, to the extent the Convener considers it necessary for the just 
conduct of the hearing, explain any legal terms or expressions which are 
used.” 
 
It is submitted that the Tribunal Rules illustrate further that the system could have 
been beneficial in relation to Scottish capacity law. As well as promoting the principle 
of conciliation, the fact that any relevant individuals should be questioned in order to 
assist the resolution process, means that if practicable, the incapable adult themselves 
would theoretically be given the opportunity to voice any wishes opinions or feelings, 
thus satisfying the procedural principle of participation. If evidence from all relevant 
individuals is heard within a tribunal system, this would also in theory help to satisfy 
the procedural principle of accuracy. As long as all relevant information is heard, and 
the best interests of the individual emphasised at all times, systemic accuracy is 
present, which in turn increases the likelihood of an accurate outcome being 
produced, which, in the context of capacity law, should always be that which 
safeguards the welfare of the individual.    
 
Despite its perceived advantages, the tribunal system, as stated above, was rejected by 
the Scottish Law Commission on the grounds that its presence could blur the 
distinction between professional medical assessment and judicial decision-making. As 
well as this, the Commission stated that there were issues of accommodation for 
tribunal hearings: 
“Accommodation for the hearings and the tribunal staff would also be a 
problem. The cost of having separate premises would seem unjustifiable so 
that the tribunal would have to share with another appropriate 
organisation.”493 
 
Unsurprisingly, much of the procedure surrounding applications to the Sheriff court 
adhere, at least in theory, to the philosophical underpinnings of the Adults with 
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000. First, Adrian Ward highlights an important aspect of 
this: 
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“In relation to any intervention under the Act the Sheriff is required to apply 
the general principles. These include the absolute obligation to take account 
of the adult’s present and past wishes and feelings so far as ascertainable by 
any means. In discharging the responsibility, the Sheriff may be assisted by a 
safeguarder or by someone else appointed specifically to convey the adult’s 
views… Where there is doubt about whether relevant views are 
ascertainable, or specialist skills may be required to ascertain them, the 
Sheriff’s powers under s.3(1) and (2) may be of assistance. By whomever the 
adult’s views are ascertained and conveyed, there must be a clear distinction 
between that function, on the one hand, and any other wider assistance to the 
court in seeking to arrive at an appropriate decision, on the other.”494 
As can be seen, it is essential that the Sheriff adhere to the general principles of the 
2000 Act at all times during hearings. Of particular importance is the requirement that 
the past and present wishes and feelings of the individual be given paramount 
importance. However, for some individuals, communication of those wishes and 
feelings may be problematic. In order to address this problem, s.3(4) of the 2000 Act 
allows the Sheriff to appoint a safeguarder: 
“In an application or any other proceedings under this Act, the Sheriff –  
(a) shall consider whether it is necessary to appoint a person for the purpose 
of safeguarding the interests of the person who is the subject of the 
application or proceedings; and 
(b) without prejudice to any existing power to appoint a person to represent 
the interests of the person who is the subject of the application or 
proceedings may, if he thinks fit, appoint a person to act for the purpose 
specified in paragraph (a).” 
As stated, the main function of a safeguarder is to oversee the interests of the 
individual. Part of this duty involves communicating the wishes, feelings and needs of 
the individual to the Sheriff, should he/she be incapable of doing these themselves. 
This process could be argued to be essential in promoting the autonomy of the 
individual, in as much as inability to communicate does not necessarily equate to 
inability to make a decision. Furthermore, the appointment of a safeguarder for the 
purposes of easier communication is in accordance with s.1(6) of the 2000 Act, in 
                                                 
494 Ward, A.D (2003) Adult Incapacity; W. Green/Sweet and Maxwell Edinburgh at Para 5.8. 
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which it is stated that although inability to communicate decisions could be indicative 
of incapacity, this could be made good via either “human or mechanical aid 
(whether of an interpretive nature or otherwise).” The appointment of an 
individual for the purposes of conveying an individual’s views could certainly be 
construed as a communicative deficiency being made good via human aid.  
 
Another important factor in the Sheriff Court procedures is the intimation, or 
notification of proceedings, to the individual from the Sheriff. Adrian Ward describes 
this aspect of procedure as “central to the philosophy and principles of the 
Act…”495 Put simply, the individual at the centre of proceedings and has the right to 
be kept up-to-date of all proceedings and progress regarding his/her case. Ward 
highlights the fact that there may on occasion be circumstances where such 
notification could be detrimental to the health of the individual. In such a case s.11(1) 
of the 2000 Act allows for the duty of intimation to be waived: 
“Where, apart from this subsection, intimation of any application or other 
proceedings under this Act, or notification of any interlocutor relating to 
such application or other proceedings, would be given to an adult and the 
court considers that the intimation or notification would be likely to pose a 
serious risk to the health of the adult, the court may direct that such 
intimation or notification shall not be given.” 
As stated above, intimation to the individual is an essential part of the proceedings of 
the Sheriff court. However, it is also essential to consider the welfare of the 
individual. As every case is potentially different, it is submitted that the government 
was wise to include provision for bypassing the intimations process should it be 
necessary. Rule 3.16.5 of the 2001 Rules provides further details of the procedure that 
the Sheriff must follow before the intimations process can be legally bypassed. It is 
not enough to convince the Sheriff to bypass the process. It will also be necessary to 
convince two independent medical practitioners that this is the most appropriate 
course of action. This is as it should be; it is submitted that dispensing with the 
intimations process is something which should be done only when absolutely 
necessary, and not simply out of convenience to any of the relevant parties. Indeed, 
Ward validly states that if an individual feels that an application made to the Sheriff 
                                                 
495 Ibid at Para 5.9. 
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court is unjust, it would be more beneficial for the individual to be kept informed of 
all proceedings in order that he/she might argue their case more effectively. However, 
the fact remains that the individual at the centre of proceedings is likely to be 
vulnerable to some extent, and it is therefore essential that their interests and welfare 
are safeguarded at all times. The inclusion of provisions which allow for dispensation 
of intimation in extreme circumstances contribute towards providing this protection 
by providing a pragmatic approach which considers the welfare of the individual and 
the potential impact of the intimations process upon this.  
 
The right to appeal to the Sheriff court is also provided for under the Adults with 
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000. First, s.14 allows for appeal against any decision 
made as to the incapacity of an adult which is made by anybody other than the 
Sheriff. This is particularly important in the context of Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees the right to a fair and public hearing 
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. 
Ward states that the right of the individual to make one’s own personal welfare 
decisions is a fundamental civil right, and any imposition of a determination that one 
is in fact incapable of exercising this right without a fair hearing will be a breach of 
Article 6. The right to appeal against a finding of incapacity is therefore important in 
this respect.  
With regards to an appeal against decisions relating to medical treatment, this is 
predominantly governed by s.52 of the 2000 Act (the only exception is for appeals 
under s.50 of the Act): 
“Any decision taken for the purposes of this Part [5], other than a decision by 
a medical practitioner under section 50, as to the medical treatment of the 
adult may be appealed by any person having an interest in the personal 
welfare of the adult to the Sheriff and thence, with the leave of the court, to 
the Court of Session.” 
 
When the appeal concerns a treatment decision, this must be made by a person who 
has an interest in the personal welfare of the individual. In such an appeal, it is quite 
possible for the person having the interest to appeal either against the provision or the 
non-provision of treatment. If for example, an appeal is lodged against the provision 
of artificial nutrition and hydration, and the appeal is successful, the end result will 
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ultimately be the death of the individual. This may well be the best course of action in 
some cases, however the fact remains that the potential outcome of such an appeal 
carries potential risks to the individual’s health. For this reason, it is arguably 
essential that those wishing to lodge an appeal must not simply claim to have an 
interest, but must prove that they have an interest. This is comparable in some 
respects to the law of childcare in England, in particular the law dealing with 
wardship. According to family law, wardship proceedings can be started by any 
individual with sufficient interest, including the child him/herself496. Cretney, Masson 
and Bailey-Harris also highlight the fact that professional carers are also entitled to 
start wardship proceedings, although the application will be considered in a personal 
rather than professional capacity. Therefore, professionals normally do not start 
proceedings unless supported by their particular organisation497. The Code of Practice 
for Part 5 of the 2000 Act provides guidance on this point in relation to s.50 of the 
2000 Act: 
“The procedure applies only in cases where a proxy decision-maker has been 
appointed, but it gives rights not only to the proxy, but also in certain 
circumstances to ‘any person having an interest in the personal welfare of the 
adult’. Such a person may be a close relation of the adult, or a person who 
has lived with, or cared for or about them, over a significant period. The 
term does not extend to those whose interest is that of an onlooker, such as 
interested pressure groups, uninvolved neighbours, or those seeking to 
achieve objectives which are of wider import than the welfare of the 
particular adult. It should be noted that, while proxies can legitimately object 
to particular courses of medical treatment, they may not act unreasonably 
by, for example, refusing fundamental care procedures. Proxy decision-
makers have a duty of care to the adult on whose behalf they act, and a duty 
to abide by the general principles set out in section 1 of the Act.”498 
The above guidance shows that anybody wishing to appeal against a treatment 
decision must demonstrate that they have a significant interest in the welfare of the 
individual. This is comparable to the terms of s.50 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, 
which stipulates that permission must be sought in order to make an application to the 
                                                 
496 see Re T (A Minor) Wardship: Representation [1994] Fam. 49. 
497 Cretney S.M, Masson J.M and Bailey-Harris R (2003) Principles of Family Law 7th Ed; Sweet & 
Maxwell London at 625. 
498 Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 Part 5 Code of Practice at Para 3.2. 
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Court of Protection unless that person falls under the exceptions listed in the Act499. 
In both cases, the overriding purpose is to protect the individual against those who do 
not have the welfare of the individual at heart.  
 
Section 50 of the 2000 Act allows for appeal against a medical decision made by a 
medical practitioner in particular circumstances. Section 50(3) provides for one such 
circumstance: 
“Where the medical practitioner primarily responsible for the medical 
treatment of the adult has consulted the guardian, welfare attorney or person 
authorised under the intervention order and there is no disagreement as to 
the medical treatment of the adult, any person having an interest in the 
personal welfare of the adult may appeal the decision as to the medical 
treatment to the Court of Session.” 
As can be seen, section 50(3) ensures that any other persons having an interest, such 
as relatives, will be given an opportunity to get their voice heard with regards to any 
medical treatment decision. In this way, the Act does not simply confer all the power 
upon medical practitioners and the appointees that they select.  
Section 50(6) also provides for appeal against a treatment decision and reads as 
follows: 
“Where the nominated medical practitioner certifies that, in his opinion, 
having regard to all the circumstances and having consulted the guardian, 
welfare attorney or person authorised under the intervention order as the 
case may be and, if it is reasonable and practicable to do so, a person 
nominated by such guardian, welfare attorney or person authorised under 
the intervention order as the case may be, the proposed medical treatment 
should or, as the case may be, should not be given, the medical practitioner 
primarily responsible for the medical treatment of the adult, or any person 
having an interest in the personal welfare of the adult, may apply to the 
Court of Session for a determination as to whether the proposed treatment 
should be given or not.” 
                                                 
499 These are: the person who lacks or is alleged to lack capacity; anybody with parental responsibility 
for the individual should he/she be under the age of 18; the donor or donee of a Lasting Power of 
Attorney to which the application relates; a person named in an existing order of the court, if the 
application relates to the order; the Official Solicitor and the Public Guardian.  
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Adrian Ward states that ‘persons having an interest’ is also intended to include 
appointees500.  
 
In addition to the Sheriff Court, the Court of Session acts as an additional safeguard. 
Under the 2000 Act, the Court of Session exists as an appellate jurisdiction, 
particularly in relation to issues of medical treatment. As stated above, appeals must 
first go through the Sheriff Principal, and then, subject to permission, may then be 
referred to the Sheriff Court. However, in the case of s.52 appeals, the Sheriff 
principal is not involved, and appeals go first to the Sheriff and then to the Court of 
Session subject to permission. The process varies further with regards to s.50 appeals, 
which go directly to the Court of Session, presumably due to the Court’s expertise in 
dealing with medical issues. Furthermore, certain treatments always require the 
permission of the Court of Session.  These are specified in Schedule 1 of the Specified 
Medical Treatments Regulations 2002 as being: neurosurgery for mental disorder; 
sterilisation where there is no serious malfunction or disease of the reproductive 
organs; and surgical implantation of hormones for the purpose of reducing sex 
drive501. It is imperative that the Court of Session adhere to the principles of the Act 
at all times when hearing cases relating to special medical treatments, as stated 
regulation 3 of the Specified Treatments Regulations: 
“(1) Subject to regulations 5 and 6 below, a treatment of a kind set out in 
Part 1 of Schedule 1 to these Regulations may be carried out in relation to an 
adult who is incapable in relation to a decision about that treatment if –  
(a) the Court of Session is satisfied, on application to it by the medical 
practitioner primarily responsible for the medical treatment, that the 
treatment will safeguard or promote the physical or mental health of the 
adult and that the adult does not oppose the treatment; and 
(b) the adult does not resist the carrying out of the treatment 
(2) The Court of Session shall, in considering such an application afford an 
opportunity to any person having an interest in the personal welfare of the 
adult to make representations in respect of it.” 
                                                 
500 Ward, A.D (2003) Adult Incapacity; W. Green/Sweet and Maxwell Edinburgh at Para 14.61. 
501 Adults with Incapacity (Specified Medical Treatments) (Scotland) Regulations 2002 (SSI 
2002/275).  
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In addition, the Court of Session has the power to appoint a safeguarder for the 
purpose of protecting the interests of the individual who is the subject of appeal502.  
 
It can be seen that the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 contains an 
exhaustive amount of procedure, all of which are designed to ensure that the welfare 
of the individual is given the highest priority. Opportunity is also given for the 
individual to exercise control over decisions relating to medical treatment and welfare 
decisions in general through the creation of a Welfare Power of Attorney document. 
Given the effort that has clearly been placed in creating an effective system of 
procedural justice, this to certainly to be commended. However, it could also be 
argued that the Act places too much emphasis upon procedure. Following on from 
this, there is a risk that the complexity of the procedural mechanisms in place may 
deter individuals from accessing these mechanisms. Hilary Patrick states for example 
that although a large number of people are creating powers of attorney, the figures are 
still comparatively low in comparison to the estimated number of people in Scotland 
with some form of incapacity503. Patrick argues for a more simplified approach to 
procedure under the 2000 Act and this is a salient point504. In addition, it is submitted 
that in some areas, the Act does not go far enough to adhere to its own general 
principles. This is most evident by the fact that advance statements have not been 
provided for in the Act, despite evidence that shows they are an effective way of 
ascertaining the wishes and feelings of an individual; a cornerstone principle of the 
legislation. It is therefore submitted that the procedural mechanisms of the 2000 Act 
are worthy in intention, but nevertheless deficient in some key areas.  
 
                                                 
502 Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 s.5. 
503 see the Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland Report (2004) Authorising Significant 
Interventions for adults who lack capacity at 31. Here, Patrick explains that over 30,000 powers of 
attorney have been registered since 2001. However, this is in comparison to the estimated 100,000 
adults with incapacity in Scotland.  
504 Ibid at 32.  
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5.3: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN INDIAN LAW AND ITS POSSIBLE 
APPLICATION TO CAPACITY ISSUES 
 
In the light of the fact that Indian capacity law is still in its embryonic stages, it is 
unsurprising that recognition of the importance of procedural justice in the same 
context is practically non-existent. However, procedural mechanisms do exist which 
could theoretically be used to resolve matters of capacity. The most relevant of these 
is the power to seek declaratory relief. The scope of declaratory decrees in Indian law 
can be found in section 34-35 of the Specific Relief Act 1963. Section 34 of the Act 
reads as follows: 
“Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any 
property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to 
deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion 
make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in 
such suit ask for any further relief.” 
Dr Abul Fazal explains the significance of the term ‘legal character’: “The 
expression ‘legal character has been equated with the status or the position 
which a person occupies in the eyes of the law. The concept of legal character, 
stretched to its furthest point, can invest the court with the widest jurisdiction to 
grant a declaration in a variety of cases.”505 Dr Fazal then quotes the work of 
Holland who wrote the following on the issue: 
“The chief varieties or status amongst natural persons may be referred to the 
following cases: sex, minority… celibacy, mental defect, bodily defect, rank, 
caste and official position, race and colour… All of the facts included in the 
list which may be extended, have been held at one time or another to 
differentiate the legal position of persons one time or another to differentiate 
the legal position of persons affected by them from that of persons of the 
normal type.”506 
 
One of the statuses contained in the above list is that of the ‘mental defect’, which 
could be interpreted in modern vernacular as referring to those suffering from mental 
                                                 
505 Fazal, M A (2000) Judicial Control of Administrative Action in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh 3rd 
Ed; Butterworths India, New Delhi at 530.  
506 Ibid quoting Holland (1924) Elements of Jurisprudence; Clarendon Press 14th edition at 351.  
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disorder or impairment. Dr Fazal states further that declarations under the Specific 
Relief Act 1963 can be used to positively determine the rights of the individual and 
have the appropriate relief granted507. In the context of capacity law, this suggests that 
in theory, an incapable adult would be entitled to apply for a declaration as they have 
the requisite legal character to be able to commence proceedings.  
 
As can be seen, Indian law does allow for declaratory relief to be sought by anybody 
with legal character. This requirement could theoretically be used to include those 
suffering with mental disorder or impairment. However, awareness of capacity issues 
in India has not yet developed to the extent that they are deemed worthy of attention 
from the courts. That an individual with a mental disorder or impairment will be 
eligible to apply for a declaration is only a theoretical right at this stage; there is no 
evidence in Indian law to show that this has actually been done. However, the system 
of declaratory relief, despite always having existed in English law, only begun to be 
used in the context of medical treatment after the common law had begun to recognise 
the significance of capacity issues in the early 1990s.508 In order for declaratory 
proceedings to be used to obtain rulings on matters of capacity, it is first necessary for 
individuals to want to avail themselves of this option. This has evidently not yet 
happened in India, although this does not mean that it will not happen. Fazal 
highlights the fact that under the Specific Relief Act 1877, any civil court in India 
may be applied to for a declaration. Prior to the implementation of the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005, only the High Court had an inherent jurisdiction to hear 
declarations in England. This was confirmed in Re F (Adult: Court’s Jurisdiction)509 
in which the court stated that the High Court’s jurisdiction could be invoked if there 
was a serious justiciable issue. The court also confirmed the decision in Re S 
(Hospital Patient: Court’s Jurisdiction)510 that the High Court would treat as 
justiciable any issues relating to the best interests of the individual.  Following 
implementation of the Act, the High Court has maintained its jurisdiction, with the 
                                                 
507 Ibid at 530.  
508 See Re F(Mental Patient: Sterilisation)  [1990] 2 A.C.1; Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment 
[1994] 1 All E.R 819; Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All E.R 821. These cases serve as evidence 
of the fact that capacity issues began to significantly permeate the English common law from 1990 
onwards. 
509 [2001] Fam 38.  
510 [1996] Fam 1 per Sir Thomas Bingham M.R at 18.  
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Court of Protection also having the power to grant declarations511. Since the common 
law jurisdiction still prevails in India, the case of Re F (Adult: Court’s Jurisdiction) 
provides useful guidance as to how the courts might decide whether to grant a 
declaration in matters of capacity and medical treatment.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, an important principle in the context of 
capacity law is the principle of conciliation, which states that any proceedings relating 
to the incapable adult should be conducted in a way that promoted compromise and 
conciliation between disputing parties. India’s legal system recognises the importance 
of alternative means of dispute resolution, and it is worth briefly analysing this issue 
to assess its relevance to capacity law.  
A review of the literature suggests that the need for alternative dispute resolution was 
triggered primarily by the significant strain on the Indian courts. In a speech made on 
the 5th Bhilwara Oration in March 2000, Central Vigilance Commissioner Vittal 
stated that as of the year 2000, there were approximately 30 million cases which were 
pending before the various courts in India, with a dispute taking an average of twenty 
years to resolve. As a result, “litigation has become a convenient method for 
avoiding prompt retribution by many people on the wrong side of the law.”512 As 
of 2007, the figures quoted by Vittal do not appear to have improved greatly, with 
25,900,000 cases pending throughout India. K.G Balakrishnan, Chief Justice of India, 
quoted this figure and stated also that this figure would be likely to increase with even 
a small amendment in legislation, but despite this, no new courts had been created513.  
Given these figures, it is clear that were matters of capacity to ever become a matter 
worthy of pursuing in the courts, they would more than likely be swallowed up in the 
system along with the millions of other cases still pending. 
 
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 aims to provide resolution of commercial 
disputes, by means of a private arbitration process. The two main methods of dispute 
resolution dealt with in the act are arbitration and conciliation, as the title of the Act 
suggests.  
                                                 
511 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.15.  
512 Ibid at Para 10. 
513 The Hindu (12/08/2007) Backlog of Cases a Matter of Concern, says CJI; accessed on 20/09/2007; 
available online at http://www.hindu.com/2007/08/12/stories/2007081254500500.htm.  
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In recognition of the need for alternative dispute resolution, the Code of Civil 
Procedure 1908 was amended in 2002 to include a section on settlement of disputes 
outside the court. Section 89 reads as follows: 
“(1) Where it appears to the Court that there exists elements of a settlement 
which may be acceptable to the parties, the Court shall formulate the terms 
of settlement and give them to the parties for their observations and after 
receiving the observations of the parties, the Court may reformulate the 
terms of a possible settlement and refer the same for –  
(a) arbitration; 
(b) conciliation; 
(c) judicial settlement including settlement through Lok Adalat; or 
(d) mediation”  
Note the reference in (1) to Lok Adalats. According to Nariman, these are currently 
the only alternative means of dispute resolution in India. Meaning ‘Court of the 
people’, the purpose of a Lok Adalat is to settle matters which have yet to reach or are 
pending in the court. In 1980, the Committee for Implementing Legal Aid Schemes 
began monitoring the manner in which legal aid was administered across India514. 
Consequently, Lok Adalats were set up and officially recognised in statute law in 
1987 via sections Chapter VI (section 19- 22) of the Legal Services Authorities Act 
1987, with the Act gaining implementation in 1995. Robert Moog describes the 
primary objective of Lok Adalats: 
“LA’s [Lok Adalats] can be considered a recent expression of a trend in 
judicial populism which has continued in India since independence. Its 
primary characteristic is an overriding concern with the delivery of 
affordable legal services to the ordinary person.”515 
 
The Legal Services Authorities Act 1987 emphasises the need for Lok Adalats to 
arrive at a compromise or settlement between the two parties whilst upholding the 
principles of justice and equality516. Any court may send a case to the Lok Adalat if it 
                                                 
514 Mukhija et al (07/05/2007) Lok Adalats: A Move Towards More Effective Dispute Resolution; 
accessed online on 22/08/2007; available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=998537. 
515 Moog, R.S (1991) Conflict and Compromise: The Politics of Lok Adalats in Varanasi District; Law 
and Society Review, Vol. 25(3), 545-570 at 552. 
516 Legal Services Authorities Act 1987, ss. 20(3)-(4). 
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is felt that the case will be resolved more effectively517, and perhaps most 
importantly, any decision handed down is legally binding and cannot be appealed 
unless a fraud has taken place. No court or legal fees are required to be paid by either 
party, providing a significant incentive for individuals to seek some form of formal 
redress.  
Figures have shown that Lok Adalats have gained in popularity, predominantly in 
cases relating to financial matters. According to the Press Information Bureau of 
India, as of 2002, approximately 15 million cases had been resolved by Lok Adalats 
capacity law. Hypothetically speaking however, the fact the Lok Adalat system 
                                                
across India, with a total payout of approximately Rs. 3600 crores518.  
As stated previously, Lok Adalats have been utilised predominantly for the resolution 
of financial disputes. Review of the literature has shown that at no time have they 
been used for the resolution of capacity matters. However, the emphasis placed upon 
issues such as conciliation and mediation suggests that the system may be usable in 
some form to resolve matters relating to capacity. Given the importance of the 
procedural principle of conciliation, using an alternative system such as Lok Adalats 
might ultimately be beneficial for dealing with capacity issues for two reasons: firstly, 
it may be helpful for disputes to be dealt with away from the traditional court setting, 
which for many, is more associated with adversariality and conflict, with both parties 
in effect taking opposite sides. This is inappropriate in the context of disputes over 
capacity issues, as both parties are in effect after the same outcome i.e. the best 
interests of the incapable individual who is at the centre of proceedings. Secondly, the 
provision of alternative justice systems such as Lok Adalats might in theory help to 
reduce the pressure on India’s heavily burdened court system whilst at the same time 
providing parties with the formality of a legally binding result. Despite these 
advantages, it must also be noted that the presence of alternative justice systems for 
resolving capacity matters is unlikely to yield any positive results until capacity issues 
are deemed important enough for cases to be brought before the courts in India. Thus 
far, capacity cases, particularly involving medical treatment, have not been accorded 
this importance, and it could therefore also be argued that discussions about Indian 
alternative justice systems should be deferred in favour of increasing education on 
 
517 Ibid s.20 (1)(b). 
518 see http://pib.myiris.com/pq/article.php3?fl=021219181818 accessed on 22/08/2007. Please note 
with regards to the quoted figure of 3600 crores; 1 crore is equal to ten million rupees.  
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emphasises conciliation between parties suggests that the system could be useful in 
resolving matters of capacity.  
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CHAPTER 6: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND FINAL 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The final chapter in this thesis will provide a summary of the main findings discussed 
in the previous five chapters. These findings will then be compared and critiqued and 
final conclusions given. This chapter splits up the comparative analysis up into four 
sections: ethical underpinnings, capacity assessment, decision-making for the 
incapable patient and procedural justice.  
 
6.1: ETHICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
 
In terms of the ethical and philosophical concepts which underpin the law on capacity, 
a clear line can be drawn between the United Kingdom i.e. England and Scotland on 
one side, and India on the other. Although this thesis is a tripartite comparative study, 
the comparisons from an ethical perspective are essentially twofold. This is because 
there is little to distinguish between England and Scotland in terms of the ethical 
underpinnings of the law in both jurisdictions. The differences lie in the manner in 
which the relevant ethical concepts manifest themselves in the law. 
 
First, the predominant principle underpinning both the English and Scottish law is the 
principle of autonomy. The importance of this principle has been emphasised in 
Article 3(a) of the U.N Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006 
and this has been fully endorsed by both English and Scottish capacity law. Both 
jurisdictions follow an almost identical approach to autonomy, and in the case of 
England, this applies to both the common law and the Mental Capacity Act 2005. In 
the case of the common law, England has stated clearly that promoting the autonomy 
of the incapable individual is of paramount importance. This is perhaps most 
effectively shown in the judgment of Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment)519, 
through Lord Donaldson’s keynote statement that every adult has the right to decide 
whether or not to accept medical treatment, irrespective of whether the reasons for the 
decision are rational, irrational or nonexistent520. In a similar vein, the case of Re C521 
stated clearly that even those with a mental disorder must not be precluded from 
                                                 
519 [1992] 4 All ER 649. 
520 Ibid per Lord Donaldson MR at 663. 
521 [1994] 1 All ER 819.  
  199   
exercising their autonomy simply by virtue of their condition, again, even if 
exercising one’s autonomy results in death or serious harm.  
The prioritisation of the principle of autonomy has subsequently been transposed into 
the Mental Capacity Act 2005, where the importance of the principle of autonomy can 
clearly be seen522. Emphasis has been placed upon the need to assume capacity, ergo 
the ability to act autonomously, as well as the need to help the individual make a 
decision themselves. Finally, the Act states that an ‘unwise’ decision should not be 
deemed as a decision which is not autonomous.  
Whilst the English legislation focuses more upon the circumstances in which an 
individual must be treated as capable of exercising their autonomy, the Scottish Act 
details what to do once an adult has been deemed incapable. The question then arises 
as to whether Scotland’s approach places less emphasis upon autonomy per se. It is 
submitted that the answer would be no. Although the 2000 Act may not highlight the 
ideological similarities with England, documents published prior to the 
implementation of the Act demonstrates a clear convergence between the two 
jurisdictions in this regard. In the 1991 discussion paper Mentally Disabled Adults: 
Legal Arrangements for Managing their Welfare and Finances, the Scottish Law 
Commission clearly stated that the overriding philosophy behind the reform proposals 
was that of minimum intervention in the lives of those suffering from mental disorder 
or impairment, coupled with the need to help individuals to maximise their 
potential523. This is clear endorsement of the principle of autonomy, and was echoed 
in the 1995 Report on Incapable Adults524.   
It was further stated in 1991 by the Scottish Law Commission that the 1971 U.N 
Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons had been of great influence 
upon the proposals for reform in Scotland. The 1971 U.N Declaration includes clear 
endorsements of the principle of autonomy, including the right of the individual to 
perform productive work to the best of his/her capabilities, and the right of the 
individual to any education and training which would help maximise his/her potential. 
The provisions of the 1971 Declaration have since been laid down the U.N 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006, which confirms the 
                                                 
522 Mental Capacity Act 2005, ss. 1(2)-(4).  
523 Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No. 94 (1991) Mentally Disabled Adults: Legal 
Arrangements for Managing their Welfare and Finances at Para 1.7. 
524 Scottish Law Commission (1995) Report on Incapable Adults at Para 1.27 
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importance of the principles of autonomy and non-discrimination for those suffering 
with disabilities.  
 
It is apparent, therefore, that the principle of autonomy holds great weight in both 
English and Scottish capacity law. However, both jurisdictions also acknowledge the 
importance of the principle of paternalism. Indeed, there is a clear acceptance in both 
England and Scotland that providing for adults with incapacity necessitates at least 
some application of the principle of paternalism. Again, there are some differences in 
approach between the two jurisdictions, but the ideological similarities remain.  
First, the English common law, whilst clearly favouring a pro-autonomy approach as 
far as is practicable, also highlights the fact that the presumption of capacity can, and 
must be rebutted in the event of evidence of incapacity. In the light of this, Lord 
Donaldson’s statement regarding the right of individuals to make whatever decision 
he/she wishes, irrespective of reason, appears not always to apply in capacity law. The 
common law has held that factors such as undue influence (Re T (Adult: Refusal of 
Medical Treatment)) and needle-phobia (Re MB (Medical Treatment)), will adversely 
affect one’s ability to make a fully autonomous decision, thus requiring the 
individual’s decision to be overridden and a paternalistic approach adopted. The 
paternalistic approach in English capacity law manifests itself in the form of the best 
interests test. Cases such as Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation), Re SL (Adult Patient: 
Medical Treatment) and Re A (Medical Treatment: Male Sterilisation) show 
application of the best interests test; Re F introduced the test into the common law in 
relation to medical procedures for incapable adults, whilst Re SL and Re A extended it 
further to include interests beyond mere medical ones, such as long-term emotional 
welfare.  
 
The best interests test was subsequently carried through and laid down in the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005, albeit somewhat differently to the approach adopted in the 
common law.  
The essential purpose of the best interests test remains the same: to provide criteria for 
making decisions on behalf of those who have been deemed incapable of 
understanding, retaining, weighing up or communicating a decision on medical 
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treatment525. In addition, the Act states that proxy decision-makers must not make a 
decision on best interests based on age or appearance, and must consider whether the 
individual will regain capacity at some point in the future, an important point 
considering the ethical implications for making decisions for one who is capable.  
Instead of adopting a pure best interests model, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
represents an attempt by legislators to bridge the gap between the concepts of best 
interests and substituted judgment, the latter being considerably more suited to a pro-
autonomy approach. In the context of ethics, this represents a shift away from 
paternalism, although as discussed, it is impossible to disregard it completely. 
Ultimately, adopting either a pure best interests or a pure substituted judgment test 
would be unrealistic; the former is too paternalistic, whereas the latter is of little use 
when the individual in question was never capable of expressing wishes or opinions 
about a given treatment. Therefore, the 2005 Act adopts a compromise between the 
two tests, favouring substituted judgment where practicable, but best interests in other 
circumstances. In ethical terms, paternalism is still an important ethical principle, but 
it becomes the dominant principle only when the individual displays a complete lack 
of autonomy.  
 
In Scottish capacity law, the concept of benefit represents a shift away from hard-line 
paternalism, with the 2000 Scotland Act giving the highest priority to the past and 
present wishes and feelings of the adult, followed by the views of relatives, carers and 
so forth526. From an ethical perspective, this confirms that the principle of autonomy 
takes precedence over the principle of paternalism. If the past wishes and feelings of 
the individual can be ascertained, these must be the basis of any proxy decision-
making, thus in effect allowing the individual to exercise their autonomy by proxy. In 
the absence of evidence of the individual’s past wishes and feelings, it is then 
ethically acceptable to prioritise the views of those other than the incapable adult. In 
this way, there is very little, if any difference in approach to the issue of ethics 
between England and Scotland, notwithstanding the fact that the manner in which 
these ethical principles are applied do differ significantly between the two 
jurisdictions. 
 
                                                 
525 Mental Capacity Act 2005 s. 3(1). 
526 Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 s. 1(4).  
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Having discussed the ethical underpinnings of English and Scottish capacity law, the 
question remains as to how India compares in this area. The substantive principles of 
particular relevance to India are the principles of non-discrimination, 
communitarianism and paternalism.  
Literature on India shows that the principle of non-discrimination has not been fully 
recognised with respect to mental health. Existing literature highlights attitudes 
towards mental illness in general, with these sources stating that those suffering from 
mental disorder or impairment are often thought of as having no capacity for 
understanding527, with the possibility of living life unaided being extremely 
remote528. Even those involved in the care of mentally impaired individuals have 
described the condition as the worst handicap imaginable529. This suggests that 
although there is some recognition that those suffering with mental disorder or 
impairment are in need of assistance, a status approach is still adopted, so that it is 
believed that such individuals require help in all areas of life simply by virtue of their 
condition. Although review of the literature also highlights that fact that work is being 
done to increase awareness of mental illness in general, particularly by Non-
Governmental Organisations530 it remains to be seen when a more functional 
approach will be taken, which acknowledges that sufferers of mental disorder or 
impairment may be capable of making autonomous decisions in the same way as 
thers.  
                          
o
 
Endorsement of the principle of paternalism is also identifiable in certain areas of the 
Indian approach to capacity, in particular where the death of the individual is at issue. 
First, consider the incident discussed by Jesani and Pilgaokar regarding the two 
protesters who went on hunger strike531. The incident shows that a paternalistic 
approach is still prevalent in practice, despite the fact that this has not specifically 
                       
992) Mentally Handicapped: Care, Financial Security and Guardianship Needs; Indian 
y: Throwing it to the Winds; Indian Journal of 
://www.issuesinmedicalethics.org/011mi006.html.  
527 Varma, L.P; Mental Disorders: Some Misconceptions; Souvenir III Conference of Eastern Zone; 
I.P.S, Gauhati.  
528 Tilak, D (1
Journal of Social Work, Vol. 53(1), 1-15.  
529 Ibid at 1.  
530 Padmavati, R (2005) Community Mental Health Care in India; International Review of Psychiatry; 
Vol. 17(2); 103-107 at 103.  
531 Jesani, A and Pilgaokar, A (1993) Patient’s Autonom
Medical Ethics; Aug-Oct Vol. 1(1); accessed online on 18/01/2006; available at 
http
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been endorsed532. There was no evidence to suggest that the two protesters were 
incapable of making a decision on whether or not to refuse feeding, yet this was not 
considered as important. This can be compared and contrasted with English cases like 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v Robb533, in which the Home Office 
successfully sought a declaration stating that all relevant prison and medical staff 
should abide by the prisoner’s decision to fast, since he was of sound mind and 
understood that the refusal of nutrition and hydration would result in his death. 
However, it should also be noted that the court in the English case of Leigh v 
Gladstone534 which was heard almost one hundred years ago, held that the force 
feeding of an imprisoned suffragette was acceptable to prevent suicide, which was 
illegal at that time. The cases of the Mumbai protesters and Leigh v Gladstone can be 
compared inasmuch as both cases involved prisoners who were on hunger strike and 
had their will overborne despite no evidence to suggest a lack of capacity. The fact 
that these cases took place one hundred years apart would suggest that the differences 
in approach between England and India are in essence developmental. How then, 
ight cultural factors impact upon issues of capacity? m
 
Chapter 4 of this thesis discussed the Indian approach to end-of-life issues. The 
literature review revealed that the right of an individual to take control over issues 
relating to life-sustaining treatment has not been fully recognised to the extent that 
they have in the U.K. There is no recognition in either common law or statute of any 
form of advance decision-making in the form of advance statements or welfare 
powers of attorney, and no protocol in place to govern who may be permitted to make 
decisions on behalf of an incapable adult. In an ethics context, this means that the 
individual’s right to exercise their autonomy in relation to such matters has yet to be 
acknowledged in full535. Instead, existing literature comments on how doctors adopt a 
paternalistic approach and feel obliged to prolong life-sustaining treatment even in 
this is against the wishes of the patient’s family536. Again, as shown with the case of 
                                                 
532 Singh J and Bhushan, V (2004) Medical Negligence and Compensation; Bharat Law Publications at 
9.  
533 [1995] 2 W.L.R 722.  
534 [1909] 25 T.L.R 139.  
535 Mani, R K et al (2005) Limiting Life-Prolonging Interventions and Providing Palliative Care 
Towards the End-of-life in Indian Intensive Care Units; Indian Journal of Critical Care Medicine; Vol. 
9(2), 96-107 at 97.  
536 Rastogi, A K (2005) End-of-life Issues Neglected in India; Indian Journal of Medical Ethics; July-
Sept 2005(3), accessed on 9/01/2008; available inline at http://www.ijme.in/133di03.html.  
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the Mumbai protesters, there is evidence of a paternalistic approach being prevalent 
when the death of the patient is a central issue. English case law states that life-
prolonging treatment on patients in a persistent vegetative state can only be continued 
if in the best interests of the patient.537 It is submitted that the difference in approach 
can again be attributed to developmental issues. There is no protocol in place to 
govern how doctors must act when faced with end-of-life issues, whether the patient 
is in a persistent vegetative state, or whether the patient, while capable, has expressed 
a wish to have all life-prolonging treatment terminated538. If guidance was available 
through either statute or common law, the doctors would have no choice but to 
comply with this guidance. As things stand, Jindal highlights the fact that without 
protocol in place, doctors have no choice but to subscribe to cultural practices539. 
Evidence from English law suggests that there is little difference in attitudes towards 
death between the U.K and India. This is illustrated in Re B (Adult: Refusal of 
Medical Treatment)540, where the healthcare staff in charge of Miss B were extremely 
reluctant to accede to her wishes to have her artificial ventilation switched off. The 
reason for this was not because Miss B did not have the requisite capacity to make 
this decision, but rather, because they felt that she was making the wrong decision in 
wanting to die. Dame Butler-Sloss’s reference to the “danger of benevolent 
paternalism”541 in her judgment seems particularly apposite in the context of the 
Indian approach and Rastogi’s commentary on the treatment of his comatose mother 
by healthcare staff in an Indian hospital. Rastogi’s statement on how the doctors in 
charge of his mother felt “obliged to keep her alive with machines”542 could, it is 
submitted, equate to the benevolent paternalism that Dame Butler-Sloss spoke of in 
Miss B’s case. Despite the fact that Ms B was competent and Rastogi’s mother was in 
a comatose state, a comparison is warranted because both cases show that a strongly 
paternalistic approach, however well intentioned, cannot simply be adopted by the 
decision-maker because they feel that it is ‘the right thing to do’. Both cases 
ostensibly involve the feelings of the healthcare staff and the apparent obligation felt 
                                                 
537 [1993] 1 A.C 789. .  
538 See for example, Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2002] E.W.H.C 429.  
539 Jindal, S K (2005) Issues in the Care of the Dying; Indian Journal of Medical Ethics; July-
September 2005(3); accessed on 9/01/2008; available online at http:// www.ijme.in/133di03.html.  
540[2002] E.W.H.C 429.   
541 Ibid per Dame Butler-Sloss at Para 100(v).  
542 Rastogi, A K (2005) End-of-life Issues Neglected in India; Indian Journal of Medical Ethics; July-
Sept 2005(3); accessed on 9/01/2008; available online at http://www.ijme.in/133di03.html.  
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in both cases to keep the patient alive. Although the capacity levels of both patients 
were significantly different, it is the approaches and opinions of the healthcare staff in 
each case which are comparable. Miss B’s case illustrated that doctors in the United 
Kingdom are no less paternalistic on an ideological level than doctors in India; it is 
simply that the substantive and procedural principles relating to capacity, as laid down 
first in common law and finally through the English and Scottish legislations, have 
developed to the extent that doctors are legally forbidden from overriding the wishes 
of a capable patient. By contrast, the law in India over such issues is not at all 
established, meaning that there is little to prevent doctors overriding the autonomy of 
atients and adopting a paternalistic approach even with a patient capable of making 
                                                
p
treatment decisions.  
 
With regards to the principle of communitarianism, Laungani stated that one’s 
individual role within a family was effectively subordinate to the collective needs of 
the family543. The problem of one individual is the problem of the whole family, even 
if that individual is capable of dealing with the problem themselves. One might 
therefore argue that if the situation is such for a capable person, family involvement 
will be greater when the individual in question suffers with some form of incapacity. 
This raises the question as to whether collaborative or deferred decision-making is 
giving full respect to the principle of autonomy. The English case of Re T (Adult: 
Refusal of Medical Treatment) illustrated how the emotional nature of familial 
relationships can impact upon valid decision-making; T was not a Jehovah’s Witness 
herself although her mother was, and her vulnerable state meant that her mother was 
able to unduly influence her to make a treatment decision that reflected T’s mother’s 
religious beliefs. Therefore, a communitarian approach to decision-making which 
involves family members may result in a similar outcome, where the influence of 
other family members may impact upon the individual to the extent that he/she makes 
decisions that reflect the wishes of others rather than themselves. However, this must 
only be considered as a possible outcome of collaborative decision-making, rather 
than a guaranteed one. Discussion of a communitarian approach to decision-making in 
India raises the question of whether the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the Adults 
with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 allow for a collaborative approach to decision-
 
543 Laungani, P (1997) Mental Illness in India and Britain: Theory and Practice; Medicine and Law; 
Vol. 16(3), 509-540 at 521. 
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making. This question is of particular relevance to Indians living in the U.K who may 
be used to making decisions collectively and wish to continue this. Literature on the 
role of family in India suggests that the concept of a hierarchical system in families, 
with the elders fulfilling the more important roles, is ideologically ingrained within 
the lives of many sections of Indian society544. Therefore, it could be inferred that for 
some, deferring decision-making to elders is not an imposition or an erosion of one’s 
autonomy, but rather, is perfectly acceptable and possibly even preferred. In terms of 
how this relates to individuals of Indian origin living in the U.K, it is submitted that 
the English and Scottish legislations do allow for communitarian decision-making. 
The crux of the matter lies in the ability to demonstrate that deferring the decision-
making process to family, in particular senior members, is part of a long and deeply 
held process. In the Mental Capacity Act 2005, the appropriate gateway for deferring 
decisions to family members would be s.4(6)(b), which states that the person making 
the determination on the best interests of the individual must consider (so far as is 
practicable), the beliefs and wishes that would be likely to influence his decision if he 
had capacity. Provided that deferring to family members on important decisions is a 
practice which has persisted for a long period of time, and provided that the individual 
is entirely satisfied with this procedure, it may be entirely possible to argue that 
deferring decisions to one’s parents or grandparents forms as much a part of a belief 
system as following a religion. Indeed, Article 9 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights guarantees the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
alone or in community with others, and the nature of the belief system is not specified 
in the provision. Therefore, to the Indian family living in the United Kingdom, the 
ght to hold a belief system that defers important decisions to elders in the family is 
                                                
ri
one that is seemingly guaranteed by law.   
 
Finding an equivalent gateway under the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 
is not as straightforward, owing to the Act’s failure to include reference to matters 
such as the beliefs and wishes of the individual. The closest approximation to s. 
4(6)(b) can be found in s.1(4)(a) of the 2000 Act, which states simply that if an 
intervention is to be made, account should be taken of the present and past wishes and 
 
544 See Rack, P (1982) Race, Culture and Mental Disorder, Routledge Press at 73; Juthani, N.V (2001) 
Psychiatric Treatment of Hindus, International Review of Psychiatry, Vol. 13(2), 125-130; Venkoba 
Rao, A (1981) Mental Health and Ageing in India, Indian Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 23(1), 11-20.  
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feelings of the adult so far as they can be ascertained. It could be argued that if an 
individual is used to deferring treatment decisions to the elders of the family and has 
always been satisfied with this, then this would form the basis of the individual’s past 
wishes and feelings. However, this argument is not altogether convincing. The Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 also includes a provision which requires consideration of the 
individual’s past and present wishes and feelings, and this can be found in s.4(6)(a). 
The fact that past and present wishes and feelings have been interpreted as being 
independent of one’s beliefs and values illustrates that at least according to English 
capacity law, the two requirements are different. The question which then follows is 
how they both differ. It is submitted that the past and present wishes and feelings of 
an individual apply to each particular treatment decision and do not necessarily 
require the presence of a deeply held-belief system. If for example, an individual 
makes an advance statement declaring that they do not wish to be resuscitated in the 
event of a respiratory arrest, this is evidence of an individual’s wishes. If, by contrast, 
an individual makes a statement refusing blood transfusions on the grounds that they 
have been a practising Jehovah’s Witness all their lives, this is in essence a decision 
based on a belief system; the individual’s religion is a constant throughout their lives 
and is likely to inform many aspects of decision-making, and not simply the treatment 
decision at hand. As mentioned above, the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 
2000 makes no reference to beliefs and values, nor is there any meaningful reference 
made to them in neither the discussion and consultation papers nor Adrian Ward’s key 
text on the law, Adult Incapacity. One of two things can be inferred from this; first, 
Scottish law does not consider the need to consider one’s beliefs and values to be 
important to issues relating to interventions to benefit the individual. Alternatively, 
Scottish law does accept the importance of beliefs and values in the context of 
interventions, but have failed to reflect this in any useful way within the legislation. 
ince England and Scotland have approached their respective legislations from S
similar ideological viewpoints, the latter premise may be the more appropriate.  
 
If misapplied, the principle of communitarianism could potentially conflict with the 
principle of autonomy and thus invalidate a decision. One has to consider the 
possibility that the practice of making decisions collaboratively, rather than 
individually, may ostensibly lead to a scenario whereby the individual’s views are in 
fact deemed unimportant when compared to those of the family. Although there is no 
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strict rule as to how this may occur, examples of this may be where the views of the 
elders i.e. parents and grandparents, are given the highest weighting, and the 
‘children’ of the family, despite having attained the age of majority, are expected not 
just to collaborate, but in fact give up their decision-making rights entirely. 
Alternatively, the hierarchical structure of the family may be decided on the basis of 
gender, with the women being expected to defer decisions to the men. Those with 
erced or unduly influenced into 
dopting a particular way of life. In this way, it can be seen how cultural issues can 
potentially impact upon the decision-making process.  
                                                
partial but not total incapacity e.g. individuals with learning disabilities, may also 
have their views deferred in favour of others in the family.  
Ultimately however, the principle of communitarianism should not be dismissed 
simply because of its potential for misapplication, as this could ostensibly be the case 
with any of the key ethical principles. What makes discussion on the principle of 
communitarianism particularly interesting is that it represents a merging of cultural 
and developmental issues. The emphasis that the principle places upon family values 
and living interdependently, has been identified by existing literature as a typically 
Indian approach545, thus highlighting culture as relevant to the principle 
communitarianism. At this stage, it is worth considering whether the younger/older 
family member dynamic would work differently within Indian families resident in the 
United Kingdom. While young people brought up in India may be brought up to defer 
to the elders in the family for important decisions, those brought up in the United 
Kingdom may find themselves exposed to a culture espousing more individualistic, 
independent behaviour. This is in addition to the individual’s family environment, 
which may still promote a more interdependent, communal way of life. Greater 
exposure to Western culture may lead the individual to question whether a 
collaborative approach to decision-making is preferable, and he/she may choose to 
take decisions on a more individualistic basis. Alternatively, he may be entirely happy 
with the family’s ethos and decide to maintain a communitiarian approach. Both are 
possibilities, and both scenarios are entirely in keeping with the principle of 
autonomy, provided that the individual has not been co
a
 
545 See Laungani, P (1997) Mental Illness in India and Britain: Theory and Practice; Medicine and 
Law; Vol. 16(3), 509-540; Ahmad, I (2003) Between the Ideal and the Real: Gender Relations within 
the Indian Joint Family; chapter in Pernau, M; Ahmad, I and Reifeld R (2003) Family and Gender: 
Changing Values in Germany and India; Sage Publications New Delhi; Venkoba Rao A (1981) Mental 
Health and ageing in India; Indian Journal of Psychiatry; Vol. 23(1), 11-20; Rack, P (1982) Race, 
Culture and Mental Disorder, Routledge Press London. 
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Similarly, work published by authors such as Rajan and Menon-Sen and Shiva Kumar 
suggest that a status approach is still adopted vis a vis women, again highlighting 
cultural attitudes. However, culture itself evolves and develops over time; even in the 
United Kingdom for instance, attitudes towards women in the 1950s were markedly 
different to those of today. It was stated in Chapter 1 of this thesis546 that mentally 
disordered or impaired individuals may also be seen as unable to make important 
decisions, even if they may retain some capacity to do so. This ties in to attitudes 
towards the mentally ill and disabled in India, where in some quarters they may still 
be seen as vulnerable and incapable of conducting any aspect of their lives 
independently547. Therefore, in the context of collaborative decision-making within 
the family, the wishes of the incapable individual may be considered subordinate to 
the views of other family members who have ‘full’ capacity, because there is still a 
lack of awareness of the fact that capacity is not an ‘all or nothing’ concept. Given 
that this attitude also prevailed in the United Kingdom until Re C (Adult: Refusal of 
Medical Treatment)548 highlighted the issue in 1994, this suggests that familial 
attitudes towards incapacitous family members will change and evolve once education 
nd awareness of issues mental illness issues develop in India in general.  
                                                
a
 
Discussion on the principle of communitarianism and its link to autonomy is 
inherently complex. This thesis has identified communitarianism as being relevant to 
Indian families, but of course it is possible for families in other communities to follow 
such an approach to decision-making. In the same way, Indian families may not 
follow a communitarian outlook at all, preferring instead to follow a more 
‘westernised’ individualistic approach. The intention is not to make generalisations, 
but rather, to highlight the fact that autonomous communitarianism is one potential 
avenue to decision-making which the individual should ideally be free to adopt or 
reject as they wish. Realistically, it is difficult to ascertain with complete certainty 
whether the line between receiving advice from family members and being coerced or 
manipulated by them has been crossed, for that can only be done by looking at each 
 
546 See page 45 of this thesis.  
547 Varma, L.P; Mental Disorders: Some Misconceptions; Souvenir III Conference of Eastern Zone; 
I.P.S, Guwahati; Tilak, D (1992) Mentally Handicapped: Care, Financial Security and Guardianship 
Needs; Indian Journal of Social Work; Vol. 53(1), 1-15. 
548 [1994] 1 All E.R 819.  
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individual case on its facts. However, it is submitted that ethical principles are 
essentially idealistic in nature; they provide benchmarks for actions and behaviour, 
and it may not be possible to achieve them absolutely. With the principle of 
autonomy, the key factor is whether it has been exercised sufficiently to render a 
decision valid. If a communitarian approach is utilised in achieving this, then it is 
elf valid and worth of consideration.   
.2: CAPACITY ASSESSMENT
its
  
6  
help to provide an analogous comparison with the law of England and 
cotland.  
eed only be informed in broad terms about the nature of 
e proposed treatment549.  
                                                
 
As highlighted above, there is little to separate the capacity law of England and 
Scotland in terms of the ethical principles which underpin the law. With respect to the 
provisions of the law which deal with the issue of capacity assessment, both 
jurisdictions again approach the issue from similar viewpoints. However, the manner 
in which the issue is provided for in statute provides significant scope for analysis. 
With respect to the Indian position, although there is no specific provision for 
assessment of capacity in relation to medical treatment, analysis of other areas of 
Indian law 
S
 
Both England and Scotland adopt a pro-autonomy, functional approach to capacity 
assessment. The English Mental Capacity Act 2005 states clearly that capacity must 
be presumed, meaning that the burden of proof lies on those wishing to prove 
incapacity. In addition, section 3(2) states that an individual will only be deemed 
incapable of making a treatment decision if they are unable to understand an 
explanation which is given in a manner appropriate to his/her circumstances. The 
Scottish position also emphasises the need for an approach which will override the 
individual’s autonomy only as a last resort. The 1991 Discussion Paper Mentally 
Disabled Adults states that an exhaustive evaluation of the treatment will not be 
necessary. The individual n
th
 
 
549 Ibid at Para 3.5. 
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Sections 2 and 3 of the English Mental Capacity Act 2005 address the issue of 
capacity assessment by providing definitions of a person who lacks capacity and the 
inability to make decisions respectively. Under s.2(1) of the Act, a person will be 
deemed to be incapable if they are unable to make a decision for themselves because 
of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain, thus 
forming the diagnostic threshold for accessing the provisions of the Act. The 
diagnostic threshold is present in the 2000 Scotland Act but in a less concise form. All 
that the 2000 Act tells the reader is that the criteria of incapacity stated in the Act 
ould be caused by a mental disorder or through an inability to communicate because 
 with the 2005 
t it is.  
The ore apparent in section 1(6) of the Adults with 
Inc
a person who has attained the age of 16 years; 
ble of –  
                                                
sh
of a physical disability550.  
 
 In the light of this, it is submitted that the 2000 Scotland Act suffers from significant 
weaknesses in the detail and wording, particularly when compared
English Act. The diagnostic threshold in the 2000 Act appears to have been included 
more as an afterthought, rather than the important provision tha
 weaknesses in drafting are yet m
apacity (Scotland) Act 2000. Section 1(6) reads as follows: 
“For the purposes of this Act… 
‘adult’ means 
‘incapable’ means incapa
(a) acting; or 
(b) making decisions; or 
(c) communicating decisions; or 
(d) understanding decisions; or 
(e) retaining the memory of decisions,” 
It is submitted that the criteria of incapacity outlined in subsections (a) to (e) are 
poorly worded when compared to the equivalent provisions in the English 2005 Act. 
Particularly unhelpful is the stipulation that the term ‘incapable’ can mean ‘incapable 
of acting’, which could conceivably encompass almost any aspect of the decision-
making process. Making, communicating, understanding and retaining the memory of 
decisions are ostensibly all examples of acts, yet ‘acting’ has been singled out as 
being separate from the remainder of the provisions. Readers are given no further 
 
550  s. 1(6).  
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explanation as to what constitutes an act and how it is separate from other 
considerations, with even the Code of Practice failing to correct this vagary. By 
comparison, section 3 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 provides more concise detail 
on the subject of inability to make decisions. In particular, s.3(1) states that a person 
will be deemed unable to make a decision if he/she is unable to understand 
information relevant to the decision; retain the information, use or weigh the 
information up, or to communicate the decision. It will be noted that these provisions 
are effectively a restatement of the capacity test laid down in Re MB (Medical 
Treatment)551. Further qualification of these criteria is provided in the remainder of 
s.3, with the Act clarifying that any information provided must be conveyed in 
language appropriate to the individual’s circumstances552, and also that ability to 
tain the decision for a short time does not preclude the individual from making a 
                                                
re
decision553.  
 
It maybe seen that the criteria of incapacity laid down in s.1(6) of the Scottish Act are 
broadly similar to the equivalent criteria in s.3 of the English Act. Both jurisdictions 
consider the ability to understand, retain and communicate decisions to be of 
significance in the decision-making process. However the provisions of the 2000 
Scottish Act are vaguely worded and ultimately unhelpful. Despite the fact that 
discussions on the Scottish law continually emphasised a pro-autonomy approach, it is 
submitted that this has not been adequately reflected in the legislation. At no point in 
the Scottish Act has it been emphasised that only a broad explanation will be 
necessary to satisfy the assessment criteria in s.1(6), despite the fact that this had been 
stated in earlier discussions on the Act. It is submitted that the Scottish Act would 
have benefited from further criteria highlighting the Act’s intention to provide as 
much scope for the individual’s capacity to be upheld as possible. Vague terms such 
as ‘inability to act’ only serve to complicate an already difficult area of law. This is 
not to say however that the provisions of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 should be 
entirely exempt from criticism. As with Scotland, it could be argued that rather than 
emphasise the criteria for the inability to make a decision, the Act would have 
benefited from more positive phrasing, i.e. provisions highlighting when an individual 
 
551 [1997] 38 B.M.L.R 175.  
552 Mental Capacity Act 2005 s.3(2).  
553 Ibid at s.3(3).  
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will be deemed capable as opposed to incapable. This is ultimately a minor point, but 
it has been mentioned particularly because of the decision to change the name of the 
legislation from the Mental Incapacity Act to the Mental Capacity Act, in order to 
place a more positive spin on the objectives of the Act. By the same token, it is 
arguable that this reasoning could have been adopted better in the provisions dealing 
with capacity assessment. This notwithstanding, section 3 of the Mental Capacity Act 
represents a worthy attempt to promote the principle of autonomy by emphasising that 
although proxy decision-making may be necessary in many cases, such a mechanism 
exists mainly as an option of last resort. While it is clear that Scotland endorses the 
me viewpoint, this does not come across adequately in the assessment criteria 
city to marry is deliberately low so as to 
                                                
sa
contained in the 2000 Act.  
 
With regards to the Indian position on assessment of capacity, the law in India 
provides no guidance on the issue of capacity assessment in relation to medical 
treatment. However, analysis of the law relating to capacity to marry provides some 
guidance by way of analogy. The amended s.5 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 states 
that a marriage may be solemnised between two Hindus, provided that at the time of 
marriage, neither party is incapable of giving valid consent as a result of suffering 
from unsoundness of mind. In addition, if an individual is capable of giving consent, 
but is deemed to be unfit for marriage or procreation as a result of mental disorder, a 
marriage may not be valid. Clearly capacity is of relevance when making a decision 
on marriage, as it is when deciding on medical treatment. However, the 1955 Hindu 
Marriage Act does not provide any criteria to aid decision-making, despite the 
presence of vague phrases such as ‘unsoundness of mind’. In addition, although the 
common law on the issue provides some guidance, there appears to be no real system 
or underlying ethos which is consistent across all decisions. What the common law 
does tell us is that the threshold for capa
ensure that marriages are not unnecessarily annulled or deemed void554, which is 
comparable to the position in England555.  
Although a rudimentary functional approach to capacity can be identified through the 
case of Usha v Abraham, this approach is not consistently applied in other Indian 
cases. It was held for example in Pravati Mishra v Jagananda Mishra that a woman 
 
554 See Usha v Abraham [1988] A.I.R Ker 96. 
555 Park v Park [1953] 3 W.L.R 112; Durham v Durham [1885] L.R 10 P.D. 80. 
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who had a low I.Q could not enter into a marriage because her condition was 
incurable and she was thus incapable of raising her children and discharging her 
duties as the member of a middle-class family. In contrast to Usha v Abraham, the 
court in Pravati Mishra v Jagananda Mishra556 adopted a status approach to capacity, 
emphasising the nature of the respondent’s condition rather than whether it would 
have an impact upon her capacity to marry. It is submitted that this inconsistency in 
approach can be attributed to a lack of development in India’s law. The decision in 
Usha v Abraham is the more compelling out of the few decisions that exist on 
capacity to marry, particularly in light of the fact that the English case of Durham v 
Durham was clearly influential. As well as the law relating to capacity to marry, a 
rudimentary functional approach can be identified through s.12 of the Indian Contract 
Act 1872, which allows an individual to enter into a contract provided that he/she is 
capable of doing so. In the case of individuals who may be suffering with some form 
of incapacity due to mental disorder or impairment, a contract may be entered into if 
at the time of making the contract, the individual is capable of understanding it and 
forming a rational judgment as to its effects upon him. This is similar to the approach 
taken in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which requires an ability to understand 
levant information and the ability to weigh the information as part of the process of 
                                                
re
making the decision.  
 
The Indian approach to capacity is still very much in a nascent stage and although a 
functional approach is recognised in a basic form, there is as yet no guidance as to 
how one’s capacity must be assessed. However, it must be noted that the 
developments in this field in England and Scotland have only taken place 
comparatively recently. Prior to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the Adults with 
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, neither England nor Scotland had provided guidance 
on the assessment of capacity and it was only through the development of the 
common law and cases such as Re MB that England and Scotland were in the position 
to introduce specific capacity legislation. This suggests that the lack of guidance on 
capacity assessment in India is attributable to developmental issues, which in turn 
suggests that either through the common law or legislation, the law will eventually 
recognise the importance of capacity law enough to provide guidance similar to that 
 
556 [1995] A.I.H.C 3434. 
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given in sections 1-3 of the 2005 English Act and s.1 of the 2000 Scottish Act. Prior 
to the implementation of the English and Scottish Acts, the English common law was 
able to provide a legal endorsement of the functional approach, even without the 
recognition of it in statute. This has not yet occurred in India, with the common law 
having not yet developed to the point where cases relating to capacity and medical 
treatment have reached the courts. However, this could again be attributed to 
developmental issues, since the same could be said of the common law in the United 
Kingdom. It was essentially not until 1994 that the functional approach to capacity 
was dealt with in common law via the case of Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical 
Treatment) (although it should be noted that the Law Commission’s 1991 report made 
reference to it). This suggests that at least theoretically, the law in India will 
eventually recognise the need to explicitly extend the functional approach to capacity 
by providing for assessment criteria within the law. It would be inaccurate to suggest 
that Indian law has officially endorsed a status approach to capacity, but in order for a 
functional approach to be better highlighted, it is necessary for awareness of capacity 
issues to increase. As with England, development of the common law will help to 
place the functional approach in context, with legislation then helping to codify this. It 
does of course remain to be seen when the common law of India will recognise 
capacity cases and the functional approach therein, although the fact that English law 
so recognised its importance comparatively recently suggests that the difference is al
more attributable to developmental issues than to other factors.  
  
6.3: DECISION-MAKING FOR THE INCAPABLE PATIENT 
 
The manner in which treatment decisions are made on behalf of incapable adults 
varies between the three jurisdictions. England utilises the best interests test whereas 
Scotland makes no reference to best interests, opting instead for a benefit test. India 
by contrast has no discernible formal system relating to such matters to speak of, 
although it may possible to discuss the direction that India should take were the 
country to adopt a system similar to that of England or Scotland. The central premise 
of both the best interests and the benefit tests are in essence the same; that the 
decision taken is that which the decision-maker deems is best for the individual. 
owever the tests which both England and Scotland provide for ascertaining this are 
different in a number of ways. 
H
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The best interests test, as preferred in English capacity law, is in keeping with the 
common law position as laid down in cases such as Re F (Mental Patient: 
Sterilisation) 557, Re A (Medical Treatment: Male Sterilisation)558 and Re SL (Adult 
Patient: Medical Treatment)559. The best interests test as laid down in the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 tells us that age, appearance or behaviour must not inform a 
determination of what is in the best interests of the individual. The decision not to 
provide a formal definition of best interests was taken deliberately by the Law 
Commission on the grounds that the circumstances of the individual should ideally 
determine the appropriate result560. Nevertheless, further guidance on the issue of best 
inte
decision-maker] must consider, so far as is reasonably 
cular any 
es that would be likely to influence his decision if he 
other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do 
to account, if it is practicable and appropriate to consult 
someone to be consulted on the matter in 
 the person, and  
st interests and, in particular, as to the 
matters mentioned in subsection (6).” 
                                                
rests was provided in s.4(6) and (7) of the 2005 Act, which reads as follows: 
“(6) He [the 
ascertainable-  
(a) the person’s past and present wishes and feelings (and in parti
relevant written statement made by him when he had capacity) 
(b) the beliefs and valu
had capacity, and  
(c) the 
so. 
 (7) He must take in
them, the views of - 
(a)  anyone named by the person as 
question or on matters of that kind, 
(b) anyone engaged in caring for the person or interested in his welfare, 
(c) any donee of a lasting power of attorney granted by
(d) any deputy appointed for the person by the court, 
as to what would be in the person’s be
 
The above provisions provide a useful point of comparison with Scotland. The 
Scottish Law Commission ultimately chose to reject the best interests test on the 
 
557 [1990] 2 A.C 1. 
558 [2000] 53 B.M.L.R 66.  
559 [2000] 2 F.C.R 452.  
560 Law Commission Report No. 231 (1995) at Para 3.26. 
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grounds that it was too vague a term and would require further clarification through 
other factors. In addition, the Scottish Law Commission stated that the concept of best 
interests had its roots in childcare law and was therefore inappropriate in the context 
of incapable adults561.  In the 1995 Report on Incapable Adults, the Scottish Law 
Commission argued that an incapable adult should not be compared to a child on the 
grounds that an incapable adult will have gone from a position of full capacity to a 
position of partial or total incapacity. 562 By contrast, children have never been able to 
approach decisions from a position of full capacity, with their incapacity simply 
diminishing each year as they reach adulthood. This is an unconvincing argument. In 
rejecting the relevance of best interests to capacity law in Scotland, it is submitted that 
the Scottish Law Commission has effectively rejected England’s common law 
approach to the issue. That the best interests test is paramount to the issue of decision-
making for incapable adults is evidenced by cases such as Re F (Mental Patient: 
Sterilisation), Re SL (Adult Patient: Medical Treatment) and Re A (Medical 
reatment: Male Sterilisation).  
                                                
T
 
 In addition, The Scottish Law Commission also asserted that incapable adults 
suffering with mental illness, head injuries or dementia will have had full capacity 
before their particular condition occurred. However, in making this assertion, the 
Scottish Law Commission failed to consider the possibility that for some, incapacity 
will be present since birth, thus falsifying the Commission’s assertion that incapable 
adults will have possessed full mental capacity at some point.563 The Scottish Law 
Commission only referred to three possible conditions which may lead to incapacity, 
one of which, mental illness, is extremely general. It could be argued that the Scottish 
Law Commission in essence felt that the best interests test was too paternalistic, and 
that paternalism was more appropriate when dealing with children than with incapable 
adults, who, despite their incapacity, were nonetheless adults. This is perhaps 
commendable to some extent; since such a view would be in keeping with the pro-
autonomy approach espoused on numerous occasions. However, the Commission’s 
view ultimately comes across as unrealistic and naïve. Both children and incapable 
 
561 Scottish Law Commission Report No. 151 (1995) Report on Incapable Adults at Para 2.50.  
562 Ibid.  
563 In Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 A.C 1; Re A (Medical Treatment: Male 
Sterilisation) [2000] 53 B.M.L.R 66 and Re SL (Adult Patient: Medical Treatment) [2000] 2 F.C.R 452, 
the condition suffered by all three patients which led to their incapacity had existed since birth.  
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adults do have one significant commonality, which is that both are likely to require 
some intervention into at least some aspects of the decision-making process. In this 
respect, the best interests test is entirely appropriate for dealing with incapable adults 
as well as children. If the Scottish Law Commission rejected the test on the grounds 
that it was too paternalistic, this is valid in relation to the test as used in English 
common law. However, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 has since included a modified 
version of the best interests test so that it now includes elements of substituted 
judgment. As the concept of benefit as included in the Scottish Act also includes 
elements of substituted judgment, it is submitted that the difference between the two 
concepts is not as significant as it would have been prior to the implementation of the 
ental Capacity Act 2005.  
nd that such benefit cannot reasonably be 
chieved without the intervention.”  
M
 
As an alternative to the best interests test, the Scottish Law Commission proposed that 
the appropriate test for proxy decision-making would be the benefit test. The 2000 
Act however provides little guidance as to how a proxy decision-maker should 
determine whether a particular decision will be to the benefit to the individual. All 
that is really stated about the concept of benefit can be found in s.1(2) of the 2000 
Act: “There shall be no intervention in the affairs of an adult unless the person 
responsible for authorising or effecting the intervention is satisfied that the 
intervention will benefit the adult a
a
 
The above policy statement is essentially no different to the English approach to 
proxy decision-making. Scottish law states that intervention i.e. adopting a 
paternalistic approach, is only permissible if attempts to benefit the individual cannot 
be achieved without making decisions on behalf of the individual. Both England and 
Scotland have given the highest priority to the same criteria. What does this tell us 
about the approach to proxy decision-making in England and Scotland? Although the 
fact that both jurisdictions do not agree upon the appropriate term to describe the test 
for proxy decision-making, the substantive similarities between the best interests test 
and the benefit test cannot be ignored; neither term has been given explicit definition, 
with both England and Scotland preferring to allow individual circumstances to 
inform the manner of the intervention. However, in both England and Scotland, the 
past and present wishes and feelings of the individual have been deemed to be of the 
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highest importance, followed by the wishes of those individuals who are closely 
connected to the individual, such as family and carers. It must be noted however that 
with regards to the Scottish position, the 2000 Act does not make it immediately clear 
as to whether the criteria laid down in s.1(4) is directly applicable to the issue of 
benefit. What readers are told is that the criteria should to be used when making a 
decision on the nature of an intervention. ‘Benefit’ as a concept is not mentioned 
within s.1(4), but is instead mentioned earlier in s.1(2) independently of the criteria of 
s.1(4). By contrast, the equivalent criteria in the 2005 English Act is explicitly stated 
as being connected to the concept of best interests, by virtue of its inclusion within 
section 4 of the Act, which deals specifically with best interests. However, this could 
ultimately be argued as being an issue of semantics rather than a discernible 
difference between the English and Scottish approaches. The s.1(4) criteria of the 
2000 Scottish Act is to be relied upon when deciding on whether an intervention is to 
be made, and how to make it. What the reader has been told is that the intervention 
must benefit the adult. In essence therefore, the criteria of s.1(4) can ostensibly be 
directly linked to the issue of benefit. Be this as it may, the fact that this issue has 
been highlighted in this analysis illustrates that the 2000 Scottish Act suffers from a 
lack of clarity. Intervention on behalf of an incapable adult is a crucial aspect of 
capacity law, and this has been accepted in the Scottish discussion and consultation 
papers. Ultimately, very little of the Act focuses upon the concept of benefit 
compared to the English Mental Capacity Act. Whilst a determination of what 
benefits an individual will often depend on individual circumstances, the provisions 
concerning best interests under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 show that some criteria 
will be universally applicable in all cases e.g. whether the individual will regain 
capacity and encouragement of the individual to participate in the decision-making 
process will be applicable in almost all cases. One might therefore argue that the 
Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 could conceivably have included greater 
detail as to what should be taken into account when deciding on whether a particular 
intervention would benefit the individual, perhaps in a separate section as opposed to 
three sentences in the ‘general principles’ section of the Act. It can therefore be seen 
that the concepts of best interests and benefit are very similar. Both concepts 
emphasise the need to balance a hard paternalism approach with a more pro-autonomy 
approach (in essence, both tests contain an element of substituted judgment which has 
been given priority above the wishes and opinions of others). Both concepts also lack 
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an explicit definition. However, the best interests test as laid down in section 4 of the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 contains significantly more detail than the explanation of 
e concept of benefit laid down in the 2000 Scottish Act.  
                                                
th
 
As with much of its capacity law, the position in India with regards to proxy decision 
making and best interests has not been formally developed. The 1994 Pune 
hysterectomies scandal highlights similar issues to those raised in English sterilisation 
cases. The operations were proposed in order to help the women manage their 
menstrual hygiene and also to safeguard against unwanted pregnancy564. However, 
the proposed operations were denounced by women’s rights groups who stated that 
hysterectomy operations were not justifiable for the purposes of eliminating menstrual 
periods, as the primary motivation was for the convenience of the carers rather than 
the welfare of the individual565. This in essence mirrors the approach taken by English 
cases such as Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation), Re A (Medical Treatment: Male 
Sterilisation) and Re SL (Adult Patient: Medical Treatment) which confirm that any 
proposed operation can only be justifiable if in the best interests of the individual. In 
addition, the guidelines published by the Forum for Medical Ethics confirm that 
performing a hysterectomy operation for the purposes of eliminating menstrual 
hygiene is justifiable subject to evidence that any breach of hygiene is hazardous to 
the patient’s well-being, again illustrating a rudimentary best interests approach. In 
addition, reference is made to the principle of least restrictive alternative by virtue of 
the fact that a hysterectomy is not permitted solely to prevent pregnancy when there 
are less invasive procedures which would accomplish this objective566. It can 
therefore be seen that both the U.K and Indian approach to best interests have similar 
starting points. The main difference lies in the extent to which India’s system has 
developed. Literature on India shows recognition of the need to safeguard the welfare 
of incapable adults, but this has not yet developed to the extent that it has been 
brought before the courts or enshrined in legislation. In addition, the literature 
 
564 Author unspecified (1994) Removing the Uterus from Mentally Handicapped Women: Some Ethical 
Considerations; Indian Journal of Medical Ethics; Vol. 1(3); accessed on 18/01/2006; available online 
at http://www.issuesinmedicalethics.org/013mi010.html. 
565 PARYAY (1994) Hysterectomy in the Mentally Handicapped; Indian Journal of Medical Ethics; 
Vol. 2(1); accessed on 18/01/2006; available online at 
http://www.issuesinmedicalethics.org/021mi006.html. 
566 Author unspecified (1994) Suggested Guidelines for Hysterectomy in Mentally Handicapped 
Women; Indian Journal of Medical Ethics; Vol. 1(4). Accessed online on 18/01/2006; available at 
http://www.issuesinmedicalethics.org/014mi002.html. 
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highlights that there is a greater emphasis placed upon the status approach in India in 
comparison to the United Kingdom. This notwithstanding, the fact the discussion on 
the relevant issues has begun means that there is scope for development in the future.  
suggests that decision-making within Indian families can be a collaborative 
                                                
 
As stated earlier in this chapter, the literature review pertaining to India has shown 
that communitarian and familial values carry as much importance as values which 
emphasise the needs of the individual. This must not be taken as meaning that the 
needs, wishes and feelings of the individual are disregarded altogether; it is simply 
that the emphasis on the individual appears not to be as pronounced as it is in England 
and Scotland. How then might a communitarian approach apply to decision-making 
on behalf of an incapable adult? In his twelve point checklist567 which is discussed in 
Chapter 4.3 of this thesis568 Ward gives primary importance to the competent 
decisions of the individual, past and present. He subsequently states that the choices, 
wishes and feelings of the individual should be considered if a competent decision is 
not ascertainable. The crux of the issue is that any ascertainable decisions and wishes 
of the individual must be given paramount importance in keeping with the 
empowerment ethos of the law of capacity. Ward also highlights any information 
from those closest to the individual as being a potentially useful factor in proxy 
decision-making. It is submitted that of particular relevance to an Indian approach to 
decision-making is the ninth factor on Ward’s list; the shared views and ethos of the 
adult’s family. This criterion suggests a communitarian approach to decision-making, 
where the family get together and collectively decide on the best approach. Ward does 
not give particular importance to this approach, only prioritising it above the shared 
views and ethos of others associated with the individual, such as religious or ethic 
groups, and the norms of society. Given the apparent importance placed upon 
collaborative decision-making, one could argue that were Ward’s list to be 
constructed in an Indian context, the shared views and ethos of the family would 
occupy a higher position in the list alongside the views and decisions of the individual 
themselves. It is difficult to be definitive on this of course, but existing literature 
 
567 Ward, A.D (2003) Adult Incapacity; W. Green/Sweet and Maxwell Edinburgh at Para 15.9. 
568 See Chapter 4.3 of this thesis at 146.  
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process569. Such an approach would necessitate greater priority being given to the 
views and ethos of family members as well as the individual themselves.  
 
Given that the English and Scottish approach to decision-making on behalf of the 
incapable adult prioritises the decisions, wishes and feelings of the individual as far as 
these are ascertainable, this raises the question of whether the English and Scottish 
legislations allow for best interests or benefit determinations to be made in the context 
of a collaborative i.e. communitarian approach. Such an approach will be possible, 
particularly under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Section 4(6)(b) of the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 allows for the decision-maker to consider the beliefs and values 
that would be likely to influence the incapable adult’s decision if capacity was 
present. The Act does not permit the family members to actually make a final 
treatment decision on behalf of an incapable family member, but it may be possible to 
ascertain evidence showing that collaborative or deferred decision-making was part of 
the individual’s value system, i.e. that the individual often or always made the 
autonomous decision to make treatment decisions with family members or defer 
decisions to them entirely. This is no less of an autonomous process than if the 
individual had come to a decision entirely by themselves. Therefore, the decision 
maker must consider whether the adult, before the onset of incapacity, chose to 
collaborate with or defer decisions to family members and whether this process was 
part of the individual’s belief or value system as specified under s.4(6)(b) of the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005. Although the family would not retain the right to make 
any final decisions, their consistent involvement in the decision-making of the 
incapable adult could be used by the healthcare professional when deciding whether a 
particular course of action is in the individual’s best interests.  
 
Whether the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 equally takes account of 
communitarian decision-making as part of a belief or value system is more difficult to 
ascertain. Although s.1(4) of the Act does make reference to the present and past 
wishes of the adult as well as the views of the nearest relative and primary carer of the 
                                                 
569 Laungani, P (1997) Mental Illness in India and Britain: Theory and Practice; Medicine and Law; 
Vol. 16(3), 509-540; Rack, P (1982) Race, Culture and Mental Disorder, Routledge Press at 73; 
Juthani, N.V (2001) Psychiatric Treatment of Hindus, International Review of Psychiatry, Vol. 13(2), 
125-130; Venkoba Rao, A (1981) Mental Health and Ageing in India, Indian Journal of Psychiatry, 
Vol. 23(1), 11-20. 
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adult, there is no reference made to the beliefs and values of the adult. Therefore, the 
only possible way for a family to establish that a collaborative or deferred system of 
decision-making was part of the incapable adult’s belief or value system is to 
establish that this approach was an important aspect of the individual’s past wishes or 
feelings. However the fact that the Mental Capacity Act 2005 refers to the past and 
present wishes and feelings of the individual separately from any reference to the 
beliefs and values of the individual570 shows that there is a difference between the two 
criteria. The past and present wishes and feelings of the individual are applicable to 
each particular treatment decision, as opposed to beliefs and values, which will inform 
many aspects of an individual’s life. In the light of this, the Adults with Incapacity 
(Scotland) Act 2000 arguably fails to sufficiently consider the impact of beliefs and 
values when deciding whether a particular intervention will benefit the individual. 
This is not to say that beliefs and values are specifically excluded from the legislation, 
but their potential impact upon families of Indian origin residing in Scotland appears 
not to have been fully appreciated.  
 
6.4: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE  
 
There is little doubt that both England and Scotland had virtually identical objectives 
when their respective governments drafted both pieces of legislation. Both 
jurisdictions have placed maximum emphasis upon the welfare and best interests of 
the individual throughout both statutes, and this stance has been maintained in relation 
to the procedural aspects of incapacity law for both England and Scotland. Although 
England and Scotland are both ostensibly similar in terms of what they are trying to 
achieve, closer examination of the procedural aspects reveals some differences in 
approach. 
 
With regards to the English position, analysis of the procedural mechanisms provided 
by the Mental Capacity Act 2005 show that the incapable adult has been provided 
with ways in which they can take control of medical treatment decisions even after the 
onset incapacity. The option to specify an advance refusal of treatment is provided for 
under sections 24 to 26 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 which will allow the 
                                                 
570 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.4(6).  
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incapable adult to make a treatment decision which is as valid as a decision made 
when capable. This is in keeping with the empowerment theme of the Act, and also 
satisfies the procedural principle of participation, which stipulates that the individual 
be provided with the opportunity to participate as fully as is practicable in any 
proceedings relating to themselves. This principle is also satisfied through the option 
of creating a Lasting Power of Attorney document under s.9(1) of the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005. As with advance refusals of treatment, Lasting Powers of 
Attorney enable the incapable adult to specify what should be done in relation to 
welfare matters upon the onset of incapacity. The attorney appointed must carry out 
his/her duties in keeping with the general principles of the Act and the scope of the 
attorney’s powers are at the discretion of the donor i.e. the individual who created the 
L.P.A document. The fact that the donor can specify precisely when the attorney can 
and cannot act again satisfies the procedural principle of participation. In addition, the 
principle of accuracy is satisfied because the detail required by both advance refusals 
of treatment and L.P.A documents means that there is less chance of the individual’s 
wishes being incorrectly carried out or ignored.  
 
As an additional safeguard, Part 2 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 establishes a 
Court of Protection. Under s.47(1), the Court of Protection has the same rights, 
privileges and authority as the High Court, which retains its inherent jurisdiction and 
power to issue declarations wherever there is a serious justiciable issue concerning the 
best interests of an incapable adult571. Section 15 of the Act confirms the power of the 
Court of Protection to make declarations on specific issues relating to the capacity of 
an individual and the lawfulness of any act done in furtherance of the individual’ s 
best interests. This power would also ensure compliance with Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which provides the right to a fair and 
impartial trial within a reasonable amount of time. In the context of capacity, this 
must include the right to challenge any finding of incapacity particularly since, as 
Ward states, “The right to act for oneself and make one’s own decisions in 
matters of one’s own personal welfare, or about one’s own property and 
financial affairs, is a fundamental civil right.”572 In addition under s.50 of the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005, the incapable adult does not require permission to apply to 
                                                 
571 Re F (Adult Court’s Jurisdiction) [2001] Fam 38. 
572 Ward, A D (2003) Adult Incapacity; W Green/Sweet and Maxwell Edinburgh at Para 1.47. 
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the Court of Protection, which will help to uphold the procedural principle of 
participation.  
 
It can be seen that the principles of accuracy and participation are appropriately 
represented within the procedural mechanisms of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. In 
addition, a number of safeguards are in place to ensure that the Court of Protection 
discharges its duties towards the individual appropriately. The Act makes provision 
for the court to appoint deputies should there be a need for an ongoing process of 
decision-making powers and if a Lasting Power of Attorney has not been set up573. 
Deputies are in turn supervised by the Public Guardian to ensure that they are suitable 
to carry out their duties. In order to provide further support to the incapable adult who 
has nobody else is available for consultation, s.35 of the Act establishes a system of 
Independent Mental Capacity Advocates to further enable the individual to participate 
in any proceedings relating to them thus further upholding the principle of 
participation.  
The procedural mechanisms laid down in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 appropriately 
consider the need to empower the individual to take control of decisions relating to 
themselves through the creation of documents such as advance refusals of treatment 
or Lasting Powers of Attorney, whilst also giving importance to the need to 
adequately safeguard the welfare and best interests of the individual, particularly 
when an application needs to be made to the Court of Protection. However, one 
important procedural principle, the principle of conciliation, has not been represented 
as effectively as it could have been.  
 
The Court of Protection is intended to be accessed as an option of last resort, with the 
ideal scenario being that an individual will have successfully utilised other options to 
have their welfare needs met, such as advance refusals of treatment or Lasting Powers 
of Attorney. The Draft Court of Protection Rules 2006 made extensive reference to 
pre-action protocols, which it was envisaged would encourage dispute resolution 
between parties in a more conciliatory manner which would not require an application 
to the Court of Protection574. However, any reference to pre-action protocols has since 
been removed and the final Court of Protection Rules 2007 make no reference to 
                                                 
573 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.16.  
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them. Further research in to why this is the case has provided no answer as to why this 
has happened, and it is submitted that the removal of pre-action protocols from the 
Court of Protection Rules 2007 was a mistake in the context of upholding the 
principle of conciliation.  
 
How then, does the provision of procedural justice under the Mental Capacity Act 
2005 compare with procedural justice as provided by the Adults with Incapacity 
(Scotland) Act 2000? As with the Mental Capacity Act 2005, the Adults with 
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 promotes the autonomy of the incapable adult 
wherever practicable, coupled with appropriate measures to safeguard the individual’s 
welfare. However, it is submitted that the procedural mechanisms that are in place 
prioritise safeguarding the individual ahead of empowering them to take control over 
treatment decisions in the event of incapacity.  
 
Section 16 of the 2000 Act allows the creation of a Welfare Power of Attorney which, 
as with the Lasting Power of Attorney in English law, allows the individual to appoint 
an attorney to act on their behalf once incapacity has manifested. The attorney must 
apply the general principles of the Act at all times and must encourage the individual 
to exercise any skills that might be present despite the onset of incapacity. In this way, 
the substantive principle of autonomy and the procedural principle of participation 
will ideally be upheld. This can be compared to the position regarding Lasting Powers 
of Attorney under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. However, a major failing of the 
Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act is the exclusion of the option to create advance 
statements on medical treatment.  
As evidenced by the Mental Capacity Act 2005, advance statements are arguably the 
most effective way that an individual can take control of treatment decisions even 
after capacity no longer exists. This is central to the pro-autonomy ethos of capacity 
law and also upholds the procedural principles of accuracy and participation. The 
principle of accuracy will be upheld because advance statements provide a clear 
statement of the individual’s wishes, thus minimising the chances of misinterpretation 
of these wishes. Furthermore, the principle of participation will be satisfied through 
the execution of the individual’s wishes even after the onset of incapacity. It is 
therefore surprising that advance statements are not provided for within the 
legislation, particularly given that they would subsequently be included in legislation 
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via the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) Scotland Act 2003. Therefore, an 
opportunity to further promote the principles of autonomy, whilst also promoting 
important procedural principles has been missed.  
 
As with the Court of Protection in English capacity law, Scottish capacity law allows 
for court applications to be made, this being the Sheriff Court.   
As things stand, applying to the Sheriff Court is a complicated process. To illustrate 
this point, consider the fact that there are effectively three ways in which an 
individual may make an application to the Sheriff court; these are under s.14 (Appeal 
against decision as to incapacity), s.50 (Medical treatment where guardian etc. has 
been appointed) and s.52 (Appeal against decision as to medical treatment) of the 
2000 Act. In addition to this, s.50 appeals are again split into sub-categories; under 
s.50(3) and s.50(6), and can only be utilised when a decision has been made by a 
medical practitioner. By contrast, s.52 is more general in scope. Whilst it cannot be 
doubted that the purpose of this overabundance of formal procedure is to safeguard 
the interests of the individual, it could equally be argued that the opposite effect will 
be achieved.  
 
It is submitted that in order to achieve procedural justice for the individual, it is not 
only necessary to provide adequate safeguards, but also necessary to do so without 
unnecessarily stigmatising the individual in the process. The English case of R v 
Bournewood Community and Mental Health N.H.S Trust, ex parte L575 highlights the 
potential incompatibility of these two factors: 
Bournewood concerned L, a 48 year old autistic and mentally retarded gentleman who 
had a history of self-injurious behaviour. Although L had been resident in a hospital 
for over thirty years, he had eventually been released to live with paid carers whilst 
still under the care of the hospital. In 1997 L became agitated a day care centre, and 
since his carers could not be contacted, he was taken to the behavioural unit of the 
hospital. L’s consultant decided that it would be in his best interests to be readmitted 
so that his condition might stabilise. Since L was compliant, it was not considered 
necessary to detain him compulsorily under s.3 of the Mental Health Act 1983. L was 
therefore detained informally in an unlocked ward under s.131(1) of the 1983 Act. L’s 
                                                 
575 [1999] 1 A.C 458; hereafter referred to as Bournewood. 
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carers did not believe that L was lawfully detained and sought judicial review on his 
behalf. The court held that since L had been informally admitted and that the doctrine 
of necessity had been complied with, his detention was lawful and the application for 
habeas corpus was subsequently refused. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that 
s.131 was designed for patients who actively complied with informal admission. 
Since L had not actually consented, but rather, simply not objected, his detention 
could not be justified. Bournewood subsequently appealed the decision and won.  
In his decision, Lord Woolf outlined the possible justification for L’s detention, and in 
doing so, outlined the potential dichotomy between safeguarding the individual and 
stigmatising him: 
“The starting point of the common law is that when a person lacks capacity, 
for whatever reason, to take decisions about medical treatment, it is 
necessary for other persons, with appropriate qualifications, to take such 
decisions for him… against this common law background the Percy Report 
recommended a shift from the ‘legalism’ whereby hospital patients were 
‘certified’ by special procedures, to a situation in which most patients would 
be ‘informally received’ in hospital, the term ‘informally’ signifying ‘without 
legal formality’… the desired objective was to avoid stigmatising patients and 
to avoid where possible the adverse effects of ‘sectioning’ patients. Where 
admission to hospital was required compulsion was to be regarded as a 
measure of last resort.”576  
In essence, the conflict in Bournewood was as follows: In detaining L informally, the 
process was considerably less stigmatising for him; he was not locked in his room nor 
forced to remain against his will. However, in being detained informally, L was 
effectively denied the legal safeguards that a patient formally detained under s.3 of the 
Mental Health Act 1983 would be privy to.  
 
Ultimately, it is a question of which of the two aspects of patient care deserves 
priority. One could argue that Scotland’s decision to put large amounts of formal 
procedure in place clearly indicates that the need to adequately safeguard the 
incapable adult has been prioritised, albeit at the expense of stigmatising the 
individual. Proponents of this approach could argue that an exhaustive set of 
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safeguards is essential when dealing with incapable adults; unfortunate though it may 
be, incapable adults are in a more vulnerable position, and the very fact that specific 
legislation has been deemed necessary in both England and Scotland confirms further 
that this is the case. The concept of ‘benefit’ plays an important part in the 2000 Act, 
and ensuring that individuals are protected at all times against ill-treatment and 
unnecessary interventions could be argued to be of the most benefit. Furthermore, 
such benefit might arguably be worth drawing attention to an individual’s condition.  
Conversely however, opponents of Scotland’s approach to procedural justice could 
argue that the 2000 Act has failed to adhere to another important principle of capacity 
law, namely the principle of non-discrimination. The need to promote an individual’s 
autonomy and to keep them involved in their own lives as much practicable is one of 
the fundamental principles of the law of capacity in both England and Scotland. It 
could therefore be argued that the level of emphasis placed upon formal procedural 
justice in Scotland potentially draws too much attention to an individual’s incapacity. 
Indeed, an individual’s incapacity has been ‘formalised’ to a great extent in Scotland 
as shown by the requirement that a certificate of incapacity must be filled out once a 
medical practitioner has confirmed an individual’s incapacity. In addition to this, it 
could be argued that the methods of lodging an appeal are so convoluted that 
individuals may be put off from seeking justice in this manner. Also, there is little 
emphasis placed on the fact that some disputes could potentially be resolved without 
recourse to the courts, thereby effectively leading individuals to believe that going 
through the lengthy process of applying to the court is the only option available. 
Therefore, an individuals’ condition is brought to the forefront of proceedings further, 
thus potentially stigmatising the individual further. In turn, it could be argued that 
Scottish capacity law, by over-emphasising the need for formal procedure are doing 
the same to the individual’s incapacity, and thus failing to satisfy the principle of non-
discrimination. Scottish capacity law, as with England, stresses the importance of 
promoting the autonomy of the individual, and along with this, the premise that the 
presence of incapacity should not always be a barrier to being able to make decisions 
as a person with full capacity would. However well intentioned Scotland’s penchant 
for formal procedure may be, a potential consequence of this is that the individual 
would be required to formally and publicly state that he/she is suffering with some 
particular form of incapacity, which in turn increases the chances of the individual 
being labelled with the status of an incapable adult whose decision-making abilities 
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are lacking across all aspects of life. This status approach has been rejected in Scottish 
law by virtue of the emphasis that has been placed upon the autonomy of the 
individual577, yet placing an individual in a position whereby their disorder or 
impairment is made the focus of proceedings, as opposed to simply using proceedings 
to allow the individual to express wishes and opinions, may actually do more to 
promote the status approach than to reject it. In comparison, England’s proposals for 
the new Court of Protection appear at least in principle to have struck the correct 
balance between safeguarding the individual and not stigmatising them unnecessarily. 
When it is decided that an application to the court is necessary, the process is simpler 
when compared to Scotland’s. However, by proposing a simpler approach, it does not 
mean that England has disregarded safeguards entirely. Instead, a pragmatic approach 
has been proposed, where the Court of Protection is available should a case warrant 
its involvement, but with emphasis placed upon the individual taking control over 
decisions so that applications to the Court will not be necessary. By contrast, 
Scotland’s approach, though undeniably well intentioned, is arguably too complicated 
for many to comprehend, and the convoluted approach risks alienating those who are 
in genuine need of procedural justice. Furthermore, the lack of emphasis upon 
resolving cases without court intervention also increases the possibility of courts 
being overburdened with cases, thus increasing the possibility of non-compliance with 
Article 6 of the E.C.H.R on the grounds that access to the courts may not be possible 
within a reasonable amount of time. It should be noted that Scottish capacity law has 
not yet been challenged under Article 6 of the E.C.H.R, but it is submitted that a 
greater emphasis upon alternatives to Sheriff Court applications would further reduce 
the chances of such a challenge being made.  
 
The importance of the procedural principles as laid down in the Council of Europe’s 
Recommendation (99)4 was discussed in Chapter 2.2 of this thesis. To what extent do 
the procedural mechanisms of both the English and Scottish legislations take note of 
the guidance given in Recommendation (99)4? 
 
With regards to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, some of the points raised in the 
procedural guidelines are dealt with in the general principles of the 2005 Act. 
                                                 
577See Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No. 94 (1991) Mentally Disabled Adults: Legal 
Arrangements for Managing their Welfare and Finances at Para 3.5. 
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Principle 11, in stating that an individual must be informed of proceedings in a 
manner and language which they will understand, is in essence a re-iteration of s.3(2) 
of the Act, which states that an individual should not be deemed incapable of 
understanding information if he/she is able to understand an explanation given in a 
manner appropriate to their circumstances. The rule which allows informing the 
individual of proceedings to be bypassed on the grounds of health could be argued to 
be covered by the Act via the inclusion of the best interests standard in s.4. As this 
states that any intervention on behalf of an individual must be in their best interests, it 
could be argued that this includes omissions as well as acts i.e. not disclosing 
information to protect the health of the individual. Indeed, the best interests standard 
is unsurprisingly a common thread throughout the procedural guidelines of 
Recommendation (99)4. This can be seen in particular in principles 12-14, which deal 
with investigation and assessment, the right to be heard in person and duration, review 
and appeal respectively. Emphasis has been placed upon the incompatibility with 
European guidance of actions which unnecessarily restrict the legal capacity of the 
individual, commit the individual to proceedings which are unnecessarily long in 
duration, and which provide no adequate rights of appeal. All these rules could be 
identified as clear indicators that the interests of the individual take priority.  
 
With regards to Scotland, the fact that the legislation has been in operation for the last 
five years suggests that the 2000 Act has adequately taken into consideration the 
guidelines of the Council of Europe. However, it could be argued that greater priority 
has been given to the procedural guidelines given in Recommendation (99)4 than the 
general principles that the document provided. As stated earlier, Scotland’s procedural 
mechanisms are considerably more formal and complex than those proposed by 
England in the 2005 Mental Capacity Act. The advantage of this could be argued as 
being that the individual would be privy to a significant amount of legal safeguards. 
Furthermore, certain aspects of the procedural guidelines proposed by the Council of 
Europe appear to have been followed by Scotland to the letter. An example of this can 
be found s.11 of the 2000 Act, which deals with the intimation of proceedings to the 
individual. This is essentially a reiteration of Principle 11 of Recommendation (99)4, 
which deals with the institution of proceedings, and more specifically, the 
requirement that the individual must be informed of the institution of any proceedings 
made concerning them. In addition, both Recommendation (99)4 and s.11 of the 2000 
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Act state that this requirement may be waived if the health of the individual would be 
affected by being notified of the institution of proceedings. As per Principle 12 of 
(99)4, the individual’s capacity must be investigated and assessed. A section 47 
certificate could be construed as satisfying the requirement that an up-to-date report 
must be published in writing. The individual also has the right to be present at the 
proceedings as dictated by Principle 13 of Recommendation (99)4578 Rights of appeal 
are also present579 as per Principle 14 of (99)4. 
It is clear that Scottish capacity law under the 2000 Act has placed procedural 
protection at a high priority. This is to be commended, particularly in the light of the 
apparent influence of the Council of Europe. However, the great emphasis placed 
upon procedural justice could be argued to have led to a neglect of the potential 
discomfort of the individual during proceedings. Although intimation of proceedings 
can be waived on the grounds of health, the complexity of the procedural aspects of 
the 2000 Act means that individuals wishing to utilise the courts may be daunted by 
the process involved. Whilst it is undoubtedly crucial to adhere to the procedural 
guidelines laid down in Recommendation (99)4, it is equally important to adhere to 
the general principles which concern the welfare of the individual. Whilst well 
intentioned, it is arguable that Scottish capacity law has prioritised procedure over 
other considerations.  
 
Given that the capacity law of India has not yet developed in any significant way, it is 
unsurprising that procedural justice for incapable adults is equally undeveloped. 
Indian law does however make provisions for declaratory relief to be sought. This 
means that the system could theoretically be used in a capacity context similar to the 
English approach. Prior to the implementation of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, 
declarations could be granted by the High Court if there was a serious justiciable issue 
brought before it, which, as was confirmed in Re S (Hospital Patient: Court’s 
Jurisdiction)580 and Re F (Adult: Court’s Jurisdiction)581 could be any issues relating 
to the best interests of the individual. The common law jurisdiction still prevails in 
India, and given the availability of declaratory relief, this jurisdiction could be 
invoked to resolve capacity matters. However, as stated in Chapter 5 of this thesis, it 
                                                 
578 Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No. 94 (1991) at Para 6.7 
579 Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 s. 53. 
580 [1996] Fam 1.  
581 [2001] Fam 38.  
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is first necessary for somebody to want to avail themselves of this, and it currently 
remains to be seen when the law of capacity will develop to the extent that declaratory 
relief will be sought in its context. However, the system of declaratory relief did not 
develop in the context of capacity until Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation)582 in 
1990. In the same way, the possibility of a similar development in Indian law cannot 
be discounted entirely.  
 
Indian law also recognises the importance of alternative methods of dispute 
resolution. This is highlighted by the system of Lok Adalats which are used to resolve 
financial disputes before in a conciliatory compromising manner as an alternative to 
seeking redress in the courts. This shows that the importance of the principle of 
conciliation is recognised to some extent in India, and it is therefore submitted that a 
similarly modelled system may be useful in resolving disputes relating to capacity 
before an application to the courts are made. Again, it will first be necessary for 
capacity issues to be deemed legally significant, but the system of Lok Adalats are 
worth highlighting as potentially useful were this to happen. 
 
6.5: SUMMARY OF FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
The research that has been undertaken for this thesis has revealed that the differences 
between the capacity law of England, Scotland and India are affected by both 
developmental and cultural issues. India’s system is particularly underdeveloped 
when compared to that of the United Kingdom’s, although analysis of existing 
literature has revealed that this development has begun, with journal articles in 
particular highlighting the Western approach to capacity and the potential impact of 
this upon Indian law. The crux of the matter is that this development is taking place 
more through academic commentary via journal and newspaper articles and books; 
the point has not yet been reached where these issues are being brought before the 
courts, much less being enshrined in legislation. The fact that some of the existing 
Indian literature makes direct reference to U.K and American capacity law suggests 
that the approach of these jurisdictions is becoming more influential. Subsequently, 
this influence could ostensibly translate to changes and development of the law.  
                                                 
582 [1990] 2 A.C 1.  
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In addition, the research also confirmed the relevance of culture upon aspects of 
capacity law, as shown in particular by the principle of communitarianism and its 
potential impact upon the decision-making process.  Research has shown that 
developmental and cultural factors may not always be mutually exclusive; shifts in 
ideology and culture may be significant enough so as to influence development of 
legal precedent. As attitudes towards women in the United Kingdom changed, so the 
law changed to reflect this in areas such as marital rape and the voting rights. 
Similarly, as U.K attitudes towards the incapable adults changed, development in the 
law continued to the point where there is now specific legislation governing capacity 
issues. Of course it is perhaps too simplistic to say that culture and legal 
developments will always have a symbiotic relationship; Indian law for example does 
not allow for discrimination against women, yet discriminatory practices and attitudes 
still continue. In England and Scotland, the existence of mental health and capacity 
legislations will not necessarily equate to a complete recognition of the relevant 
principles which underpin them. The purpose of this thesis is not to provide definitive 
answers to these questions, but rather, to raise and highlight them in greater detail 
than has already been done in existing literature. Speculatively, it is submitted that for 
Indians resident in both India and the United Kingdom, a communitarian approach to 
decision-making is likely to prevail and thus remain an important cultural aspect of 
decision-making within families.  
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